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PREFACE

While I was preparing my thesis I was asked, "What has your*
research to do with political science?"

The question was an acute one,

rooted in the knowledge that my thesis is without charts, graphs,
tables and statistical analyses.

Should the thesis, therefore, he

"relegated" to the category of history— as opposed to political
science?

In responding to the question, I disclose my preference for

the traditional approach to the study of politics.
Despite the many accomplishments and the potential of the
behavioralists, their approach to politics is severely limited and there
are many questions, they freely admit, which they are unable to explore.
It is where the behavioralists end their research that the tradition
alists must begin theirs.

Whereas the behavioralists are limited by

their insistence upon exactitude and regularity, the traditionalists
are limited by their inability to insist upon those desiderata.

Poli

tical science is best served, therefore, by its students who understand
the prejudices of their favored approach and look to their colleagues
of different persuasions for their compleieitary wisdom and advice.
A persistent danger exists in the arguments of those who wish
to define out of the discipline of political science those whose
methods of research may not be in vogue.

Whether he uses mathematics

or philosophy there ought to be room within the discipline of politics
for any student or scholar who seeks to understand political man.

At

one point in the education of every student should come the knowledge
that college catalog division of subjects is a matter of academic con
venience and that the unity of knowledge resists such arbitrary com
partment alization.

In short, then, who is to say whether history is

the rightful property for study of political scientists or politics is
the bailiwick of historians?
This thesis is a reflection of my belief that a political
science devoid of philosophical speculation and historical analysis is
a bankrupt enterprise.

Perhaps the best example of this in inter

national politics is in the writing of Thucydides who said that the
events he described in the Peloponnesian War " . . . have been before
and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same.""*'

Because the

work of philosophers and historians cannot be reduced to formulas or
equations is no reason to dismiss their work as only peripheral to
political science or to fail to honor them by the conferral of the
title of "political scientist."

*

*

*

For his patience, encouragement and constant assistance, I must
thank Professor Alan J. Ward.

Both as teacher and as thesis advisor,

Professor Ward has been willing to help me in every way possible in my
year at William and Mary.

Professor Chonghan Kim and Professor James

M. Roherty critically read the manuscript and provided a number of
helpful suggestions.

I am grateful also for their availability to me

■^■Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Vol. I, the Thomas Hobbes
Translation, ed. by David Grene (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1959)> P* 20l|. (Bk. Ill, 82; see also, IV, 18 inter alia.)

v

and their genuine interest in my thesis throughout the year.
I owe an indirect and inestimable debt of gratitude to Profes
sor Peter V. Sampo, former associate professor of politics at
St. Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire, whose love of learning
first attracted me to the study of politics.

I must also acknowledge

the help and ready encouragement of my wife Rebecca.
Learning is an activity without end.

Students of all disci

plines might well adopt as their motto, as I have, the maxim of the
French historian Fustel de Coulanges, "Qiiaero"— "I seek to learn."

To

those who have helped me learn to this point I am sincerely grateful.

JHT

vi

ABSTRACT

The thesis is an historical analysis of the diplomatic and
military policies of the United Rations and the United States during
the Korean War. The thesis demonstrates that the mis judgments in
United Rations1 policy have their origin not in a conspiracy against
or by the United States, but rather in the failure of UR leaders to
appreciate the symbiosis between military power and diplomatic purpose.
The failure to integrate power and purpose was most dramatically mani
fested in the fluctuating objectives of UR policy and the progressive
deterioration of UR military might.
The thesis inquires into the nature and causes of the frustra
tion and irresolution which characterized the two-year period (195>1 1953) of the Korean War truce talks. The argument is adduced that, to
a significant degree, the impasse at the conferences was a product of
the UR leaders' diplomatic misperceptions of the cultural, political
and military orientations and objectives of their bargaining adver
saries.
The thesis concerns itself with the notion that the respective
bargaining rivals represented divergent— and at first, irreconcilable—
purposes; that only after prolonged disputes did it become clear to the
UR leaders What the progress of truce talks between belligerents
depends for its direction upon the application of military power which
is coincident with and complementary to simultaneous negotiatory ini
tiatives. The thesis characterizes the policies under examination as a
study in negotiatory naivetel
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WAR:

INTRODUCTION

. . . In a legitimate order, a conference represents a struggle to find
formulas to achieve agreement; in a revolutionary order, it is a strug
gle to capture the symbols which move humanity.— Henry Kissinger

Although the complexities and controversies of the Korean War
pale by comparison with those of the Vietnam War, there is a plethora
of information about the three-year conflict in Korea.

In the twenty

years that have elapsed since the signing of the armistice at Panmunjom,
scholars and soldiers have produced a wealth of commentary concerning
the issues that emerged during the war.

Among the controversies are

MacArthur's relief by Truman, the brainwashing- of UN POWTs, the degree
of success of the UN collective security effort, the alleged use by the
UN of germ warfare against the North Koreans and a host of other debat
able topics.

A representative divergence of opinion about the success

of the UN military effort is that between Senator Joseph McCarthy and
General Matthew Ridgway.
"tremendous defeat"

p

The former regarded the effort in Korea as a

while the latter thought that in Korea "the crest

of the Communist wave was broken" by the UN Army.-^

ICited in David Rees, Korea:
Martin's Press, 1961+), p. 310.

The Limited War (New York:

2Pacts on File, XIII, No. 667 (August 7-13,

19$h),

St.

P- 2 6 7 .

^Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1967)> p. 2i|l.

2
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Almost all the controversies about the Korean War are related
to the core question of whether the United Nations should have pursued

a policy of military victory.

Is it true, as Lord Fisher said, that

’’moderation in war is imbecility”^ or, as General MacArthur put it,
that "in war there is no substitute for victory”

b

To be sure, the

indecisiveness of the war (ridiculed by some with the label "Die for
Tie") was a factor in its increasing unpopularity in the United States;
"by 195>2 there were even allegations that victory was not forthcoming
because the State Department was honey-combed with subversives.

On

balance, however, Thomas Schelling seems right in making the observa
tion that because the Korean War was limited by "dramatic restraints"
such a.s no use of atomic weaponry and no invasion of Chinese Communist
soil, the war can be considered "evidence that the capacity for vio£
lence can be consciously restrained."
This thesis is concerned with the notion that for the United
Sta,tes^

the conscious restraint of violence represented an anomaly from

the traditional American approach to the problems of power (military
force) and politics (diplomacy).

In recent previous wars, military

victories had permitted Americans the comfortable illusion of regarding
power politics as an oxymoron.

In Korea, with the prospect of military

^Cited in Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York:
Harper and Row, 1967 ), p. 332.
^The New York Times, April 20, 195>1» P»
^Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven:
versity Press, 1966 ), p. 31*

Yale Uni

^Except where plain distinction is indicated by the text, the
terms United States and United Nations are used interchangeably through
out the thesis.

k
victory ruled out, Americans were confronted with the need to under
stand power as an aspect of diplomacy.

Forced by the reality of the

Korean War truce talks to integrate power and politics, Americans only
slowly realized the bankruptcy of their former arbitrary compartmentalization of power and politics.

The division of power and politics

that had been a comfortable illusion before the war in Korea, became a
serious liability during it.
The problem explored in this thesis is not whether the Korean
War should have been limited and localized (which is here understood as
axiomatic); rather, the problem examined in the following chapters con
cerns the influence of the limited application of TIN military power
upon the truce talks.

General Mark Clark’s words neatly summarize the

argument of this study:

"I believe . . . that we could have obtained

better truce terms quicker, shortened the war and saved lives, if we
Q
had got tougher faster.’1 The American experience of deprecating power
politics led many American leaders and their TOT counterparts to a
series of judgments about the purpose, the

principles and the timing of

negotiations that can best be described as

naive.

The problems encountered by TOT negotiators during the Korean
truce talks are of enduring interest.

The

point should bemade in that

connection that of the mistakes made by TOT leaders during the Korean
War, a fair share may have their roots in the very soil of democratic
institutions themselves.

Alexis de Tocqueville observed about a cen

tury ago that

Q
Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York:
and Brothers, 195U)> P« 3«

Harper

5

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities
which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the con
trary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which
it is deficient. . . . A democracy is unable to regulate the
details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design,
and to work out its execution in the presence of serious
obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and
it will not await their consequences with p a t i e n c e . ^
While the thesis will make the point that, because of their attitude
toward the experience with power politics, the Communists had the edge
during the Korean truce talks, no implication is intended that western
ers should adopt entirely the ruthless approach of Communist bargain
ers.^

bean Acheson has rightly observed that "The means we choose to

overcome the obstacles in our path must be consonant with our deepest
moral s e n s e . S i m i l a r l y , George Kennan has written that "The great
est danger that can befall us in coping with . . . Communism is that we
shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping."

1p

The point of the thesis is that it is imperative for western
diplomats to understand the approach to diplomatic and military (diplomilitary) affairs of their bargaining rivals,

buring the Korean truce

talks TJN strategists were continually offering the Communists 13 the
9Alexis de Tocqueville, bemocracv in America, trans. by Henry
Reeve (New York: Arlard and Saunders, 1838 ), pp. 215-216.
■^Walter Hermes has written that "Since the Communist dialectic
permitted the ends to justify the means, the enemy had no hesitation in
employing any method calculated to achieve success in the negotiations."
US Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and. Fighting Front (Washington,
b.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966 ), pp. 50$-%Q6 .
•^Cited in Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean
War,1950-1953 (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962 ), p. 399*
•^cited in Halle, The Cold War as History, p. 266.
13The term Communist,unless otherwise specified in the text,
is used throughout the thesis as a collective reference to the North
Koreans, the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. This collective
reference, of course, is more appropriate in that connection then
(1950 -1953 ) than a similar use would be now.

/
o
carrot of good will and faithful negotiations instead of admonishing
them with the stick of applied military power.

If the UN leaders had

understood that the Communists were coming to truce talks to achieve
purposes vastly different from those of the UN, it is probable that the
UN. could have adopted a different, far more effective negotiatory tech
nique.

Hans Morgenthau, for instance, has written that among the tasks

of diplomacy is the need to determine its objectives "in the light of
the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these
objectives.

The thesis attempts to marshal evidence that the United

Nations based its policy options more on hopes than facts, more on
promises than realities.

In its great concern to have peace, the UN

undermined its own military and diplomatic cause and contributed to the
support of its foes.
The Korean truce talks, as William Vatcher has observed, repre
sented a "battleground between two ideologies— one dedicated to world
revolution, the other to evolution; one seeking to impose its ideals by
lb
force or subversion, the other attempting to protect its ideals." ^
This conflict of ideology is a theme that runs through the history of
the Korean War.

The democratic leader, as opposed to the autocrat, has

a constant need to explain and defend his programs and policies, to
justify them to his national constituency.

By so doing, however, he

runs the risk of providing his enemy with an intelligence that might

■^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace, 5>th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972)> p^
f>1 9 . All references to this book in the thesis are to this edition.
■^William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmun.jom: The Story of the Korean
Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
195>8)> P« vii.
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otherwise "be -unavailable.

Nowhere is this great paradox of democracy

so clear as in the Korean trace talks.

A good portion of the first

chapter is an examination of the public relations problems encountered
by the Truman Administration from the time the decision was made to
enter the war until the truce talks started a year later.

/

Fred Ikle

addressed himself to this problem in his book How Nations Negotiate:
In situations where fighting will continue or threatens
to resume unless agreement is reached, public opinion and
other domestic forces may exert considerable pressures on
negotiators to agree. Often, there are important asymmetries
in the susceptibility to such pressures. American negotia
tors at Panmunjom and their superiors in Washington felt very
strongly the yearning back home for an end to the fighting,
but their Chinese and North Korean opponents— while sensitive
to the military weakness of their side— remained relatively
immune to popular sentiment in their countries.1^
The prescience of Morgenthau's "rule" of diplomacy that the government
must be the leader of public opinion, not its slave, 17' is made apparent
by a study of the Korean War's diplo-military events.
Although a chronology is provided in the thesis (see Appendix
A), mention should be made here of the major diplo-military occurrences
of the war.

It is possible to divide the war into seven time frames in

order to demonstrate the chief events of the war:

18

(1)

The North Korean Invasion (June-September, 19f?0).

(2 )

UNC Recovery and Invasion of North Korea (SeptemberNovember, 1950).

(3 )

Chinese Communist Entry and NKPA Recovery (November, 1950January, 1951)•

l^Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and
Row, I96 I+), p. 2 9 . His Chapter 12, "Negotiating Skill: East and
West," (pp. 225-255) highlights a number of differences in approach.
-^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 5^7*
^®A glossary (abbreviations) and maps follow the concluding
chapter of the thesis.

8
(U)

UNC counter-offensive and First Hints of "Peace" (JanuaryJune, 195l)*

(5)

The Beginning of Talks at Kaesong and their Suspension
(July-August, 1951).

(6)

TJNC Autumn Offensive (August-October, 193>l).

(7 )

Start of Talks at Panmunjom and Subsequent Events (October,
1951-July 27, 1953).

An historical analysis, the thesis is divided into four chap
ters.

The first chapter deals with the diplo-military events from the

decision to intervene in the war to the decision to negotiate an end to
the war, a year later.

Of particular importance in the first chapter

is the relationship between military circumstance and political policy.
The second chapter describes the first meetings of the UHC delegates
with their CCF and EKPA counterparts at Kaesong.

This chapter is

largely concerned with the relationship between the battlefield situa
tion and its influence, or lack of it, on the negotiatory process.

The

third chapter is concerned with the conference at Panmunjom and with
events leading to the end of the war.

Of chief importance in the third

chapter are the "little armistice" and Eisenhower's accession to the
Presidency.

The fourth chapter is the conclusion.

To claim for the thesis that it is anything more than a case
study of how UN leaders understood the relationship between power and
politics during the Korean War would be too pretentious.

The thesis,

therefore, is not represented as a handbook for negotiators or as a
manual for soldiers.

However, although the literature dealing with the

Korean War is plentiful, there are relatively few sources concerned
with diplo-military events and inter-relationships.

A thesis concerned

exclusively with that subject may be able to make a contribution to the
understanding of this critical aspect of the Korean Conflict.

9
Of the secondary sources used in this thesis, three were espe
cially valuable:

Fehrenbach's This Kind of War, Hermes' Truce Tent and

Fighting1 Front, and Rees' Korea:

The Limited War.

Primary sources for

this thesis have included works by Douglas MacArthur, the first UHC
Commander-in-Chief; Matthew Ridgway, the second Commander-in-Chief;
Mark Clark, the third UHC Commander-in-Chief; Dean Acheson, Secretary
of State; J. Lawton Collins, US Army Chief of Staff; C. Turner Joy,
Senior Delegate of the UEC to the truce talks at Kaesong and Panmunjom;
William Vatcher, a US Army lieutenant who served on the Panmunjom truce
team for eight months; and Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.

A number

of other sources, primary and secondary, were used, including govern
ment publications and periodical literature.
The principal source for the thesis is Admiral Joy's How Com
munists Negotiate.

Fred Ikle/fs comments about Joy's book highlight the

basic premise of this thesis.
The American military officer, when he finds himself in
negotiations with the opponent, may still fail to see that
military power must serve the over-all aims of foreign policy
and that the distinction between military and political objec
tives is only a question of emphasis between means and ends,
not a choice between two divergent goals. An illustration is
provided by Admiral Joy. . . . After one hundred and fifty
pages of penetrating insight and useful advice, Joy's book
lapses into the following error: "A military armistice agree
ment should be no more than an agreement between opposing com
manders to stop the fighting. It should never be concerned
with political questions.
The point that Ikle*" makes is that what is political and what is mili
tary is not always perfectly clear; efforts to segregate the two ele
ments are capricious and counter-productive.

•*-9ik;le#, How Nations Negotiate, p. 1^7•

This thesis contends that

10
negotiators in wartime

20

require a particularly keen sense of balance

"between negotiatory initiative and military power.

The most naive and

telling mistake made by the leaders of the United Nations was their
failure to appreciate the symbiotic relationship between military power
and diplomatic purpose.

Their inability to perceive that wartime

diplomacy depends for its direction and denouement upon applied mili
tary power resulted in a derangement of their objectives and a vitia
tion of their strength.

20

The point here is that wartime diplomacy, which is concerned
with ending wars, is different from peacetime diplomacy, which is con
cerned with preventing them. One must therefore regard definitions of
negotiations, unless clearly stipulated, as pertaining to peacetime
negotiations. Examples of this type may be seen in Arthur Lall, Modern
International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York: Colum
bia University Press, 1966), p^ 9 ; and Ikle1*, How Nations Negotiate, pp.
3-k.

CHAPTER

THE

UN

GOES

FARRAGOES

TO
OF

I

VAR:
LIMITED

THE

POLICY

CONFLICT

The crusading mind knows nothing of persuasion and compromise.
It knows only of victory and defeat.^
— Hans J. Morgenthau

Historical Background
At the Cairo Conference in December, 191+3 > ^he United States,
Great Britain and China pledged their determination that "in due course"
Korea would become free and independent.
the Potsdam Declaration in July, 1945?

That pledge was reaffirmed by
subscribed to by the Soviet

Union when it declared war against Japan in August, 19U5>-

When the

Japanese surrendered, the nearest American troops to Korea were in
Okinawa, 600 miles away and in the Philippines, about 1^00 miles away.
The Soviets and Americans therefore decided that Soviet troops, which
were already in Korea, would disarm the Japanese above the 38"th paral
lel, and the Americans, below it.
Although this division of Korea at the 38 th parallel had been
intended by the Americans as a temporary expedient, it soon became evi
dent that the Soviets regarded it as a permanent division.
US efforts to unite Korea were unsuccessful.

In May, 191+8> the United

■^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 5>30"5>31«
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Subsequent

12
Nations supervised an election in South Korea and on August l5> 19U8,
the Republic of Korea (ROK) was officially established.

Not to be out

done, the Soviets proclaimed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
on September 9» 19^8, and announced in December that its withdrawal of
troops from North Korea had been completed.
Despite evidence that the Soviets had been building a powerful
North Korean Army, the United States completed its withdrawal of occu
pation forces in June, 19^-9> leaving only a small military advisory
team in the ROK.

The Soviets did not permit UN observation of their

troop withdrawal; however, the American withdrawal was verified by a UN
O
commission which filed its favorable report in July, 19^-9After the
war had begun, US Representative Walter Judd was to write that among
the mistakes that led to Korea was
. . . the decision by military men in Washington to divide
Korea along the 38 th parallel. . . . /Another error/ was that
for the first three years after V-J Day we refused to train
armed forces to defend South Korea, although we knew the Rus
sians were feverishly developing large forces in North Korea
and had large and experienced units made up of Koreans in
both Siberia and Manchuria.3
Although the United States had contributed economic, technical
and some military assistance to the fledgling government of South
Korea, there were serious questions being raised in the US about the
strategic importance of the ROK to the American defense posture.

That

the ROK was not considered especially important to American security
interests is attested to, in part, by both the words of high military
^U.S., Department of State, United States Policy in the Korean
Crisis, Par Eastern Series
Pubn. No. 3922 (1930), pp. IX-Xll see
also John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196%), pp. 8 I4-8 6 .
3walter H. Judd, "The Mistakes That Led to Korea," Reader's
Digest, November, 1950, pp. 5U-55-
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and political figures and the disposition of forces.

In the spring of

1949? for instance, General MacArthur had outlined an American "line of
defense" in the Far East that omitted the Korean peninsula.^"

In Janu

ary, 1950? the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, made a speech in
which he too outlined a defense perimeter which ran, he said, " . . .
along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus . . .
Philippine Islands."

to the

Representative Judd said of Achesonrs speech

that "The occupants of the Kremlin looked at the map and found that
Korea . . . was "beyond our line and therefore would not "be defended by
us.

So they moved in.

Why should anyone be surprised?"

One major consideration of the post-World War II world was the
declining strength of the American armed forces.

By 1950 there simply

^Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American
Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957)? P- 164*
^Cited in Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Inter
est (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951)? P* 2 6 3 . As historian Samuel
Eliot Morison has pointed out in his The Oxford History of the American
People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965): "This speech was
held up against Acheson . . . as an ’invitation' to the communists to
overrun South Korea. He was able to prove that his perimeter was
exactly the same as the one previously defined by General MacArthur.
Moreover, he repeatedly asked Congress to provide military aid for
South Korea, even after the House on 19 January defeated the aid bill
which the state department had requested." (p. IO6 7 ). Discussing the
failure of the Congress to furnish continued support to Korea, Acheson
said, "The idea that we should scrap all of that /help to Korea/, that
we should stop half way through the achievement of the establishment of
this country seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter mad
ness in our interests in Asia." Cited in Morgenthau, In Defense of the
National Interest, p. 266. For further debate on the matter of defined
American defense interests, see J. C. Vincent's letter in The New York
Times, January 30, 1957 (p* 28), and General MacArthur's rejoinder in
ibid., February 4? 1957 (p* 18).
^Judd, "The Mistakes That Led to Korea," p. 55* In this
regard, Robert T. Oliver wrote: "To the Kremlin it must have appeared
that the Republic of Korea was not only hopelessly weak militarily, but
also had been abandoned diplomatically." "Why War Came in Korea," Cur
rent History, September, 1950? P* 140.

lb
were not enough troops to fulfill widespread American commitments.

In

this shortage of troops, one writer, Robert Osgood, finds another rea
son that the Communists felt they could invade South Korea with impun
ity.
. . . It did not even take the withdrawal of American troops
or the statements of MacArthur or Acheson to assure the Com
munists that they might safely attack South Korea. The severe
shortage of American ground troops, combined with America's
repeated stress upon preparing to meet the Russians in a total
war in Europe, ought to have been enough to convince them that
the United States would not divert precious troops from major
strategic areas for the defense of Korea. . . . America's
military establishment in the years before the Korean War was
so inadequate that . . . the Chiefs of Staff were concerned
about obtaining enough men to guard the air strips at Fair
banks, Alaska.7
John Spanier reached a similar conclusion in saying that Korea was mili
tarily dispensable within the framework of American security because in
a global war, its fate would be decided in other theaters of war.

In

fact, Spanier points out, one of the reasons that US troops were with
drawn from Korea was that in a major confrontation with the Russians,
US troops in Korea would be vulnerable to Soviet ground forces and might
g
be trapped on the Korean peninsula.
These misjudgments in American policy provided the Communists
with ample evidence that, as Osgood put it,

7osgood, Limited War, p. 161+. Particularly revealing in this
connection is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War; Korea-A Study in
Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, Inc. , T§oU)} pp. 5>-108, passim.
See also David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1961).), especially pp. x-xvi.
o
°Spanier, American Foreign Policy, p. 8 7 . The high state of
readiness of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) was consistently
underestimated by American political and military leaders. Said General
Matthew B. Ridgway in The Korean War, p. 114: "What is truly inexcus
able, I believe, . . . was a failure to assess properly the high level
of combat effectiveness that the North Korean Peoples Army had attained."
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. . . the American government would not consider it worthwhile
to defend South Korea; and if they interpreted America's con
duct of foreign policy in terms of their own standards, they
could hardly have reached any other conclusion than that the
United States would acquiesce in a limited move of a satellite
army into a minor strategic p o s i t i o n . 9
American strategic thinking, in the five-year period between the end of
World War II and the start of the Korean War, can be summarized this
way:

if war comes, it will be total; if war comes, it will occur in a

major theater (viz., Europe); even if war occurs in Korea, it will not
involve vital American interests.

The uncertainty and instability of

this strategic thinking is vividly illustrated by the events of June,
19509 when:

war came and it was limited; the war occurred in Korea;

and the war was seen as involving vital American interests.

The case

can be made that in making his decision to intervene in Korea, Presi
dent Truman was significantly influenced by a desire to salvage what he
could from policies that the NKPA invasion had shattered.
One should recall when examining the Korean War intervention
decision that it came close on the heels of the fall of China to the
Communists.

Truman's entire Far East policy was under political attack.

To many people in the United States of 1950 > "the invasion of South
Korea was as much a product of Administration blundering as it was of
North Korean aggression.

Truman, of course, is said to have kept on

his desk the famous sign "The Buck Stops Here."

With respect to Korea,

the buck surely did stop with Truman, but not until a number of bureau
crats had passed it along at top speed in hopes of averting liability
for the Korean War "fault."

In fact, according to US News and World

Report, Korea, in effect, was

^Osgood, Limited War, p. 165.
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. . . a second "Pearl Harbor," less than nine years after the
first. . . . no real military defense was ready. . . . Rear
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, chief of the Central Intel
ligence Agency, now testifies before Congress that he warned
the Defense Department on June 9— about two weeks before the
attack— -that the North Korean Army had ordered civilians
evacuated . . . a sure sign of approaching military activity.
He also had reported that a sizable military force was ready
in North Korea and that Russia had agreed to supply North
Koreans with a stated number of tanks, planes and other mili
tary equipment.10
Then was the "fault" with the Defense Department?
News:

No, according to US

"Defense officials imply that CIA has been crying ’WolfI' so

often and about so many places that Korea was not considered any more
crucial than a number of other spots.
Was the Far East Command, which clearly was unprepared, at fault
for the failure to detect and react to the invasion?

MacArthur said no:

"The Far East Command, until the President’s great pronouncement to
support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no slightest
responsibility /sic~7 for the defense of . . . Korea.

With the Presi-

dent’s decision, it assumed a completely new and added mission."

12

Congress, in not responding to Acheson’s requests for aid to
Korea, may be assessed a portion of the blame; its case is not helped
by the record of an interview with Senator Tom Connally, then chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who, when asked if Korea
were still an essential part of the US defense strategy, had replied
(on May 5, 1950), "No.

Of course, any position like that is of some

10"Korean Fumble: Whose Fault?" US News and World Report,
August 1+, 1950, P» 18. See also: "Capital in Dispute on Korean
Attack," The New York Times, June 26, 1950, p. 3? s-nh "War No Surprise,
Intelligence Says," in ibid., June 27, 1950, p. 3^-''Korean Fumble:

l^ibid.t p# 18.

Whose Fault?" p. 18.
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strategic importance.

But I don’t think it is very greatly impor

tant.”^
The confusion caused by the North Korean invasion was a con
tinuation of muddled, cloudy thinking about whether Korea was, in fact,
important to American defense posture and, if so, how important it was.
The ill-conceived strategies and public statements concerning Korea
were reflections of a hesitant and poorly-defined policy.

Later,

during the MacArthur hearings, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was
asked, "Was there a U.S. war plan made up for use in case of attack in
Korea?"

Secretary Johnson replied simply, "No, sir."^
On the strength solely of public statements by American leaders

and available information about the disposition and readiness of US
armed forces, North Korean authorities appear justified in concluding
that an invasion of the ROK would not stimulate a high-powered American
response.

At worst, the North Koreans might have anticipated US invec

tive against them in diplomatic circles.
The Framework of the Intervention Decision
Few incidents in history lend themselves to unicausal analysis.
That is, with few exceptions, most historical events require analysis
based upon several probable causes.

The decision of US leaders to

intervene in Korea is not one of the few exceptions.

To be sure, one

of the factors which influenced Truman in his decision to intervene was
his desire to redeem his Far East policy which, after the fall of China

13ibid.
Johnson Tells About 'K Day,'" US News and World Report,
June 22, 19^1, p. 21.
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and the invasion of the ROK, was liable to being' charged as "soft on
communism."

However, Truman’s desire to redeem his policies is only

one of a number of compelling reasons that the Administration reacted
to the Korean crisis with its surprising speed and firmness.^
While few would dispute that the American decision to go to
the aid of the South Koreans was a highly political decision, calcu
lated according to international diplomatic and military exigencies,
one would be remiss in attributing only a political character to the
Korean intervention decision which was rendered in a moral framework.
It is inappropriate to speculate here on the chemistry or formula (so
much politics added to so much morality) to which US foreign policy
must be made to conform; it is equally out of order to survey the
foreign policies of other nations to arrive at a base for comparison
of the degrees to which their foreign policies are moral or political.
And there is the recurring problem of definition:
what is political?

what is moral and

Are they mutually exclusive or do they strike a

balance at some imperceptible point in the formulation of foreign
policy?
It seems fair to say that the history of US foreign policy
reveals a preoccupation with what is considered to be objectively
right, ethical or moral.

Thus it was in keeping with tradition that

Truman could say of his intervention decision that:

"It should be made

15a version which differs markedly from the one documented in
this thesis concerning the US entry into the war, its prosecution, and
the peace talks, can be read in I. F. Stone, Tne Hidden History of the
Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952); Stone's book is
highly polemical and is dismissed by John Spanier as "untenable." See
Spanier's criticism of the book in his The Truman-MacArthur Contro
versy and the Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965)»
p . 305.
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perfectly clear that the action was -undertaken as a matter of "basic
moral principle."

l6

If US policy is formulated— or, at worst, ration

alized— in terms of what is thought to be objectively right, Communist
foreign policy formulates or rationalizes what is right in terms of
self-interest.

While we must be willing to make allowances for the

individual actions of some Communist nations, Communist ideologues have
made no secret of their formula for foreign policy:

what advances

their cause is just and what impedes their cause is unjust.

The right

eousness of Communist ends permits, even encourages, means that the
less ideologically committed would view as unscrupulous. 17'
In international politics nations preserve or extend their
advantages by employing power.

Power can be defined in any of a number

of ways but what underlies nearly all definitions of power is the
notion that power is a tool used to promote certain purposes decided
upon by the leadership of the nation in question.

The conception of

power as a political tool is one that plainly is more in harmony with
the Communist understanding of adversary world politics than it is with
the American.

John Spanier has expressed the problem this way:

American depreciation of power and reluctance to recognize it
as a factor in human affairs makes it psychologically neces
sary to rationalize actions in the international arena in
terms of ideological objectives and universal moral principles.
American power must be "righteous" power used not for purposes
of power politics and selfish national advantage but for the
peace and welfare of all mankind. Inherent in this public

XDHarry S. Truman, "Tire Korean Situation: Its Significance to
the People of the United States," The Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. 23, No. £78 (July 31, 1950), p. 163.
■^See, for instance, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on UnAmerican Activities, Facts on Communism: The Communist Ideology, by
Gerhart Niemeyer, House Document No. 33^, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., i9 6 0 ,
especially pp. 133 -1 3 5 •
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image of the United States as a noble and unselfish crusader on
behalf of moral principles was an extreme danger, however—
namely, that if the enemy were not properly punished through
total defeat, the reaction to the war would be one of frustra
tion and disillusionment.-*-^
Of critical importance, then, to an understanding of war aims
and objectives is the framework in which they are set.

Waging a war

with limited means for a limited objective, and possibly for an unlim
ited time, was a new and upsetting experience for Americans.

If US

policy is labeled moral, then that of the enemy must be understood as
immoral. How does a nation deal with the immorality of another nation?
Set in a moral frame-work, the only logically consistent suggestion is
that the immoral nation must be punished.

In short, as Henry Kissinger

points out, US moral foundations require a total solution, resulting in
the proper punishment to the immoral adversary:

". . . we necessarily

had to ascribe the cause of war to the machinations of wicked men.

Our

military actions were thereby transformed into crusades to punish the

9
aggressor."f.1^
Extending the argument, one cannot adequately punish the
immoral nation by accomplishing a very circumscribed, limited objective.
What is called for is victory:

victory in the manner of the Spanish-

American War of 1898 and of World War I and World War II.

Anything

less than total victory would accord a measure of triumph to the enemy,
that is to immorality.

As expressed by Robert Strausz-Hupe:

■*-®Spanier, American Foreign Policy, pp. 89-90.
-^Henry a . Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of
American Foreign Policy, Anchor Books (Garden City, H.Y.: Doubleday
and Co., Inc., 1962 ), p. 182.
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It is indeed a paradox of our time that democracies, once fully
mobilized for military conflict, are apt to outdo the dictator
ships in waging total military war— the war for unconditional
surrender. This paradox derives from the democracies' instabil
ity of mood— the oscillation between the aversion against all
things military and a war psychosis that can be appeased only
by total victory and the severe punishment of the enemy.^0
What all of this points out, of course, is that the moral frame
work in which the war was set demanded a total, that is a military,
solution.

How can one bargain or negotiate with evil?

reach an accord or agreement with him who is immoral?

How can one
The moral dilem

ma of the Korean War, one which originated in part with the need to
brand the adversary’s actions as "immoral," seriously impeded and
jeopardized the negotiations which later took place.
In assessing the framework in which the intervention decision
was set, we also need to understand the political interpretations of
the North Korean attack that were employed by UN leaders in their
policy formulations.

Alexander George presents five interpretations

that help explain why Korea rather suddenly became, as Spanier put it,
". . . identified with the survival of the United States itself."
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The interpretations of the attack were:
(1)

the "Diversionary Move" Interpretation— the attack on
Korea was a mere diversion; a major attack in a vital area
might occur anytime.

(2 )

the "Soft-Spot Probing" Interpretation— the attack was a
probe to see whether the US would permit the erosion of
its soft spots.

(3 )

the "Testing" Interpretation— if Korea were allowed to
fall, then the Soviets could test US resolve elsewhere.

pr\
/
Robert Strausz-Hupe, et al., Protracted Conflict: A Chal
lenging Study of Communist Strategy, Harper Colophon Hooks (New York:
Harper and Row, 1 963 ), p. 3 7 .
2^-Spanier, American Foreign Policy, p. 8 7 *
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(U)

the "Demonstration" Interpretation— Korea was a Communist
show of force, a propaganda effort.

(5) the "Soviet Far East Strategy" Interpretation— Korea was
proof of Soviet intentions in the Far East.^2
Regardless of the interpretation considered to he most important in the
decision to defend Korea, it is of central importance that, according
to the announced policy of the United States, Korea should have heen
permitted to fall.

However, according to George, there is no material

available to indicate whether consideration was even given to the pos
sibility of permitting the fall of Korea while concentrating on preventing further Communist aggression in other areas. 21
The Army Chief of Staff at the time, General J. Lawton Collins,
has suggested two chief reasons that, when confronted by the NKPA
attack, the Truman Administration felt compelled to change its policy
and take action to defend Korea:
First of all, I believe our political and military leaders
were surprised and deeply shocked by the bald actuality of the
North Korean attack. . . .
We received a second shock when it became quickly evident
that the ROK Army's capacity to stop the attack had been
grossly exaggerated.
Collins’ suggestion about the "bald actuality" of the NKPA attack high
lights what appears to be the single most important reason that Truman
and his advisers adopted a course of vigorous military action in Korea.
The most visible line of thought concerning the larger political
op

Alexander L. George, "American Policy-Making and the North
Korean Aggression," World Politics, Vol. VII, No. 2 (January, 1955)j
pp. 211-215.
23jbid.,

pp.

225-226.

?J
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons
of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. i+1*
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implications of the attack on the ROK was that if this aggression went
■unchecked, it would destroy the foundations of international security
and help engender the third world war.

Alexander George supports

this argument.
Our evidence suggests that in the crisis engendered hy the North
Korean attack, certain leading American policy-makers (President
Truman and perhaps Secretary Acheson as well) took their bear
ings to some extent from the testing interpretation, which made
use of the historical parallel with Hitler.^6
The extreme of that interpretation, found in the writing of
Walter Judd, contributes to our understanding of the climate of opinion
of the day:
If we failed to take a stand against this . . . Communist aggres
sion, then not only Korea but the United Nations would have gone
just as the League of Nations did. . . . Who in Asia— or in
Europe, for that matter— could again put any confidence in us
or in the United Nations? Formosa would go. The Philippines
would go. Indo-China and the rest of southeast Asia would go.
Then Europe would go because it cannot become self-supporting
without Asia. We either had to resist this aggression in Korea
or withdraw to the North American continent.2 1
This interpretation of events, which might fairly be described
as the father of the domino theory, is a lead-in to the strong under
current of moral influence which, as has been pointed out, was a factor
of major significance in the Korean intervention decision.

The moral

factor, the idea that, as Osgood has written, it was the role of America
to be ". . . leading the civilized world in preventing a chain of

2^Osgood, Limited War, p. 169.
26

George, ’’American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggres
sion, ” p. 220.
27Judd, ’’The Mistakes That Led to Korea,’’ p. $6. Although it
is more notable for its polemics than its scholarship, one book which
helps re-create some of the fear of imminent Communist success both in
Asia and in Europe is John T. Flynn, While You Slept (New York: The
Devin-Adair Company, 1931*
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aggression that violated the universal principles of law and order
28
championed by America”
is manifestly important to both the decision
to intervene in the war and subsequent efforts to negotiate the war
to a conclusion.

The Intervention Decision
On Saturday, June 21*, 1950 > President Truman had left Washing
ton to fly to Independence, Missouri, for a restful weekend.

His rest

was interrupted by Secretary of State Acheson whose phone call informed
Truman that Korea was under attack.

Having learned the next day that

the situation in Korea was deteriorating, Truman decided to return to
Washington immediately.

His thoughts during the return flight are

recorded in his Memoirs.
I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation,
this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked
the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria,
Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time the democracies
failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going
ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini
and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years
earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to
fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations
closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted
to force their way into the Hepublic of Korea without opposi
tion from the free world, no small nation would have the
courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist
neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would
mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought
on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the
foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at
stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped. '
On the afternoon of the 25th, Trygve Lie of the United Nations
placed before the Security Council a report from its own commission in
28

Osgood, Limited War, p. 166.

^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Yol. II: Years of Trial and Hope
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956)7' PP. 332-333.
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Korea which indicated that the North Koreans had launched an all-out
attack on South K o r e a . L i e indicated that the UN had a clear duty to
take steps to restore peace.

In a meeting1 of the Security Council, the

United States proposed a resolution which declared that North Korea had
committed a breach of the peace, called for the immediate cessation of
hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38 ^

paral

lel, and requested all UN members to assist in the execution of the
resolution and to refrain from assisting the North Koreans.

There was,

however, no mention in this resolution of armed help for South Korea.
on
It was passed by the Security Council, 9-0-1 (Yugoslavia abstained.)^
The President had requested that his key advisers meet with him
at the Blair House that Sunday evening.

32

Because Truman and his

advisers were unaware of how serious the situation in Korea really was,
little of major importance was transacted in this first meeting.
Throughout the period of the decision crisis there was an "information

3^Lie, a Norwegian, was the first Secretary-General of the UN.
It is interesting to note, in connection with the UN commission’s
findings, this report from Tass. "Tass reported today that South
Korean troops made an unexpected attack on North Korea early this
morning /jxme 2j£7", but were driven back by North Korean police and
armed forces." In The New York Times, June 26, 1950» P» 3»
^Significantly, the Soviet Representative to the UN, Jacob
Malik, had boycotted the UN since January, 1950, as a protest against
its refusal to admit into membership the Chinese Communists. An
interpretation of Malik's continued absence is discussed later.
3^At the time, the White House was being remodeled. For a
detailed, yet highly readable, study of the intervention decision, see
Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: June 2li-30, 1950 (New York: Free
Press, 1 968 ). Dean Acheson’s Present at the Creation: My Years in the
State Department (New York: Signet, 1970) is indispensable. In this
thesis, all references to this book are taken from the Signet edition.
Of particular value also is an article by Beverly Smith, "Why We Went
to War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, November 10, 1951» PP» 22-23,
et seq. Less valuable but still helpful is Albert L. Warner, "How the
Korea Decision Was Made," Harper’s Magazine, June, 1951, PP« 99-106.
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lag" which hindered the decision-making.

An example of this problem of

information lag is found in The New York Times of June 25 where one
could read that " . . .

United States military advisers said the inva

sion was virtually stopped by this afternoon." (p. 2l).

Although the

invasion did slow down some, its progress went virtually unchecked for
several weeks.

Faulty reports from the Korean front created a grossly

inaccurate picture, entirely too optimistic.

This kind of optimism, as

we will see, troubled the United States throughout the Korean War.
At a second Blair House meeting on Monday (June 26), Secretary
Acheson advanced a critical suggestion:

the use of the US Navy and

Air Force to help the embattled South Koreans.

Acheson also favored

the idea of bringing before the Security Council a resolution calling
upon UN members to provide military assistance to the ROK.33

Contra

dicting the misleading optimistic reports, General MacArthur managed
to get word to Truman that the utter collapse of the South Korean
forces was imminent.

J

This datum and the strong advice of his staff

prompted the President's June 26 decision which authorized MacArthur to
employ " . . . his navy and air force to attack all North Korean mili
tary targets south of the 38th parallel, with the object of clearing
South Korea of Communist military forces."

35

Truman's conferees were unanimous on the decision to employ air
andnaval forces
of the

to help the South Koreans.

There was no appreciation

fact that the ROK Army had been virtually shattered and although
33Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 531*
3^-Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 36.

3^Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), p. 108.
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the use of US ground forces had "been discussed, the hope was that air
and naval units would he sufficient to ohviate the need for infantry
men.

There was also some discussion of what the Russians might do; the

prevailing belief was that the Russians would not employ their own
forces in Korea.

There was very little consideration of what the

Chinese Communists might do.

16

To he sure, the decision to commit US air and naval forces was
a major one.

It is necessary to underscore the fact that the decision

was made hy the President and his advisers from the Departments of
State and Defense.

There were no Congressional leaders at either of

the Blair House meetings.

In effect, Truman, in deciding to commit US

17
forces to battle, was confronting Congress with a fait accompli;-"
moreover, because the UN had not yet approved the commitment of "allied"
military power, it too was confronted with the problem of judging and
approving actions that had already been initiated.
The President decided to inform Congressional leaders of his
decision to commit air and naval forces to Korean combat before the
news was officially released to the public.

On the morning of Tuesday,

June 27» fourteen Congressional leaders were summoned to the White
House to hear his decision.

"No one," Beverly Smith observed, "ques

tioned the propriety of the decisions; the general attitude was one of
O
warm and friendly support."-^
When news of the President's decision to
3^Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was Made," p. 10317
-"That
this is not at all uncommon in US history is amply
demonstrated in "Use of Land and Naval Forces of the United States for
Protection Purposes," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, No.
£78 (July 31, 1950), PP« 177-178. A list of 85 such uses is cataloged
there.
3^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 82.
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commit air and naval forces to the help of the ROK was heard in the
House of Representatives, the members rose to their feet and cheered. 39
That afternoon, the United Nations was confronted with Truman’s
decision.

The resolution which the Security Council was to consider

was that members of the United Nations ’’furnish such assistance to the
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore the international peace and security in the area.”
tion was passed 7-1-2.

The resolu

As David Rees observed, "For the first time in

history an international body had voted force to meet force.
The Soviets again boycotted this meeting.

Beverly Smith sug

gests the possibility that the continued boycott was permitted by the
Soviets in order to allow the US to intervene in Korea.

After all, the

Soviets knew the power of the NKPA, which had been trained by Soviet
officers; the United States did not have any clear idea, as releases
from the Korean front point out, of the high state of readiness of the
NKPA.

The theory argues that for the US to have its forces tied down,

or better yet to suffer a defeat

was an

appealing idea to Soviet plan

ners.^

way to

be certainthat this policy or

There is, of course, no

a similar one was not followed by the Soviets; however, available

New York Times, June 28, 1950, p. 1. See also "Act of
Aggression in Korea," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, No.
575 (July 10, 1950), pp. 1|3-U6; and. Warner, "How the Korea Decision
Was Made," p. IOI4.
^Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 2l(.. Britain, France,
Nationalist China, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway voted for the US resolu
tion; Yugoslavia voted against it and India and Egypt abstained.
^-Smith, "Why We Went to
War in Korea," p. 8 6 . Harry F. Kern’s
theory is nearly identical. See
his "An Opinion: Maybe Moscow Wasn’t
Surprised," Newsweek. July 2]+, 1950, p. llj. — ("Had the Russians plan
ned it all this way in order to entice the U.S. Army into Korea?")
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evidence suggests that this theory, while tantalizing, is rather too
conspiratorial to be true.^
The advantage of hindsight now prompts the observer to the con
clusion that Truman would have fared better had he secured formal Con
gressional and United Nations’ approval before he committed US forces
to battle in Korea.

Although his quick actions were warranted and jus

tified, Truman was later accused of stampeding the Congress and the
United Nations.

)

Writing on Wednesday, June 28, Hanson Baldwin made the observa
tion that US ground troops would probably be needed in Korea because of
the inability of the ROKA to stem the tide of the North Koreans.
Despite this type of ominous prediction, June 28 was a quiet day except
for Robert Taft's speech in which, in essence, he said the President
had done the right thing in the wrong way.

However, while criticizing

Truman's snub of the Congress, Taft said he supported the use of US
forces in Korea. ^
A key to the series of decisions made throughout the week
during which the United States became involved in Korea is the character

^ T h e "evidence" refers to subsequent events: it simply seems
unrealistic in view of Soviet military and diplomatic actions through
out the Korean War to argue that they contrived a scheme to embroil the
US in Korea. In any case, the theory is intriguing and deserves men
tion.
^ T h e stampeding charge is one of I. P. Stone’s points against
Truman in his Hidden History of the Korean War. Cf. with Smith, "Why
We Went to War in Korea," p. 7 8 , ff.
*^The New York Times, June 29, 1950, p.
^Robert A. Taft, "The Korean Crisis," Vital Speeches, July 15»
1950, p. 6li|, 6 1 7 . See also Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 53U-
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of President Truman.^*

He was guided throughout, he said, by one

determination:
Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict
had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and
the terrible destruction it would "bring to the civilized
world. ^+7
The great significance of Truman's understandable desire to avert a
major war became increasingly important with the unfolding of Korean
combat events.
At a press conference on June 29, Truman was asked if the US
military intervention in Korea could be described as a police action.
The President responded, "Yes, that is exactly what it amounts to,"

]R

It was at this same press conference that Truman called the North
Koreans bandits^ which is not unlike terming them immoral.

If the

NKPA was merely a horde of bandits and the UN Army a police force, what
were the prospects for negotiating an end to the conflict?

To be sure,

the image of policemen discussing and debating across a conference
table with bandits would not be a popular one.

Policemen are not

regarded as international mediators any more than are soldiers.

While

Truman could not have foreseen the consequences of his labeling of the
i/
The late President had the habit, and on balance it was a
good one, of making a decision to the best of his ability and in light
of all the information available to him and then not fretting about it
for years on end. See Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (New
York: Apple ton-Century, 1 9 66 ), p. 161+.

n

^Truman, Memoirs, p. 3U5*
Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 86; and The New York
Times, June 30, 1950, P- !• Said Smith, "On that Thursday the descrip
tion seemed appropriate. It became absurd when whole armies fought
savagely up and down the peninsula."
^ Facts on File, X, No. 50l+ (June 23-29, 1950), p. 201+.
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North Koreans as bandits, it says something that, as Beverly Smith has
written, he never bothered to disavow or amend that label.^
It had become fairly obvious by late Thursday that the ROK
could be saved only by ground forces.

At a meeting with his advisers

that evening, Truman affirmed his decision to commit US ground troops
to Korea.

One of the things that convinced Truman he could commit

American forces without involving a Russian response was their reply to
a US request that the Soviets use their good offices to bring an end
to the fighting in Korea.

Although the Soviets refused to assist in

this regard, certain phrases in their reply gave Acheson and his staff
an indication that they would not intervene in Korea. 61

Having decided

to use US ground forces, Truman had completed the series of judgments
that led to US involvement in Korea.

He later wrote that his decision

to intervene in Korea
. . . was the toughest decision I had to make as President.
What we faced in Korea was the ominous threat of a third world
war. I prayed that there might be some way other than swift
military action to meet this Communist aggression, for I knew
the awful sacrifices in life and suffering it would take to
resist it. But there was only one choice facing us and the
free world— resistance or capitulation to Communist imperial
ist military aggression. . . . This was the same kind of
challenge Hitler had flaunted in the face of the rest of the
world.52
A Friday morning phone call to the President confirmed the need
for American ground forces in Korea.

Truman authorized one combat

regiment to be sent, approved a naval blockade of North Korea and pro
mised a later decision on additional troops which, of course, he made

^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 86.
^ ibid., p. 88.
^Truman, Memoirs, p. I+6 3 .
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in favor of commitment.

By 11 A.M. on Friday, June 30> Truman had once

again assembled the leaders of Congress to communicate to them his
decision.

Their reaction was predictably favorable.

J

Truman, as we

have seen, was most preoccupied with preventing a major war.

At the

same time, he knew that the path of appeasement was only an invitation
to the aggressor to continue his practice. ^

Truman was thus emplaced

between the Scylla of having to exert military power and the Charybdis
of limiting it; determined to avert both policies of appeasement and
Armageddon, Truman chose the path of limited war.

The Influence of the Intervention Decision
on the War and the negotiations
Truman's desire to check the chain of aggression that he feared
would accompany or result from US inaction in Korea was complemented
by his conformity to the American habit of dressing the wolf of selfinterest, of power politics, in the sheep's clothing of a moral crusade.
It is politically expedient, of course, for almost any national leader
to attach exalted moral purpose to his international dealings; not for
nothing do national leaders appeal to higher, nobler standards than
those of self-interest to sanction their policies.

The problem with

the US involvement in Korea is not that this practice was followed, but
that it was adhered to so strictly that it obstructed the underlying

^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 88. Shortly after
the intervention, Gallup found that of those he interviewed 8l% favored
the intervention, 13% were opposed and 6% had no opinion. Cited in
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (hew
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 821n.
-^Harry S. Truman, "Aims and Objectives in Resisting Aggression
in Korea," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23» No. 584 (Septem
ber 11, 1950), p. 407*
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political purposes for which the war was fought and for which, later,
the negotiations were conducted.

The point is made succinctly by

Robert Osgood:
UN sanction gave American intervention the color of a cru
sade. As leaders of the UN forces, Americans could envision
themselves as missionaries for the principle of collective
security. In this role they would be above power politics.
As upholders of the integrity of the United Nations they would
be fighting for the peace and welfare of all mankind, not for
their purely selfish national advantage. . . . The trouble
with our action in Korea was not that we intervened in the
war— which was necessary from the standpoint of containment—
or that we intervened under the aegis of the United Nations—
which probably facilitated more than it hampered the achieve
ment of American objectives— but, rather, that our eagerness
to represent American intervention as an altruistic act of
pure collective security tended to obscure the underlying
basis of Realpolitilc without which intervention, regardless
of UN sanction, would have been unjustified.^
Whether the US used a moral shield or a policeman’s badge,
whether the Korean War was regarded as a crusade or a police action,
the framework tended to frustrate limited military action and to
thwart the concessions of give-and-take negotiation.

In either case,

crusade or police action (and of course the two are clearly related),
the imagery simply is not consonant with the purpose:

if the enemy is

evil, he must be rooted out and destroyed, not simply pushed back to a
convenient line and allowed to escape.

And if the enemy is a criminal,

the law officers cannot be expected to bargain with their adversaries
about the justice of the law they are appointed to enforce.
Although stamping the UN military mission in Korea with the
imprimatur of righteousness was strikingly incongruous in a limited war
in which final, telling blows were forbidden by the ground rules, this
is the manner in which US-UN policy was identified.

^Osgood, Limited War, pp. I66-I67.

Dean Acheson, for

instance, thought that the attack on Korea
. . . was a challenge to the whole system of collective secur
ity, not only in the Par East, hut everywhere in the world. . . .
This was a test which would decide whether our collective
security system would survive or crumble. . . . The decision
to meet force with force was essential. It was the unanimous
view of the political and military advisers of the President
that this was the right thing to do. This decision had the
full support of the American people because ft accorded with
the principles by which Americans live.
hid it accord with American principles, then, to wage a carefully
orchestrated war, one without conclusive results?

hid it accord with

American principles to bargain with an enemy for two years, again with
out conclusive results?

Before identifying any political or military

endeavor with "American principles," one must be sure about what those
principles are.
While the popularity of the war eroded as it dragged o n , ^
there is little doubt that the decision to intervene was warmly wel98
corned.^

That there were inherent contradictions in the rhetoric and

the policy associated with the intervention decision came to light,
unfortunately, only later.

The ill-chosen rhetoric was not consistent

with the objective either of limiting the conflict or, later, of
^ /pesun. AchesonT”, "World Documents: The Acheson Testimony,"
Current History, August, 195>1, p. 98. Emphasis supplied.
^ S e e John E. Mueller, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars
in Korea and Vietnam," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV
No. 2 (June, 1971), pp. 35'8-373.
^®This is not to say that there was not, even at the outset of
the war, some dissent. George Kennan, for instance, was later to
write: "I never approved of the involvement of the United Nations in
the Korean affair or understood the rationale for it." Cited in Glenn
Paige, 1930: Truman's Decision (New York: Chelsea House Publishers,
1970), p. 69.
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settling it diplomatically.

cjg

J

There are instances as well where the

rhetoric may "be understood as the mid-wife of the policy.

Were all the

problems of the Korean entry decision reduced to a single sentence, it
would be this:

from the outset, there was a failure by the Administra

tion to understand the war effort as a limited application of military
power to achieve a general political objective known to the public.

60

It is relatively easy to enumerate the faults of the US'deci
sion to intervene:

the decision was made by a coterie whose leader,

^ F o r Truman's message to Congress about the war, see Truman,
"The Korean Situation," The Department of State Bulletin, pp. I 63 -I6 9 .
^ A number of problems attend this general sentence. It appears
that two types of "objective" are required. The first is a precise and
certain objective given as a mission to the military command; normally,
this objective will refer to reaching a certain geographic point and
securing the area around and behind it, while inflicting a maximum of
damage upon the armed forces of the enemy. To accomplish its mission,
the military must be sure of what it is its forces are to do. While
military operations must be based upon certitude of objective, quite
the opposite is true about diplomatic objectives, at least insofar as
the public and rival diplomats are permitted to know. The democratic
public, of course, must have knowledge of the objective for which its
military is fighting: however, the objective defined for the public
and for foreign diplomats must be vague and purposely sketchy. The
reasons are clear: if the public is informed of the exact objective
and it is never reached, the conclusion to be drawn is that the war is
a failure; should the objective be exceeded, on the other hand, the
administration in power is liable to charges of aggression by its own
definition. Vague objectives also provide a groundwork for bargaining
whereas stiff objectives sacrifice the flexibility and possibly the
timing of negotiations to the initiative and pleasure of the enemy.
An example of these points would be the following: in Korea the mili
tary might have been ordered to proceed to a set point and secure a
main line of resistance, defined by the government according to the
political and military exigencies of the time; public and international
policy would then have been published as, say, an effort to secure the
territorial integrity of the ROK. Depending upon the progress of
diplomatic and military initiatives, the objective could have been
brought increasingly into focus. What happened in Korea, as we will
see, was markedly different from this prescription: the policy decided
upon fluctuated with the fortunes of battle. American policy was con
fusing to the American public, the American military, and to the enemy.
Of course, these obscure and vacillating policies impeded both mili
tary and diplomatic settlements to the war.
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the President, announced his decision to key Congressional leaders
after the decisions had "been made; his decisions were couched in rheto
ric plainly inconsistent with the purposes and the limited extent of
the war; the objectives of the war, as will become obvious, were con
fused and confusing.

The Korean War, from the intervention decision

through the negotiations, required a diplomatic artfulness, a finesse,
which UN leaders were unable to produce.

We turn now to the military

progress of the war which points up one of the major problems the
Administration had in waging both the war and peace talks:

what was

the goal, the objective, of the war?

Pusan to Inchon
The invasion of South Korea, which began
reached and captured Seoul by the 28th.

on June 25>, had

By July 20, despite some

heroic resistance, the United Nations A r m y ^ had abandoned Taejon.

By

August 1, 19^0, the military situation in Korea was perilous for the
UNC.

Despite the serious military situation, there was a crass opti

mism about UN involvement in Korea.

For instance, just two weeks

before the Pusan Perimeter was established, one could read in US News
the opinion of one correspondent that it might take as long as three
or four months to push the Communists back to the 38 th parallel.

62

One

of the major problems, as General S. L. A. Marshall has said, was that

On July 7, 19^0, the United Nations created the United
Nations Command (UNC), under a commander appointed by the United
States. In this thesis, except where the text indicates a clear dis
tinction between the two, UN and US Army and UN and US policy will be
used interchangeably.
^"Victory in Korea in 3 Months?” (Telephone interview with
correspondent Joseph Fromm) US News and World Report, July llj., 195>0»
P. 15.
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operations in Korea ". . . were begun with an air of excessive expecta
tion "based, upon estimates which were inspired by wishful optimism.
Despite the arrival of American troops, commanders questioned
how much help these soldiers, either fresh from training in the US or
from occupation duty in Japan, would prove to be.

The UK Army had been

waging the classic retrograde movement, trading space for time and now,
the optimism of the amateurs notwithstanding, it half-collapsed into
the famed Pusan Perimeter.

For a time it appeared as though the North

Koreans would push the UK Army into the sea.
The Eighth US Army Commander, Lieutenant General Walton Walker,
may not have been the perfect man to conduct the Pusan perimeter
defense, but he seemed to come close to it.

By all accounts, Walker

seemed able to give the appearance of being almost everywhere at once.
"Johnny” Walter neatly summarized both his own determination and the
desperation of the situation in his order:

"There will be no more

retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines, or anything else
you want to call i t . " ^
Established in early August, the Pusan perimeter represented
the last line of defense for the UNC.

Some of the heaviest fighting

of the war was done in these early days as the NKPA tried to push the
UNC off the Korean peninsula into the sea.

From about August 27 through

mid-September, the UK Army was literally fighting for its life.

69

^ S . L. A. Marshall, "Our Mistakes in Korea," The Atlantic,
September, 1953* P* ^4-6 .
6^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 162.
69
^An excellent military history of the campaigns mentioned in
this chapter is Roy E. Appleman, US Army in the Korean War: South to
the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, B.C.: Office of the Chief
of Military History, 1961). This heavy fighting occurred in the first
UNC campaign: the fight to hold the Naktong River line.
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During these first days of the war the truth of General Ridgway's
statement that "We were . . . in a state of shameful unreadiness when
the Korean War broke out . . .’’

was brought home to thousands of

soldiers.
Although the clash of two different types of "military cul
tures" in Korea is itself a fascinating story, we cannot be too con
cerned here with the purely military side of the war.

Most soldiers

learn early that they have to fight not just the enemy, but the weather
and the terrain as well.

In Korea, there were new circumstances of

weather and terrain to which the TIN soldier had to become accustomed.
North and South Korea together have only about 8^,000 square miles
(Utah is about the same in area.)

Eastern Korea is very mountainous,

while much of western Korea is valley with, as military men would say,
good avenues of approach for tanks and infantry.

The NKPA, of course,

had adjusted its tactics to the terrain of its homeland whereas much of
the UNO’s initial problem was to
and learn how

familiarize

best to modify its tactics and

itself with a

newterrain

superior firepower to

exploit the terrain.
LTG Walker’s tenacity (of the "Stand and Die" variety), the
massive inpouring of troops and equipment, the increasing familiariza
tion with the

enemy, the terrain and the weather gained by UNC staff

officers— all

contributed to the development

of an idea in

General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the UNO.

There was no

question that the North Koreans had over-extended themselves:
were pushing for final victory at Pusan.

themind of

they

Their rear areas were weakly

^%Iatthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956)> P » 191-
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guarded and their lines of supply and communications were most vulner
able near Seoul.
MacArthur had formulated a plan that called for an amphibious
invasion at Inchon, on the west coast of Korea.
an unlikely place for such an effort.

Inchon was, at best,

The tides prohibited use of the

beaches except for about six hours a day, the approach was partly
blocked by Wolmi Island, port facilities were poor and, significantly,
Army manuals allow for about six months planning time for an operation
of the type planned by MacArthur.

Nevertheless, MacArthur told his

staff on August 12 that he wanted the planning completed in one month. ^
Paradoxically, MacArthur believed the Inchon landing would
succeed principally because the odds against its success, he thought,
were

$,000

to 1.

68

Inchon would be a success for the classic military

reason that no one would expect it.

Had it not been the renowned mili

tary commander MacArthur arguing the case, the plans to invade Inchon
might have been scrapped as the work of a madman.

The nearly insur

mountable technical obstacles were problem enough and, as David Rees
points out, Inchon (or, as it was called, "Operation Chromite") became
known as "Operation Common-Knowledge."

Communist spies had the details

at least a week before the invasion but, movie-style, were unable to
get word to Pyongyang (capital of North Korea).

6q

y

At a final strategy

meeting, MacArthur swayed his peers and won permission to go ahead with
67 "The Korean War," Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1970> Vol. 13»

p. I+6 9 .

68Rees, Korea;
the Creation, p. 980.
^Rees, Korea:

The Limited War, p. 82; and Acheson, Present at

The Limited War, p. 9 6 .

ho
the £,000 "to 1 gamble.

With his characteristic eloquence, MacArthur

told those at the meeting:
If my estimate is inaccurate and should I run into a defense
with which I cannot cope, I will be there personally and will
withdraw our forces before they are committed to a bloody
setback. The only loss then will be my professional reputa
tion. But Inchon will not fail. Inchon will succeed. And
it will save 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 l i v e s . 70
The Inchon landings constitute one of the greatest military
operations in history.

To be sure, the key to both this victory and

the string of subsequent defeats which followed on the heels of Inchon,
was the character of MacArthur himself.

David Rees offers this sum-

Inchon . . . could not have happened under any other com
mander but MacArthur. It sprang from his overpowering per
sonality and his self-confidence, and his plan was supported
by no one else for it looked back to an age of warfare unen
cumbered by specialist objections and peripatetic Joint
Chiefs. It remains an astonishing achievement precisely
because it was a triumph not of military logic and science,
but of imagination and i n t u i t i o n . 7^This ’’impossible victory” was achieved on September l£, 1950, and was
followed three days later by a break-out from the Pusan perimeter.

By

September 28, Seoul was cleared and the momentum of the M P A checked.
In a matter of days, it was clear that the M P A was not only incapable
of resuming the offensive, but stood on the brink of military disaster,
a stunned and crippled force.

That MacArthur's strategem had literally

70

Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (hew York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 196U), p. 350* Dean Acheson reports how MacArthur brushed
aside objections to his plan with a brilliant defense, ending his argu
ment in hushed tones, "I can almost hear the ticking of the second hand
of destiny. . . . We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them."
Present at the Creation, p. £80. Acheson's source is Rees, Korea: The
Limited War, p. 83.
7^063, Korea:

The Limited War, p. 9 6 .
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snatched victory from the jaws of defeat reintroduced the problem of
the objective:

what would the UN Army do with its victory?

After Inchon:

A Reversal of Objectives

As Montgomery of Alamein once observed,
The responsibility of statesmen and politicians is very
great. The higher direction of war is in their hands and they
must see to it that they give clear political directives to
the service chiefs.7^
This opinion is vindicated by the imbroglio which occurred after MacArthur’s stunning success at Inchon.

The North Korean Army, caught

between MacArthur*s surging forces and the break-out drive from the
Pusan perimeter, was virtually shattered.

"Victory" was clearly in

sight; but victory, of course, is a relative term:

one achieves vic

tory according to pre-defined conditions which are either met or missed.
MacArthur*s mission of clearing the enemy from the Republic of Korea
was now nearly accomplished, but was that achievement sufficient to
merit the label of victory?

A number of leaders including, apparently,

MacArthur, thought not.
The all-important objective that must be clearly defined to
military leaders for them to devise functional operations plans had
been hazy at best in the first months of the Korean War.

Although Mac

Arthur had been permitted to conduct limited operations above the 38 th
parallel, his superiors, chief among them the President, were cautious
about extending the scope of major operations beyond that line.

Paring

the week of the entry decision, (on June 2 9 ) Truman was convinced that
the sole purpose of UN involvement in Korea was to restore the border.
" ^ M o n t g o m e r y Gf Alamein, A History of Warfare (Cleveland:
World Publishing Company, 1968 ), p. 552.

k2
Secretary /of the Arm// Pace expressed the "belief that we
should "be very careful in authorizing operations above the 38 th
parallel and that we should clearly limit such operations. I
agreed, pointing out that operations above the 38 th parallel
should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I
wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were
designed to restore peace there and to restore the border.73
The UN resolution under which the UNC was conducting its operations
had spelled out (on June 27) that member nations were "to furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area."
As the weeks of conflict passed, it was becoming increasingly
evident that the UNC was on the verge of destroying the UKPA.

The

goals once so clear to both Truman and to the TOT became less welldefined.

By the time of Inchon, the original goal of repelling the

aggression had, in fact, been changed to the unification of Korea by
force.

What was to become for the UN and the US a reversal of policy

was, from the outset, the goal of ROK President Syngman Rhee.

When

Truman marked the second anniversary of the ROK (August 13>) by sending
Rhee a message on August lip that "the aggressor will be expelled,"
Rhee replied,

"We shall complete unification of North and South . .

for all time."^
The first hint that UN-US policy might change came from US

Truman, Memoirs, p. 3^-1 • Truman was unequivocal about US
aims in the first weeks, "I wanted to take every step necessary to push
the North Koreans back behind the 38 th parallel." Cited in Spanier,
The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p . 33•
7%a c t s on File, X, No. £ll (August 11-17, 19^0), p. 2^8.
"Where is the 38 th parallel?" Rhee once asked. "It is non-existent. I
am going all the way to the Yalu, and the United Nations can't stop me."
Cited in Halle, The Cold War As History, p. 219.
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Ambassador to the United Nations Warren R. Austin who declared on
August 17, 1950> that the UN should not let Korea remain "half slave,
half free."

Although at the time Truman's policy was still that the

invaders would be driven back only to the 38 th parallel, Austin said
that the General Assembly decisions of 1947-1949 that Korea be united
under a freely elected government should be upheld.

Austin did, how

ever, stop short of advocating that UN armies overrun North Korea after
75
repelling the aggression.'^
When Representative John C. Davies (D-N.Y.) called on Truman
on August 23, he asked the President about the UN goal in Korea.

Of

Truman's answer all Davies could later say was that the President had
not yet "decided in his own mind" whether UN forces should stop at the
76
38 th parallel once they gained momentum. 1

At a news conference on

September 21 Truman announced that the decision about whether UN troops
would pursue the North Koreans beyond the 38 th parallel was not his to
make.

Rather, he said, the US would abide by the decision of the UN. 77

A week later (September 28), the President implied that the decision
was being worked out through the UN; however, the view prevailed at
the State Department that the Security Council resolution of June 27
("to repel the armed attack . . .") gave MacArthur authority to cross

^Facts on Pile, X, No.
(August 11-17,
The New York Times, August 18, 1950, P* 17^Facts on File, X, No.

512 (August l8-24>

1950), P« 258;

1950)» p. 266.

77jbid.t X, No. 516 (September 15-21, 1950), p. 297*

and,

U

JQ
the parallel.

In view of the conditions under which that resolution

was passed in late June, that prevailing State Department opinion
(coming in the wake of Inchon) is debatable, at best.
UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie in a Chicago speech delivered
on September 8 had put the matter squarely:

"It will not be enough,"

he said, for UN forces to drive the North Koreans back to the 3 8 th
parallel; he declared that the UN must see to it that Korea be "unified
and independent" and that all Koreans be "able freely to select a
79
government of their own choosing."'y
On September If?, the day of the Inchon landings, MacArthur was
authorized by Truman to extend his operations north of the 38lh paral
lel and to plan the occupation of North Korea.

No ground operations

were to be conducted north of the parallel, however, if there was

78ibld., X, No. 317 (September 22-28, 1950), p. 305- An impor
tant theme of the Korean War involvement is the extent to which the
United States surrendered its diplomatic options to the UN. To be sure,
the United States had to give up a degree of its own latitude in order
to achieve UN approval of US actions in Korea; however, in light of
Truman's statements about the willingness of the US to follow the UN
lead on such vital questions as crossing the parallel (although Truman,
as we will see above, was not at all reluctant to cross after the
Inchon victory), one might legitimately argue that the US gave away too
much of its diplomatic option. An example of this sacrifice of US
freedom of diplomatic movement occurred on January 1 3 , 1951? when the
General Assembly adopted a peace plan that, among other things, called
for the seating of the Chinese Communists in the UN. This, and other
points about the plan, completely contravened US policy at the time;
however, the US, not wishing to lose UN support, had to vote for the
peace plan which Robert A. Taft called, perhaps not unjustly, " . . .
the most complete surrender to which the US has ever agreed." (Facts
on File, XI, No. 533? January 12-18, 1951? P* 1^)* Although the plan
passed the UN, it was rejected out of hand by the Red Chinese, much to
the relief and delight of Acheson and others. Acheson’s follow-up
helped bring about the February 1, 1951? branding of the Communist
Chinese as aggressors, of which more later in the text. The background
of this "peace plan" that the US did not approve but nonetheless had to
vote for is explained in Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 661-662,
and in Leckie, Conflict, pp. 253-255*
7^Facts on File, X, No. 515 (September 8 -II4., 1950), P* 290.
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Russian or Chinese military intervention.

As Louis Halle has remarked

about this curious authorization:
The confusion
operations in
they had been
in Washington
them . 80

implicit in this order, which forbade certain
a contingency that would be realized only after
undertaken, represents the efforts of the men
to control the events that, in fact, controlled

Certainly, MacArthurfs victory at Inchon had obviated any chance
for the North Koreans to control the ROK by applied military power.
The NKPA was a stunned and reeling army.

The instinct of the army com

mander, when his opponent is "on the ropes," is to close in swiftly for
the final assault.

MacArthur, understandably, wanted to finish the job

of destroying the NKPA.

The problem was that if the NKPA were allowed

to retreat into its homeland across the 38 th parallel with impunity, it
could nurse its wounds, recover its strength and, in theory at least,
again present a formidable threat to the security of the ROK.

Now,

thought MacArthur and others, was the time to avert that threat by
smashing the North Koreans while they were still badly wounded.
In fact, on September 27, 1950, MacArthur was ordered by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff "to destroy the North Korean armed forces."

His

operations north of the parallel were to proceed only if there had been
no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces,
no announcement by them of an intended entry and no threat by them to
counter UNO operations in North Korea.

As an additional "safeguard,"

only ROKA forces were to be used in North Korean provinces bordering
on China or the USSR.

8l

Two days later, President Truman personally

80 Halle, The Cold War As History, pp. 220-221.
0~j

"The Korean War," Encyclopedia Brittanica, p. 1+70?
The Cold War As History, pp. 221-222.

Halle,

1+6
cabled MacArthur authority to advance into North Korea
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and Secretary

of Defense Marshall sent MacArthur word that "we want you to feel
unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 3 8 th
parallel.

Although MacArthur held back his US units from crossing

the parallel immediately in order to establish viable logistical
chains, ROKA units crossed the parallel on October 1.
Victory was in sight; not simply the success of repelling
aggression, but the final and clear victory to which American armies
had become accustomed.

In the fall of 195>0 a number of leaders looked

upon the conflict in Korea as a favorable opportunity to reverse the
disconcerting post-war series of events.

After the war, much of east

ern Europe had fallen to the Communists and by 19U9 China had fallen.
On the horizon was the high-water mark of the McCarthy era.

Could the

Truman administration turn its back on the opportunity to reclaim from
Communism the

l\9>000

square miles of North Korea?

The unification of

Korea had been an objective of the US since 19^3 and. of the UN since

19b7 • Here was the chance to achieve that goal, to punish the North
Koreans, to enhance American and UN prestige and to satisfy "the psy
chic need for a clear-cut, absolute solution for Korea in the pre-cold
pi
war tradition of American political thought." ^
In the United States elections were to be held in November.
One Senator, as early as late September, had published his opinion that

82nijThe Korean War," Encyclopedia Brittanica, p. 1|70«
^Halle, The Cold War As History, p. 222. Halle observes that
Marshall's sentence authorized MacArthur "to interpret his instructions
so widely as to nullify them." (p. 2 2 2 ).
^Rees, Korea:

The Limited War, p. 100.

kl
failure to cross the parallel would constitute appeasement of Russia.8-^
Similarly, General MacArthur had made it clear that if the chance to
have total victory were denied him, he would regard it not simply as
appeasement, "but as a defeat for the West, and a scuttling of United
Nations objectives.

86 As Louis Halle has pointed out, the critical

decision whether to pursue the NKPA across the 38 th parallel— and thus
for the UNC to begin an offensive phase in the war— came at a time when
the American people were becoming convinced that Communist infiltrators
had virtually taken over the formulation of US foreign policy.

If

Truman had forbidden MacArthur to administer the coup de grace to the
NKPA, his action would have appeared to substantiate the conspirator
o7

theory and would have been regarded as the great betrayal.
To deny the UN Army the opportunity to pursue the NKPA deep
into North Korea would have required enormous political courage.

The

leaders were caught up with the spirit of impending military victory
and the counsels of diplomatic prudence were now of little importance.
Louis Halle provides this analysis:
. . . The influence of the reasonable, the prudent, the sensi
tive, and the moderate men was now in sharp decline. Control
of events had been lost. Either one went along with them or
one was spilled off into the roadway of history, to be left
behind.88
Whereas Halle notes that events were controlling men, not men the
events, David McLellan sees the confusion of moral and political

8^ibid., p . 100.
^David S. McLellan, "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," Politi
cal Science Quarterly, Vol. 8 3 * No. 1 (March, 1968 ), p. 30^Halle, The Cold War As History, pp. 219-220.
88ibid., p. 220.
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purpose which plagued UN efforts throughout the war:
The advance to the Yalu is a prime example of an American pro
pensity to take the righteousness of its actions for granted
and to ignore the objective reality which its behavior repre
sents to others. 9
The decision had to be made:

should the UN conduct major

operations north of the 38 th parallel and, if so, why?

Was the object

simply to be the destruction of the NKPA whereupon the UN Army was to
be withdrawn, its officers content in the knowledge that it would be
years before the North could again threaten the South?
insure that elections be held in the North?

Was the goal to

Or should the UNO unify

Korea by force?
On September 20, Acheson made it clear, according to David Rees,
that he had abandoned his former views (expressed in June) that the
goal of the UN armies was simply to restore the status of the ROK prior
to the NKPA invasion, and embraced the goal of unification. 90

Although

the State Department thought that the resolution of June 27 would cover
this new objective, Truman felt a new resolution was in order. 91

The

opportunity to expand on the original purposes of the US-UN commitment
to South Korea was irresistible,
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and on October 7> 1970, the UN

General Assembly approved a UNC advance into North Korea.

That same

^McLellan, ’’Dean Acheson and the Korean War," p. 39. McLellan
makes the point that the failure of US policy in this instance ". . .
appears to lie in the comparative insouciance with which the conduct of
policy in the concluding phase of the war _/November, 195>1~J was left to
the determination of the military campaign." (pp. 37-38)•
^Rees, Korea:

The Limited War, pp. 100-101.

9-^ibid. , p. 101.
9^As McLellan has observed, it ". . . was not in Acheson's
nature to pass up an opportunity to enhance the strength and stability
of the non-Communist world." "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," p. 17.
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day the Eighth US Army crossed the parallel and by October 20, Pyong
yang had fallen to the UN Army.
While the October 7 Resolution did not mention forceful unifi
cation, it did recommend that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure
conditions of stability in Korea."

And, of course, holding elections

with the goal of unifying Korea peacefully was, in effect, the same
thing as unifying Korea by force of arms.

In either case, North Korea

would have ceased to exist.
According to Acheson, MacArthur gave the October 7 Resolution a
meaning never intended:
General MacArthur at once stripped from the resolution of
October 7 its husk of ambivalence and gave it an interpretation
that the enacting majority in the General Assembly would not
have accepted. Nowhere did the resolution declare that the
Eighth Army would impose a unified and democratic government
on all Korea. Its task was to "ensure conditions of stability
throughout Korea."9b
As we have seen, however, stability and peaceful elections proposed by
Acheson would have had in essence the same effect as the surrender of
the North Koreans for which MacArthur was calling. 9^
Truman, who had met with MacArthur at Wake Island on October
1^, had been assured that the chances of a Communist Chinese entrance
93Although the resolution was concerned with "ensuring stability," The New York Times, as if to underscore the intention of the
resolution, featured this headline on page 1 of its October 8, 1950,
edition: "U.N. Body, iff to 5> Votes to Unify and Rebuild Korea."
Technically, US troops crossed the parallel before that move was sanc
tioned by the UN; see ibid., p. 1. The ROKA had been conducting opera
tions in North Korea since October 1.
9^Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 5>89.
9^This point is made by Spanier in The Truman-MacArthur Contro
versy, pp. 90-91, and in Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 101-103.
MacArthur’s demand of the NKPA was for them to "forthwith lay down your
arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may
direct." Cited in Rees, p. 10J+.
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into the war were slight.

MacArthur1s opinion, as pointed out "by John

Spanier, was rendered on the 15th, some fifteen days after South Korean
troops had already crossed the parallel.
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By the end of October, Life

could report that "The end of the war loomed as plain as the mustache
on Stalin's face. . . . Now MacArthur could say confidently,

'The war
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is definitely coming to an end shortly.'"^1
The entry of the Chinese into the war was precipitated by a num
ber of factors but among them, certainly, was the fear that North Korea
was about to be destroyed either by UN military or diplomatic action.
The most succinct analysis is Spanier1s:
In fact, the advance into North Korea reflected a political
decision by the United States government to achieve a militar
ily unified Korea. In the context of the events of late Septem
ber and early October such a decision should occasion no sur
prise. It was the logical outcome of the military victory
achieved by I4acArthur at Inchon and the demand for unconditional
surrender issued shortly thereafter. Secretary Acheson coiild
hardly have accepted compliance with this demand. On June 13>
1950, only two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, he
had himself declared that the "one difference which is just
about impossible to negotiate is someone's desire to eliminate
your existence altogether." In short, the call for North

9 ^ S p a n i e r , The Truman-MacArthur Controversy.
Spanier continues:
"The President had approved of the extension of military operations
north of the parallel on September 11, and the Joint Chiefs had sent
MacArthur a directive to this effect on September 1%— that is one month
before the Wake Island Conference. Eleven days later, the Joint Chiefs
had informed MacArthur that his 'military objective is the destruction
of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are
authorized to conduct military operations north of the 38fh parallel.'
/_See footnote 81./ MacArthur had, therefore, tendered his opinion
after the Administration had already decided that it was safe to march
up to the Yalu River." (p. 95)-

97"Hard-Hitting U.N. Forces Wind Up War," Life, October 30>
1950, p. 21.
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Korea's unconditional surrender ensured the continuation of
hostilities.98
One cannot doubt that MacArthur wanted to achieve a clear-cut victory;
the question that perhaps only the Communist Chinese may have the ans
wer to is whether they would have been more favorably disposed to the
unification of Korea by the peaceful, electoral means (after the UN
Army had sufficiently secured the North) proposed by Acheson and made
into policy by the October 7 Resolution.

The conclusion reached here

is. that military unification imposed by the UN Army or unification by
election supervised by UN committees were simply two sides of the same
coin, equally repugnant to the Chinese Communists.
At about mid-October, the UN Army would have been well-advised

to halt its progress, consolidate and fortify its positions, and
announce that no further military operations would be conducted.
offer to negotiate might have been extended to the North Koreans;

An
at

the time the UN would have had thousands of square miles of North Korea

with which to bargain and well-entrenched defense positions from which
99
to bargain. ^

Had the North Koreans declined the negotiating invita

tion, the UN could have continued its works of fortification and
exploited their own peace feelers while scoring their enemy on their
lack of desire to talk peace.
98<3panier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 91* David
McLellan has concluded that Acheson went along with the decision to
drive into North Korea for bwo main reasons: the carrot— the chance
to improve the stability of the free world /see footnote 92J— and the
stick— the political price he would have had to pay for resisting the
opportunity for total UN victory. Additionally, McLellan argues that
Acheson misunderstood the threat to Chinese national interest that they
would perceive in a UN drive to the Yalu. "Lean Acheson and the Korean
War," p. 17 et passim.
^9j4acArthur discusses such a possibility in his Reminiscences,
p. 35?7 ff• in reading his suggestions one should recall, however, that
they are made by him with the benefit of hindsight.
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In any case, this was not to he.

On November 21+, MacArthur

launched his "end-the-war-by-Christmas" drive.

Three days earlier,

elements of the US Seventh Division had reached the Yalu River; how
ever, the task of destroying the final remnants of the NKPA was not
yet accomplished.
pose.

MacArthur's final drive was to achieve that pur

Although it was known as early as November 1 that there were

Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) in Korea, MacArthur had split his com
mand and advanced on a wide front, with no reserve.

On November 26,

the CCF attacked in force; what followed was a series of disasters for
the UN armies.

Their setbacks and retreat was described by Time, very

probably correctly, as ". . . the worst defeat the U.S. had ever suf
fered.

The hopes and expectations that the war was over dis

appeared among new concerns about how to save the UN Army from threat
ening disaster.
After the entry of the CCF, any chance for unification of
Korea, or for negotiations, or for peace, had to be abandoned, at least
for the moment.

Suddenly, it was August all over again and the UN Army

was once again facing defeat.
to 1 victory at Inchon.

This came, ironically, after the f>,000

102

100ttj)efea-k9it Time, December 11, 1950, P- 17*
^OIa particularly valuable source for information on the entry
of the CCF is Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision
to Enter the Korean War (New York: The Macmillan Company, i9 6 0 ).
S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Time, Inc.,
1953) describes the defeat of the Eighth Army by the CCF in November,
1950, in the battle of the Chongchon River.
^02pac]ia;rg Ruetten has written that "The ill-fated offensive
of November 21+, 1950, suggests that the President could very well have
considered relief of the General for military reasons alone." "General
Douglas MacArthur's 'Reconnaissance in Force1: The Rationalization of
a Defeat in Korea," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 3 6 , No. 1 (February,
1967) , p . 9 3 .
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Start of the Stalemate
The TOT Army was able to avert disaster and was even able by
January 25, 1951» 1° resume an offensive.

Although ground was hard to

gain and the progress of the TOT Army was slow, the TOTC had reached the
outskirts of Seoul by the end of February; by March 31, the TOTC had
restored itself to the position it had held some three months earlier.
General MacArthur, intensely dissatisfied with the restraints imposed
upon him and unable to show sympathy for the positions of the Presi
dent, was relieved by Truman on April 11, 1951*
mander of the TOTC (CIITCTOJC) was General Ridgway.

His successor as Com
Ridgway, who had

taken command of the Eighth US Army when General Walter was killed in
a December jeep accident, was replaced at that post by LTG James A.
Van Fleet.
On February 1, 1951, the United Nations branded the Chinese as
aggressors and at the same time determined to end the war by peaceful
means.

In indicating its willingness to accept the 38 th parallel as a

stopping point for the UN Army, the UN utterly reversed its policy
prior to that time.
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A Communist spring offensive was fairly successful in gaining
ground but terribly exorbitant in the price in lives the CCF had to
pay.

The TOT counter-offensive in May and June placed the UNC in a good

position, along the 38 th parallel, but Ridgway and Van Fleet were
1 Q8 The New York Times, February 2, 1951, P* 3- Facts on File,
XI, No. 93^ (February 2-8, 1951) reported that "word was going around
Washington that the U.S. might be willing to re-draw the line in Korea
at the 38 th Parallel. The State Dept, left this question open by saying
in a statement Feb. 2 /"~3_7 it did not want to indulge in 'speculation
about the 38 th Parallel at this time.'" (p. l+l). See also footnote ll+
in the Conclusion.

5h
ordered not to launch a major invasion of North Korea.

On the success

of this UN drive turns a good portion of the argument later advanced by
Van Fleet and others that in the summer of 1951 exhausted and beaten
CCF and NKPA forces had only one device with which to save themselves
from yet another trip to the Yalu, truce talks.
In Washington, just prior to MacArthur's relief, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had decided that the Korean War could not be settled
satisfactorily by military action alone.

As then Army Chief of

Staff General Collins said,
Though the JCS said so only by inference, there was no
question but that a military stalemate had been reached
between the U.N. Command the the Chinese and North Korean
forces.105
This conviction of the JCS was transmitted to the National Security
Council, which formulated its policy in May, 1951:
The National Security Council's policy of May 17, 1951,
determined the course of the U.N. Command's combat opera
tions for the two long years that were to elapse between
its approval and the signing of the armistice on July 27?
1953.
During this period the main purpose of the United
Nations operation was to keep pressure on the enemy and
to inflict maximal casualties on the Chinese and North
Koreans in order to force an agreement that would end the
fighting.10^
As the United States and United Nations gravitated toward con
cluding the war by negotiation as opposed to military action, the
desire to negotiate again called into question the problem of the 38'fch

lO^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 30l+.
1Q5jbid. , p. 30l+.

106jbid., pp. 305-306. Had this policy been vigorously pursued
throughout the period of negotiations, this thesis argues, the UN would
have achieved a negotiated truce more quickly and on more propitious
terms.
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parallel.

The UN ’s '’willingness" to settle the war on the 3 8 th paral

lel was now transformed into official policy, evidenced "by the pro
nouncements of its leaders:
In March, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway . . . said the w a r ’s end at
the 38 th parallel would be "a tremendous victory." In June,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson said a cease-fire at the paral
lel would mean "successful conclusion" of the war. Their
statements laid the groundwork for a settlement short of full
military victory. -^7
After statements that the UN goal must be the extirpation of
the NKPA to insure the safety of the ROK, after statements that only
a drive to the Yalu, through the very heart of North Korea, could
punish the aggressors sufficiently, and after a diplomatic and military
drive to unify Korea either by force of arms or ballot, there now
occurred this change in policy which Time labeled "surprising":
"What is the U.S. willing to settle for in Korea? Testifying
before the MacArthur investigating committee, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson gave a surprising answer: the U.S. will be
content to stop the fighting at the 38 th parallel. It will be
willing to leave North Korea in Communist hands, so long as
there are "reliable assurances” that the Communists will not
renew their aggression. A "unified free and democratic Korea"
is not one of the U.S. war aims. . . . To get a cease-fire
agreement from the Communists, the Administration was resigned
to the minimum goal— the restoration of the status quo ante.10°

107"Why U.S. Decided to Halt in Korea," US News and World
Report, July 20, 1951? P« 18. Ridgway's March 12, 1951? statement is
also mentioned in Facts on Pile, XI, No. 5^1 (March 9-15? 1951)> P» 8l.
108npeace Terms," Time, June 11, 1951? P» 21. See also T. R.
Fehrenbach, The Fight for Korea: From the War of 1950 to the Pueblo
Incident (New York:Gr o s s e d and Dunlap, 19 6 9 ), pT 96 for an analysis
of the Acheson statement. See also The New York Times, June I4., 1951?
p. 1; and ibid., June 8, 1951i "He stated that an armistice in Korea
at the Thirty-eighth Parallel . . . would wholly keep faith with the
pledges made by the United Nations.
'Neither the United Nations nor
the United States,1 he said, ’has ever undertaken the obligation to
unify Korea by force.’ He had already made it plain, however, that a
unified Korea, to be achieved by the means of peace, was and remained
the ultimate objective." (p. 16). On June 26, Acheson said that Ameri
can troops had gone into Korea to stop aggression and to restore peace,
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Although President Truman indicates in his Memoirs that the
agreement to halt UN military progress at the 38 th parallel represented
no change (p. U5 6 ) > available evidence simply does not substantiate
that claim.

Major changes traced here demonstrate that the US moved

from announcing that Korea was relatively unimportant strategically to
the commitment of thousands of troops when challenged there; from the
objective of clearing the ROK of aggressor troops to unifying Korea by
military power; from deciding that the 38 th parallel was not acceptable
as a stopping point to announcing that a halt there would be a great
victory.

The only thread that runs throughout the rhetoric to keep it

together is the notion of unification; now, twenty years after the
signing of the armistice at Panmunjom, Korea still is not unified.

In

any case, it was determined that the war be brought to an end by nego
tiation.

Said Truman,

Regarding Korea, we distinguished between the political aim—
a unified, independent, democratic Korea— and the military aim
of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities
under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the
purpose would be to establish the authority of the Republic of
Korea over all Korea. 18*9
not to unify Korea. The US military objective would be satisfied, he
said, if the Communists withdrew behind the 38 th parallel and that uni
fication could be the subject of subsequent political negotiations.
Reported in Pacts on File, XI, No. 556 (June 22-28, 1951)> P« 202.
Acheson1s positions of June, 1950 > and June, 1951» are virtually iden
tical; the problem, of course, is that he adopted another position
entirely in the fall of 1950 when he became convinced that the UN had
the ability to unify Korea with elections made possible by a secure
military environment. After the Chinese intervened and secure military
conditions could no longer be maintained, he returned to his former
stand. The day after Acheson's June 27 affirmation that the 38 th paral
lel would be acceptable to the US, Pyongyang radio dropped its "drivethe-enemy-into-the-seaM slogan and adopted a new one: "Drive the enemy
to the 38 th parallel." (ibid., p. 202). ROK President Syngman Rhee
appears never to have wavered about rejecting any truce talks without
unification (ibid., p. 2 0 2 ) of which more later.
•1'8|9p'ruinan> Memoirs, p. 1+56.
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The question whether the US could legally negotiate an armis
tice was resolved by UN Secretary General Lie who obtained an affirma
tive ruling from the UN legal c o u n s e l . T h e
tiations:

stage was set for nego

all that was needed was a reciprocal gesture on the part of

the Communists.

In late June, 1951 > that gesture was given and truce

talks began shortly thereafter.

With the commencement of the talks,

the UN once again switched positions on the issue of the 3 8 th parallel.
This is discussed in Chapter II, "The Kaesong Negotiations."
Chapter Summary
The decision to intervene in the Korean War represented a
change of major proportion in American policy.

Although the nation was

at the time unprepared militarily, the United States leaders, confronted
with a crisis they had not anticipated, decided that South Korea could
not be abandoned to the Communists of North Korea.

The war was alter

nately regarded as a police action meant to punish the NKPA bandits
(imagery unconducive to negotiation) or as a crusade (imagery unconducive to waging a limited war).
In the first year of the war there arose a number of problems
concerning US (UN) policy that point out the failure of the Administra
tion to understand two fundamentals:

(l) that the military’s objective

must always be exact and (2) that the objectives announced nationally
and internationally must deliberately be ill-defined, while still some
what restricted, to avoid sacrificing diplomatic initiative to the

HOCollins, War in Peacetime, pp. 327-328. See also Leland M.
Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, pp.
I83 -I8 J7 . This is a valuable source for information on the problems
attending US actions under the auspices of an international body.
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potential bargaining rival.

Throughout at least the first year of the

conflict, the US permitted its policy to be the consequent of the
military situation whereas the reverse is the proper object of states
manship .
This dilemma is thrown into sharp relief by the Inchon victory
which provided the US with a most advantageous bargaining position.
Unfortunately, however, what might have been an extraordinary bargaining
posture was eroded by naive diplomatic administration:

the UN was

unable to translate military triumph into diplomatic advantage, per
mitted yet another public (and. priva/be) policy change, and authorized
a military solution to the war which, as events proved, was no solution
at all.
This chain of events is best described by Henry Kissinger:
The fluctuation of our objectives demonstrated that it is
impossible to conduct limited wars on the basis of purely mili
tary considerations. After Inchon, at a moment of maximum
strength, we proved unable to create a political framework for
settling the Korean War, and we thereby provided the enemy with
an incentive, if any was needed, to seek to restore the mili
tary balance as a prerequisite to any negotiation. It is not
clear that a generous and comprehensive offer, for example, to
stop at the narrow neck of the peninsula and to demilitarize
the rest of North Korea under United Nations supervision, would
have been accepted; for purposes of this argument, it is suffi
cient to note that it was never m a d e . m
After the military setbacks imposed by the intervention of the
CCF, the UN regained the momentum and, after still more see-saw warfare
throughout the spring of 1951 > the UNC commanded its former position
along the 38th parallel.

The UN Army, under Ridgway, even now against

the combined powers of the CCF and the NKPA, was in a superior position

York:

■^■^Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New
Harper and Brothers, 1957)? P« 50.

and was ready, once again, to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea.
At this juncture, it received orders to halt, take up positions and
await the start of talks at Kaesong.
In the spring of 1951 > of course, there had been still another
policy change:

the 38th parallel, it was publicly announced, would be

satisfactory as a halting line.

At Kaesong, however, the Communists

were not alone in their surprise in learning that the 38th parallel was
not, after all, suitable as a stopping point.
the next chapter.

The issue is taken up in

CHAPTER

THE

Pericles’ warning*:
strategy of our enemies. 1

KAESONG

II

NEGOTIATIONS

I fear our own mistakes far more than the

OThe Military Situation
By the summer of 1951» most American leaders believed, as
General Omar Bradley once phrased it, that an all-out conflict in Korea
"would involve us in the wrong* war, at the wrong place, at the
time and with the wrong enemy."
localize the war.

2

wrong

The UNC was, therefore, required to

The prospect of a war without victory posed new and

difficult questions to US military leaders who had been taught all
along that the object of war is victory.
The public utterances of leading UN and US political figures
had, howevex*, made it clear that "the barometric changes in plans as
battle skies clouded or cleared /had finally/ reached an equilibrium."^
The course of action chosen now was one of negotiation.

So long as the

Korean War is a subject of interest, scholars and soldiers will dispute

^Cited in Kenneth W. Thompson, The Moral Issue in Statecraft
(Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 115.
p
Yatcher, Panmunjom, p. 16 .
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 52.
^ibid., p. 5 2 .
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the wisdom of the decision to negotiate in the summer of 1 9 5 1 *

As dis

cussed in the first chapter, a Communist spring offensive had been
fairly successful in gaining ground, but the price in casualties had
been exorbitantly expensive.

In its counter-offensive, the TJNC was

able both to recoup its lost ground and build momentum; by May, the UN
Army stood poised along the 38 th parallel once again awaiting orders to
pursue the enemy into the hills of North Korea.
The success of the UNC counter-offensive engenders some of the
most difficult theoretical considerations of the entire Korean War nego
tiations.

Two separate problems, for instance, accompanied the mili

tary success.

The first was concerned with whether the UN should

exploit the situation by driving into North Korea, winning the war and
unifying the country.

To the Truman Administration, as we have seen,

debate over this question was superfluous; they had already supplied an
answer with the limited war policy.
The second problem dealt with the disparate views about whether
the CCF was, in fact, defeated by late June, 1951*

Within the confines

of the limited war superstructure, those convinced that Communist
armies had been shattered had to regard negotiation as the outcome of a
successfully prosecuted war (final victory, of course, had been ruled
politically unacceptable).

Those who, on the other hand, regarded the

CCF and NKPA as still formidable, albeit stunned, opponents, understood
negotiation in a different light.

To them negotiations would not be

the culmination of the war, but its complement; not the denouement of
war, but its derivative.

Thus, with the onset of negotiations, the

former would consider further military operations as unnecessary, even
counter-productive; the latter would still view them as critical.
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If the Communist forces had "been effectively "defeated," their
leaders may have seen in protracted negotiations an opportunity for
undoing their "defeat" hy degrees.

Similarly, if the Communist forces

at the time were only stunned, negotiations, with a concomitant and
predictable diminution of military operations, would still afford them
a marked advantage.

It was clearly to the benefit of the Communists to

give indications that they wanted peace, thus fortifying the arguments
of those UN leaders who saw continued military operations as redundant
in the face of the ostensibly imminent peace.

By carefully balancing

their propaganda, the Communists could, at the same time, avert the
admission and stigma of defeat.
The most outspoken advocate of driving into North Korea and
winning a clear military victory was General MacArthur.

With his

relief from command in April, 19!?1 > no active duty senior officers were
prepared to express publicly their contempt for Truman’s limited war
policy.

Although General Yan Fleet later argued that the TJN should

have made victory its object, he and those who agreed with him knew at
the time that Truman's policy of negotiating an end to the conflict
could not be changed or reversed until the November, 1952, elections,
if even then.

Although a number of people might have preferred a

quick, convenient solution to the war, most were prepared to adjust
their preferences to accord with the policy pronouncements of the Admin
istration.^
^A recent article is interesting and instructive on this theme.
See: Andre Modigliani, "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political
Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy," The
American Political Science Review, Yol. 66,No. 3 (September, 1972),
pp. 960-978.

With the decision made that the war would end by negotiation,
speculation was divided into the two camps we have mentioned.

One camp

felt that the talks at Kaesong were simply a manifestation of the
impending end of the war; their unguarded optimism ironically contri
buted to precisely the opposite effect.

The other camp, whose members

are hardest to identify, was far less optimistic and far more suspi
cious of ulterior Communist motives.

Although General Ridgway most

nearly approaches this type, his temporary willingness to forego mili
tary operations at the start of the talks precludes his convenient
assignment to this category.
While there is little debate that the Communist forces were
badly hurt and that the momentum, at least at that time, was with a
reinvigorated UN Army, there is dispute about whether another great
drive into North Korea would have resulted in final victory.

Each

side, those who argue that a vigorous offensive would have ended the
war with a -unified Korea and those who contend that such an offensive
might have increased the stakes in Korea even to the point of an
entrance by the Soviet Union, has its champions.

The moderate view

point that victory, albeit a Pyrrhic one, could have been won, is held
by General Ridgway:
If we had been ordered to fight our way to the Yalu, we
could have done it- if our government had been willing to
pay the price in dead and wounded that action would have
cost. Prom the purely military standpoint the effort, to
my mind, would not have been worth the cost.
On the other hand, a number of others, including General James
A. Van Fleet, then Commander of the US Eighth Army and Ridgway's

^Ridgway, Soldier, p. 219.

6h
immediate subordinate, have argued that the decision to negotiate pre
vented a virtually assured UN military victory.

Van Fleet thought that

after the UN Army had met the Communist spring offensive and repelled
it, the next six weeks "were among the greatest in the history of the
U.S. Army.”
We met the attack and routed the enemy. We had him beaten
and could have destroyed his armies. . . . Then our government's
high policy intervened, and we were ordered not to advance any
farther. . . . We have made many mistakes in Korea, but the
greatest mistake is this: we have consistently underestimated
the Koreans and overestimated the Chinese Reds.7
Although it appears extreme to say that the CCF and the NKPA
g
were "beaten," evidence is strong that their armies were, at that
time, in serious difficulty.

However, those who would have pressed for

a military victory in summer, 1951 ? discount the fact that as the CCF
fell back into North Korea, they would have been retreating into their
strength.

That is, the nearer China that the CCF retreated, the closer

^James A. Van Fleet, "The Truth About Korea From a Man Now Free
to Speak," Life, May 11, 1953* P* 127. (The second part of this twopart series is: "How We Can Win With What We Have," May 18, 1953? PP*
157-158+.) In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Van Fleet said essentially the same as cited above; see The New York
Times, March 23, 1953? P* 1* Among those who shared Van Fleet's view
point is William C. Bullitt: " . . . Lack of a will to win was the
chief obstacle to victory under the Truman Administration. We could
have crushed the Communist armies in the summer of 1951. . . . "
"We
Can Win the War in Korea," Reader's Ligest, March, 1953? P* 31*
o
Ridgway, for instance, reported to the UN Security Council on
June 28 that the Communists had 77 divisions in Korea and could launch
a new offensive, despite recent "severe losses," within "a minimum of
several weeks." Facts on File, XI, No. 557 (June 29-July 5? 1951)? P*
210. Interestingly, Ridgway also disputes Van Fleet's analysis of the
extent of deterioration of the Communist armies: "In the light of
later statements by Van Fleet to the effect that I had prevented him
from driving on to total victory, it is interesting to recall that his
views then were that he did not favor an advance by the Eighth Army."
See Ridgway's The Korean War, p. l8l. Ridgway’s version is supported
then Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins. See his War in
Peacetime, pp. 306-307*
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would have been large reserves of troops and equipment and the more
reason the CCF and NKPA would have had to rally and fight more deter
minedly.

Evidence is not only strong, but overwhelming, that the Com

munists thought the time ideal to talk and relieve military pressure on
their battered armies; however, the contention that military victory
was the UNC’s for the asking is unsupport able.

9

The pressure for a conclusion to the conflict in Korea by peace
ful means had been building since the February 1, 1951» UN resolution
which called for exactly that.

In the United States on May 17, Senator

Edwin C. Johnston introduced a resolution asking the UN to urge the
belligerents in Korea to declare a cease-fire along the 38 'fcN parallel
by June 25, the first anniversary of the war.

Johnston also thought

that foreign forces should be withdrawn and that prisoners of war
should be exchanged.

The wide publicity of the Johnston resolution

throughout the Soviet Union was interpreted by some UN analysts as an

9Another General (Edward M. Almond) thought the NKPA and CCF
were "punchdrunk and ineffective, and I personally thought at the time
that it was the time to finish the effort." US News and World Report,
"What Happened in Korea When Chinese Marched In," February 13, 1953?
p. 1|0. William Vatcher has argued that "a limited victory was not
inconceivable. The North Korean forces had been decimated. The Chin
ese had suffered untold destruction. Under these circumstances it was
wise policy for the Communists to seek peace before other gains were
lost." Panmunjom, p. 22. Without the requisite Communist documents,
scholars may never know for certain whether the UN Army could have
pushed on to clear victory and a unified Korea. Viewpoints on the
issue, then, amount to little more than speculation. The standpoint of
this thesis is that Communist China, very probably with the full back
ing (and possibly the troops) of the Soviet Union would not have per
mitted the conquest of North Korea by the force of UN arms; by 1951
the world prestige of China and, for that matter, of Communism itself
was invested in Korea. The closer to China those "punchdrunk and
ineffective" Communist armies approached the more sober and effective
they would have become. In this sense, negotiations represented an
insurance policy for the Communists: if they could not achieve their
aims by conferral, they could at least re-supply and re-build their
army in hopes of preserving their military image.
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indication that the Communists wanted peace.
On May 26, Lester Pearson, President of the UN General Assembly,
indicated that the surrender of the aggressors might not be necessary
if the fighting could be brought to an end.

Trygve Lie, reversing his

former stand, contended on June 1 that a cease-fire along the 38 th
parallel would be suitable.

In that judgment he was supported by Lean

Acheson who said he was amenable to a reliable armistice on the 3 8 th
p a r a l l e l . A s T. R. Fehrenbach observed, "the United States had come
full cycle, back from its position of October 1950 > to its position of
the previous June.

The goal was containment, not victory."

12

The combination of diminished UN objectives and the battered
state of their armies induced the Communists to accept the opportunity
for peace talks.

Their acknowledgment of willingness to talk came from

an unusual source, a radio program.

The Soviet Ambassador to the UN,

Jacob Malik, indicated on the "Price of Peace" program (June 23, 1951)
that "the Soviet peoples . . . believe that the most acute problem of

■^Vatcher, Panmunjom, pp. 17-18.
~*~~*~ibid., p. 18. Acheson first made mention of the suitability
of the 38 th parallel for a settlement line on June 1. He repeated and
confirmed the offer on June 2, June 7 and June 26, which explains why
various sources may list the date of his offer differently. See:
"Problems in Ending a War," US News and World Report, July 6 , 1951» P»

16.
-^Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, pp. 525-526. The problem this
new goal caused for the UN Army was explained this way by Walter Hermes:
"They no longer sought to win by a knock-out, but rather on points.
They had to hurt the enemy enough to influence him to accept the UNC
terms for a settlement, yet not enough to provoke an all-out counter
attack and a widening of the struggle. The United States must win the
decision, but not decisively." Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 52.
That this policy of negotiation as opposed to victory by military means
was not subscribed to by all concerned is amply demonstrated by Bavid
Lawrence. See his "Civilian Stupidity," US News and World Report, May
ii, 1 9 5 1 , p. 1 3 2 .
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the present day- the problem of armed conflict in Korea- could be
settled.M

He was careful to include the demand that both sides should

withdraw from the 38 th parallel.^
Convinced that the Communists were willing to talk, UN leaders
gave General Ridgway permission to contact by radio the commander of
the Communist forces in Korea.

On June 30? 1951» Ridgway sent this mes

sage:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an
armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all
acts of armed forces in Korea, with adequate guarantees for
the maintenance of such armistice. 1^"This was the first time," wrote T. R. Fehrenbach, "an American comman
der in the field, while he was winning, offered to make terms with an
aimed enemy without a complete victory or surrender." 15

Despite the

fact that Pyongyang radio asserted that Ridgway1s truce proposal had
been made because "armed aggression of the United Nations forces has
ended in failure,"

l6 an agreement was reached that liaison officers

13Robert Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce,"
Saturday Evening Post, October 17, 1953, P* 125. That the first hint
of Communist willingness to talk peace came from the Soviet UN Ambassa
dor lends credence to the contention that there was collaboration among
the Soviets, the Chinese and the North Koreans. The extent of the col
laboration, however, cannot be ascertained because reliable primary
documents have not, of course, been made available.
■^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 527*
(Original in
italics.) See also "Exchange of Messages. . .," The Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 628 (July 9, 1951), PP. U3“U5*

l5Fehrenbach, Fight for Korea, p. 9 6 . See also The New York
Times, July 2, 1951s
"• • . I n previous cases negotiations followed
a clear-cut victory, with the United States and its allies dictating
the terms and the enemy coming in to surrender. An armistice in Korea
with the meeting place in a No Man’s Land therefore presents a new
security problem." (p. 3).
•^ T h e New York Times, July 2, 1951, P* 3*
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should meet at Kaesong to lay the groundwork for subsequent talks.
Ridgway was authorized to "discuss an armistice, providing for the ces
sation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with ade
quate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

Ihroughout

the talks, which concerned only a cease-fire, this authorization given
to Ridgway remained the principal object of the UK negotiators.

The Selection of Kaesong
The United Nations Command suggested that the truce teams meet
on board the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia in Wonsan Harbor, but the
Communists suggested instead that the meetings be held at Kaesong.
expedite matters, the UN agreed.

l8

To

As William Yatcher observed, this

quick agreement was a mistake:
At the time that the meetings commenced, the U.N. forces
were advancing at a substantial pace. By meeting at Kaesong it
meant that a large area right in the path of advancing U.N.
forces would be immune from attack. This contributed to re
tarding our advance. Holding the conference at Kaesong, which
was below the 38 th parallel, represented a victory to the Reds.
Kaesong was well within Red lines, which meant that the Commun
ists would be the hosts.
Despite the fact that the UN negotiating team would have to
enter Communist lines and that Kaesong was below the 38 th parallel
(which might serve to strengthen the Communist demand that the war be
■*-7ibid., July 1|, 1951» P« !•
-^Writing later, Captain George Miller, USN, made this reveal
ing observation: "Impatience is an expensive luxury. It is possible
that t h e Communists recognize impatience as one of our weaknesses.
Perhaps it is their hope that through the use of stalling and other
irritating tactics it will be possible to wring a number of concessions
from us. . . . "
"Shall We Blow Them Up?" United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, Yol. 79» No. 2 (February, 1953)> P« 151*
19william H. Vatcher, Jr., "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in
Korea," US News and World Report, January 23, 1953> P* 36.
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ended on that line), the site of the talks was given little considera
tion "by UN leaders.

As The New York Times reported on July 2, 1951,

"the place, and even the time, of the armistice talks were not regarded
in official Washington quarters as vital." (p. l).

What mattered most

to UN leaders was that the Communists were willing to talk and it
appeared senseless to quibble over something as apparently trivial as
the place; after all, as one version had it, the Communists might have
thought that holding a conference on a ship was "a trick to capture the
North Korean-Chinese leaders"

20

or that substitution of Kaesong for

Wonsan (which is in North Korean territory) might simply have been a
device for saving face. 21
Arguments of the variety that what mattered was the conference
and not its petty administrative details, must have been very convinc
ing in July, 1951*

The prevailing opinion was that peace was at hand.

Time, for instance, reported that "peace was in sight."
that " . . .
tory.

22

Newsweek,

the Korean affair was about to become the property of his

US News, with careful ambiguity, contended that "it's only a

matter of time until the real end of the Korean War."2^- With peace so
2QThe New York Times, July 2, 1951, P« 3*
PI
ibid., p. 1. Cf. Owen Lattimore, "Korea: We Win a Round,"
The Nation, July 21, 1951 > P* UU* Lattimore managed to convince him
self that holding discussions at Kaesong represented a triumph for UN
diplomacy; and, see "The Communists Accept," New Republic, July 9 ,
1951» P* 6, which argues that the need for the Communists to save face
precluded the possibility of discussions on board the Jutlandia.
22"No Whistles Blew," Time, July 9, 1951, p. 1523 " P e a c e - B u t

With Our Guard Up," Newsweek, July 9, 195l» P« 17•

^"Moscow's Orders: Make Peace," US News and World Report,
August 10, 1951, P* 22. The front page of The New York Times on July
8, 1951, reported the prevailing opinion: "Fighting for Several Weeks
is Foreseen by Washington." That was, if anything, the dim view of
events at the time.
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close, there seemed little reason for undue concern with the timing and
setting of the conference.

Even Admiral Joy, the chief TOT negotiator,

later wrote that he was convinced that a cease-fire would not he diffi
cult to achieve:
• . . many people believed the Communists wanted an armistice
badly enough to agree on reasonable terms. I was one of them.
Their armies had taken a beating on the battlefield . . . they
had suffered some 200,000 casualties. The Eighth Army had
counterattacked and was slowly pushing them beyond the 3 8 th
parallel. Though by no means decisively defeated, the Communists
were in a bad way and needed a cease-fire to repair their bat
tered war machine.^5
The first meeting of the liaison officers who were to work out
the details of the talks proper seemed to go smoothly.

The TOT team,

led by Colonel A. J. Kinney, TJSAE, landed at Kaesong by helicopter on
July 8.

Met by their Communist counterparts, they were escorted to a

near-by tea house.

Kinney and his team proceeded immediately to a

table and sat down, facing south.

Although Kinney had done this quite

by chance, the action so upset the Communist leader that he could manage
no more than stuttering in replying to Kinney's opening remarks.

The

oriental custom is that the vanquished sits facing north and Kinney's
accidental seating had forced the Communists into sitting in this
direction.

26

When the main TOT delegation returned to Kaesong two days

later, they found their way to the north side of the table blocked.
The readiness to agree to the Communist suggestion that talks
be held at Kaesong, the optimism that attended the opening of the talks,
and the US willingness toslow down, if not to halt altogether, the

2f?C. Turner Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks,"
US Nev/s and World Report,May 22, 1953» P* i+8.
^DCollins, War in Peacetime, p. 3^9; and Hermes, Truce Tent and
Fighting Front, p. 21.
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military progress of the UN Army (discussed below) are symptoms of what
William Vatcher has described as naivete*T
Perhaps the most conspicuous UNC mistake was to assume at
the outset that it could deal with the Communists on what it
understood as an honorable basis, that a settlement would be
reached within a few days or at the most within a few weeks,
that the Communists were really sincere in seeking a peaceful
resolution of differences, that negotiation meant to the Com
munists what it meant to the UNC: to sincerely and frankly
discuss issues with a view to reaching an equitable and quick
ending of the war. This initial naivete'on the part of the
UNC led to the protracted talkathons and an extension of the
war. UNC naivete'was first demonstrated by the acceptance of
Kaesong as the site for the talks.^7
Caught up in the surging expectations that peace was imminent,
few wanted to pay much mind to those who were more cautious, more
reserved in their judgment.

According to correspondent Rutherford

Poats, the "pessimists" among the newsmen converging on Korea were say
ing that it might be as long as six weeks before the signing of the
armistice. 28

Two notable exceptions to those who thought the end of

the war was near were Hanson Baldwin and David Lawrence.

As Baldwin

wrote, "the real danger in the Kaesong negotiations . . .

is that the

enemy may accomplish by words what he has not been able to accomplish
by bullets.

27yatcher, Panmunjom, pp. 205-206.
^^Leckie, Conflict, p. 299•
^^Hanson Baldwin, "Danger in Kaesong," The New York Times, July
1 2 , 1 9 51 , p. h. David Lawrence was arguing, perceptively, that " . . .
to get no agreement except to stop fighting and begin talking means
endless parleys. Such talks will not cause the Communists to concede
in negotiations what they have not been compelled by battlefield opera
tions to concede." See "Defeat?" US News and World Report, July 6,
1 9 5 1 , p. 96.
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The Curtailment of Military Operations
Although ROK President Syngman Rhee issued a statement on July11 that he would "rather die than see the war end "before total victory

30
or defeat,"-^ there was little he could do to influence TIM policy.
Through June, the UNC had been keeping up strong, constant pressure on
the CCP and the NKPA, hut by the first of July with truce talks start
ing, Ridgway was instructed to keep TIN military activity to a minimum.
Ridgway fully agreed with his instructions.

As he later said:

While both sides had immediately agreed that hostilities
should continue during negotiations, it seemed to me, with a
cease-fire faintly visible on the horizon, that I should do
all I could to keep our losses at a justifiable minimum.
I
notified our commanders therefore that we would conduct no
major offenses. . . . I thought peace might be just around
the corner.32

The report of the liaison officers that the first meeting at
33
Kaesong on July 8 had been "carried out without incident" ^ confirmed
the feelings of military leaders that continued extensive military
operations would only result in needless casualties.

One Army officer,

for instance, told reporters at a Pentagon briefing, "Don't go out and
write that there will be a cease fire tomorrow.

. . . These orientals

move slowly and they may want to dicker two or three weeks.

Despite

the feeling that the war was virtually over and the end of major

The New York Times, July 12, 1951? P* 5»
31ibid., July 2, 1951* p. 1.
3^Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. I82-I 83 .
33"Agreements Completed for Meeting to Discuss Truce in Korea,"
The Department of State Bulletin, Yol. XXY, No. 628 (July 9» 195^)> P*
k33Usherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 125.
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operations, there still were some small-scale, limited-objective attacks
and frequent reconnaissance patrols were sent out.

With the start of

negotiations, however, the tempo of combat operations slackened considerably.
In a letter to the New Yorker, E. J. Kahn, Jr., described the
reaction of US officers and troops to the diminished operations.
"I wish we could have kept the news from the troops," one
officer told me. "Now that they think there's a good chance
everything may be over in short order, it's inevitable that
some of them will ease up. Nobody wants to be the last man
killed in a war. It doesn't rate the same kind of glory the
first man g e t s . "3^
Despite the best efforts of senior officers to maintain a fighting edge
on the troops, the unofficial truce caused a problem as soldiers are
understandably reluctant to die when a war is considered to be nearly
ended.37

This problem for the UNC was not shared by its enemies, few

of whose soldiers thought that peace was close at hand.-^

The slackened

pace of operations cost the UN Army its combat edge and its initiative
but worked to the clear benefit of the Communist forces, now more able
to rest and recuperate.
One of the most stinging indictments of UN policy at this junc
ture is Kissinger's:

3^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 32.
J. Kahn, Jr., "Letter Prom Korea," New Yorker, July 7,
1951, p . 5U*
■37see "Foothold on Peace," The Nation, July 7, 195l» P* U*

3^Particularly instructive in this regard is Alexander L.
George, T h e Chinese Communist Army in Action (New York: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1967). See especially Chapter Seven, "Motivation and
Control of Combat Personnel," pp. 127-151* See also Hanson W. Baldwin,
"China as a Military Power," Foreign Affairs, October, 1951, P* 57,
especially p. 57*

Ik
The same attitude toward power which kept our diplomacy
from setting limits to our military aims after we had the
upper hand after Inchon also prevented us from drawing strength
from our military posture after we had opened negotiations for
an armistice. Our decision to stop military operations, except
those of a purely defensive nature, at the very beginning of
the armistice negotiations reflected our conviction that the
process of negotiation operated on its own inherent logic inde
pendently of the military pressures brought to bear. But by
stopping military operations we removed the only Chinese incen
tive for a settlement; we produced the frustration of two years
of inconclusive negotiations. In short, our insistence on
divorcing force from diplomacy caused our power to lack purpose
and our negotiations to lack force.39
One should not be misled here, however.

While ground operations were

greatly curtailed, the Navy blockade of North Korea and Air Force bomb
ing and interdiction missions continued unabated.^

This is not to say,

however, that their operations could replace the pressure on the Commun
ists from UN ground forces.

It is

enough to say that the initiative was

lost to the UN army.^

39Ki ssinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. ^0-^1.
Emphasis his. The impression should not be created, however, that all
leading US political figures subscribed to the dichotomy of military
and diplomatic power. The Administration was criticized by a number of
leading Republicans whose policy it was that the UNC should continue to
wage an offensive war. See Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and Ameri
can Politics: The Republican Party as a Ca.se Study (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, i9 6 0 ), p. 180. Caridi further argues
that "the Republican party's response to the Korean War in the July
1991
July 1992 period can be characterized by: a determination to
increase pressure on the Administration to terminate its limited war
policy; the conviction that the peace talks were being used by the Com
munists to shield an ever-increasing escalation; and the genesis of an
alternative foreign policy." (p. 182). See also his article "The G-.O.P.
and the Korean War," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 37 > No. k (Novem
ber, 1 9 68 ), pp. I423-I4I4.3 .
^Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics, p. 180.
^ O n how militarily important it is for an army to seize and
maintain the initiative, see Montgomery of Alamein, A History of War
fare, p. 2 2 .
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On Military Negotiators
While it is possible that a high-level political conference
might have been held to resolve the Korean question, the situation
seemed to warrant a military conference.

Dean Acheson in his Present

at the Creation sets forth the five reasons for the decision to hold
military talks:

CD

Neither Chinese nor North Korean authorities were recog
nized by the United States.

(2)

"It was highly desirable" to exclude political matters,
such as the status of Formosa or the admission of the
Chinese Communists into the UN, from the talks.

(3)

The forum of the United Nations was undesirable ("worst of
all places") as a setting for the conduct of negotiations.

(U)

The talks hinged on battlefield conditions at the time.

(5)

Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese assumed responsibility
for the CCF "volunteers."^

As Acheson pointed out, the military was very reluctant to assume re
sponsibility for the conduct of negotiations, but once assigned the task
by the President, they "loyally accepted."^

The task of actually choos

ing the UN negotiating team devolved to the UN commander in the field,
General Ridgway.

As his choice as UN senior delegate, Ridgway picked

US Navy Vice-Admiral C. Turner J o y.^- While there would be little
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 686.
U3ibid., pp. 686 -6 8 7 .
^■Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 182. The first UNC delegation
was composed of Joy; Major General Laurence C. Craigie, USAF; Major
General Henry I. Nodes, USA; Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; and
Major General Paik Sun Yup, ROKA. The Communist delegation: General
Nam II, North Korea Senior Delegate; Major General Lee Sang Cho, North
Korea; Major General Chang Pyong San, North Korea; Lieutenant General
Tung Hua, Chinese; and Major General Hsieh Fang, Chinese. As Vatcher
says in Panmunjom (p. 30n): "It was significant that the Communist
delegation contained three North Koreans and two Chinese, even though
the Chinese had 95 Pe** cent of the front-line troops. This was obvi
ously a propaganda move."
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dispute atout Joy's intellectual ability to handle his assignment, Wil
liam Yatcher has pointed out that in terms of the negotiating team per
sonnel, the advantage seemed to go to the Communists:
. . . the Communist senior delegate, North Korean General Nam
II and his so-called assistant, the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers, General Hsieh Pang, who actually was in
control of Nam II- "both of these men are political officers.
Both had been extensively trained in debating and the use of
Communist logic. Our senior delegate, Admiral C. Turner Joy,
and his successor, Lieut. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., had
backgrounds as fighting m e n , ^
Of course, it is possible for a military man to be a skillful
negotiator, but as Hans Morgenthau writes, it is unlikely:
. . . the military leader must think in absolute terms. He
lives in the present and in the immediate future. The sole
question before him is how to win victories as cheaply and
quickly as possible and how to avoid defeat. . . . whereas
the mind of the diplomat is complicated and subtle. It sees
the issue in hand as a moment in history, and beyond the vic
tory of tomorrow it anticipates the incalculable possibili
ties of the future.^+6
As General Collins observed, the " . . .

vacillating instructions and a

lack of firmness . . . distressed our negotiators, military men accus
tomed to sticking to decisions once made."^

While we would be remiss

in dismissing the military leader simply as a type, generally incapable
of the conduct of diplomatic conventions, there is something to say for
the thesis that by training and usually by temperament, the professional
^Yatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," p. 3 6 .
Ridgway corroborates Vatcher's point that Hsieh Fang was the real
leader of the delegation.
(The Korean War, p. 182).
^ H a n s J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972), pp. 55-6-51+7* See also Alfred
Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign
Relations (New Y o r k : K i n g ' s Crown P r e s s , 1 9 5 6 ) , especially Chapter
One, "Soldiers and Diplomats," pp. 1-12.
^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 331 •
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soldier is less inclined toward understanding and employing the shift
ing situations at the conference table than he would those on the bat
tlefield.

This was the opinion of Hanson Baldwin:

"Our mistakes- mis

takes that almost invariably recur when military men attempt to handle
the intangible of public relations like an operations plan- have,
regrettably, made it easier for the enemy to make black white.
The major mistake made at Kaesong was the failure of the Admin
istration to appreciate the inherent political implications of the
armistice talks.

General Ridgway, however, seems to have understood

that the conference was sure to have political ramifications.

He wanted

to keep Ambassador John J. Muccio and US political advisor William J.
Sebald at Munsan-ni, about twenty miles north of Seoul.

However, his

superiors in Washington refused permission fearing that the presence of
these diplomats would encourage Communist efforts to introduce clearly
political issues into the talks.

Ridgway had to ask Sebald to return

to his post in Tokyo and Muccio to remain in Seoul. 1±9
If the composition of the Communist truce team was a propaganda
ploy, the composition of the UN truce team indicated a cavalier disre
gard for propaganda.

The five team members (exclusive of staff) were

maintained at a constant ratio of four Americans and one South Korean
throughout the talks.

By November, 195>1 , the British press and politi

cians were asking why they had no representative on the UN truce team.^
This was a question that could have been asked with equal justification

^ The New York Times, July 12, 195>1 > P*
L.9
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 19-20.

2hf

^Freda Kirchwey, "Breaking the Circle," The Nation, November
1951, P. U35.
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t>y any of the nations that provided more than token contributions of
men to Korean combat.

Had representatives of other nations been includ

ed on the UN truce team, there would have been more emphasis to the
term "United Nations" and other nations could have shared the frustra
tions of attempting to negotiate with the Communists.

te

At the time there appeared little cause for concern over such
matters as which nations should be represented on the UN truce team.
The State Department thought that the truce talks would last only four
weeks.

b2

What real purpose, then, would be served by excessive concern

over the availability of political consultants, the ratio of the member
ship of the truce team or, as we have seen, the location of the site
for negotiations?

Matters thought trivial by the UN were regarded as

significant by the Communists.

What the UN team did not know in July,

1 9 5 1 » was that anything held to be important by either side during nego

tiations is ipso facto important and must be so regarded.
The Start of the Talks
At the time the Communists suggested that the talks be held at
Kaesong, it was a kind of no-man’s land, three miles south of the 38 th
parallel and appeared to be neutral territory, but once Ridgway
accepted, the Communists .immediately occupied it, requiring the UN
delegation to pass through their lines to arrive at the conference

^Yatcher, Parmmn.iom, p. 206.
^ " T h e Education of a General," Time, July 7* 1952, p. 2 3 .
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table.

Colonel J. C. Murray, USMC, the commander of the white flag

laden UN motor convoy to Kaesong on July 10, described the procession
this way:
As the procession wound through the town these buffoons
ludicrously assumed the demeanor of conquerors and perhaps as
many as a dozen cameramen dropped off along the route to photo
graph the spectacle. Without doubt these propaganda shots
have been circulated widely throughout the Communist world to
give substance to the myth of Communist victory in Korea.5U
Having arrived at his destination, Admiral Joy and his team,
still upset that their convoy to Kaesong would serve a Communist propa
ganda purpose, took their places at the conference table.

He wrote

latex*:
I seated myself at the conference table and almost sank
out of sight. The Communists had provided a chair for me
which was considerably shorter than a standard chair. Across
the table, the senior Communist delegate, General Ham II,
protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished stature.
This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam II with
a chair about four inches higher than usual. . . . I ex
changed my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but not
before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film.55
At a recess of the first meeting said Joy, MI was directly threatened by
56
a Communist guard who pointed a burp gun at me and growled menacingly."^
^Pehrenbach, The Fight for Korea, p. 9 8 . There is little
doubt that the UN was in a position to dictate details and formalities
had it insisted. In June-July, 1951 > time and momentum were on the
side of the UN; it is probable that the Communists would have accepted
any reasonable offer, such as the ship Jutland!.a, about the location
at which the talks would be held. Although it may seem paradoxical,
the hand of the UN would have been considerably strengthened by more
intransigence on its part. In rushing to accept the Communist offer
of Kaesong, the UN unwittingly undermined its own cause.
5^-J. C. Murray, "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 79 > No. 9 (September, 1953)>
p . 982; see also, Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 21.
55J0y , How Communists Negotiate, pp. i|-556jbid., p. 5*
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Another American officer was told "by a Communist guard that the gaudy
medal he wore had been awarded him for killing forty Americans. 57
Most observers might express surprise or shock at these calcu
lated, some might say childish, tactics, but from just these first few
hours it was evident that the Communists regarded negotiations as an
opportunity to enhance their image, at least in their own nations.
They also regarded the conference as a highly political matter, whereas
the UN employed every tactic to divorce this "military armistice" con
ference from issues of political importance, naively failing to appre
ciate the political undercurrents of the Kaesong meetings.
Nothing was overlooked by the Communists.

Their painstaking

attention to detail is attested to by William Vatcher in his account of
the intricate preparations made for the UN team:
The Communists had anticipated that we would live and eat
at Kaesong. They had prepared a building for the U.N. delega
tion and staff. The beds were even made. They offered us
food. They, being adept propagandists, recognized the value
of the maxim that one does not bite the hand that feeds him.
Admiral Joy rightfully declined the offer.58
Even the contrast in dress among the delegates was deliberate.

Except

for the ROKA delegate (who wore fatigues), the UNC officers were wear
ing summer tan uniforms.

The Chinese wore drab uniforms without insig

nia, but the North Koreans wore high-collar dress blouses, full insignia,

^ i b i d . , p. 5* Joy amusingly relates that during one of the
early conferences a UN interpreter placed a miniature UN flag in a
stand on the conference table. After a recess the delegates returned
to discover a miniature North Korean flag in a stand that rose six
inches higher than that of the UN. "All in the United Nations Command
Delegation speculated with amusement as to where an increase in the
height of the United Nations Command standard would lead. I hastened
to veto any tendency toward such competition, thereby perhaps averting
construction of the two tallest flagpoles on earth." (p. 8 ).
^Vatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," p. 3&.
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and high leather hoots.

They were clearly, in Hermes' phrase, the

"sartorial champions."
While Ridgway's instructions were simply to end the fighting on
reasonable terms and obtain assurances that it would not be renewed,

£>0

the Communists approached the table with a comprehensive plan, designed
to achieve a number of purposes.

The Communists were keenly aware of

the fact that no separation between the military and the political was
possible and they capitalized on every opportunity to make political,
psychological or propaganda capital out of a conference intended by the
61
UH to concern only military problems.

Initial Problems
Among the first difficulties for Joy and his team of negotia
tors was the problem of language.

Far more was involved than that

there were a number of languages spoken at Kaesong; the roots of the
problem went deeper, into the culture and into the political persua
sions and perceptions of the negotiators themselves.

If the mechanical

problem of translation was fairly easily solved, the problems of the
meanings and connotations of words were residual and persisted through
out the two-year period of the negotiations.

Words such as "logic,"

"reason," "injustice," and "democracy" meant markedly different things
to each team and literal interpretation served only to exacerbate the

^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 23.
^Vatcher, Panmunjom, p. 28, and Collins, War in Peacetime,

P. 330.
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p.

%0\\,
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situation. 62

Even the form of address first used by Admiral Joy was

found unsuitable by the Communists.
immediately rebutted by them:

Joy's allusion to "Communist" was

"The term 'Communists’ is not proper

£

here because you are not handling

sic

J

with the Communists but

with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers."
It was

not unreasonable, as David Rees wrote, for the Commun

ists to insistupon being called

"the delegation of the KPA and CPV";

however, in turn, they consistently referred to the ROK President and
Chiang Kai-shek as, respectively, "the murderer Rhee" and "your puppet
on Formosa."^

At one point Joy made mention of military power and its

role in the defeat of Japan, but General Ram II adamantly refused to
accept any intimations that it was American military power that had
defeated Japan.

It was obvious, said Nam II, that it was the Korean

people's struggle, the Chinese people's war, and the Soviet Union's
resistance that had defeated Japan.

The United States had fought Japan

for three years inconclusively until the intervention of the Soviet
Union dealt Japan a crushing blow.

"Can these historical facts be

negated lightly?" asked Nam II. 66
These distinct differences in terms of history, logic and forms
of address were later neatly summarized by General Mark Clark:
62

ibid., p. £06. Hermes continued, "As the negotiations wore
on,
the two delegations began to sound more and more like each other.
'The peace-loving peoples of the world' were always solidly lined up
behind the UNC or the Communist proposal. . . . " (p. £>06).
^Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 3 8 •
^^Rees, Korea, p. 293.
^Vatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," pp. 35 and
38.
As Walter Hermes observed, "Each side was obviously using a dif
ferent history book." Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 3 6 .
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Consistency in argument never was a characteristic of the
Communist negotiator. Nam II was no exception. We might "be
able to embarrass him occasionally, but we never could budge
him by argument or logic.
The manner in which the armistice talks were conducted
gave free rein to this Communist tactic of negotiation. There
was no moderator to decide whether a point had been proven
satisfactorily. There was no chairman to decide whether a
speaker was in order. There were no rules to require either
side to answer questions. ^6
Despite occasional Communist intransigence and interruptions,
despite the language problems and the irritation of incidents, some
petty, some relatively more important, and others actually amusing, the
negotiators were able to begin discussions on substantive issues.

Al

though the progress had been slower than most had expected, progress
was at least being made and within ten meetings an agreement on the
agenda had been worked out.

The struggle to establish the agenda is

representative of the clash of the two different viewpoints, if not two
distinct cultures.

Admiral Joy's apt illustration is worth full repro

duction:
Americans meeting to discuss arrangements for a baseball
game might adopt an agenda as follows:
1. Place the game is to be played.
2. Time the game is to start.
3- Selection of umpires.
Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this:
1. Agreement that the game is to be played at Shanghai.
2. Agreement that game be played at night.
3. Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials.
Thus the Communists seek to place their negotiating oppo
nents on the defensive from the outset. If the rigged agenda
is carelessly accepted by their opponents, the Communists are
able to argue that the only questions x'emaining are: exactly
where in Shanghai the ball game is to be played, exactly what

^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 103.
Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8.
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time at night the game is to start, and precisely which Chin
ese are to officiate. 68
The haggling over the agenda convinced a number of people that
in coming to the conference table the Communists were merely seeking a
de facto cease-fire.

The Under Secretary of the Army at the time,

Archibald S. Alexander, convinced that the Communists were seeking only
to gain time, declared that, "the closer you are to the field, . . .
69
the more you feel the truce talks are just a hoax." y

Late in July,

President Truman could say only that "we do not yet know whether the
Communists really desire peace in Korea or whether they are simply try
ing to gain by negotiations what they have not been able to gain by
70
conquest."
By July 27, the agenda problems had been settled as had, seem
ingly, other problems such as Communist guardsf brandishing of weapons
and the problems over the admission of western newsmen to cover the
proceedings.

The agenda that had been established called for discus

sions of five topics:
(1 ) The adoption of the agenda.
(2) The establishment of a military demarcation line (and a
demilitarized zone) as a basic condition for a cease-fire.
(3 ) Concrete arrangements for the cease-fire, including composi
tion, authority and functions of a supervising organization.
( W Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
(5) Recommendations to the governments of the countries con
cerned on both sides.
/TO

Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 18-19.
6?The New York Times, July 2k, 195>1> P- 3«
7°ibid., July 29, 19£l, p. 1.

Emphasis his.
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As discussions began in earnest over item 2 of the agenda,
there were recurring incidents culminating on August !{., when a heavilyarmed company of Chinese troops passed within a few hundred yards of
the UK team's headquarters.

General Ridgway, angered over the viola

tion of the neutral site, called off the conference until assured that
similar violations would not be repeated. 71
resumption of the talks on August 10.

So assured, he permitted a

The talks proceeded until the

Communists called them off on August 23.

During these days at Kaesong,

the principal substantive issue that was debated was the 38 th parallel.
The 38 th Parallel Controversy
Although the discussion of the location of the cease-fire line
72
as the second matter of business was later regarded by Joy as a mistake'
or by others as a Communist trap, 73
y those assessments do not appear to
be warranted.

At the time the Kaesong conference was begun, TJK Armies

were north of the 38 th parallel at almost every point.

Moreover, the

positions of the UK army were on naturally fortified key terrain and
represented the successful ground-gaining effort of the past year.

The

military difficulties of the CCF and KKPA afforded them, at the time,
little hope of regaining the ground they had lost.

An acceptance of

the offers of such UK leaders as Acheson, Ridgway and Lie that the 38 th
parallel would be a suitable demarcation line would have been the wise
course of action for the Communists.

"^Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 199*
72jc>y, How Communists Kegotiate, p. 28.
73"gci.-u0aAi.cn of a General," Time, July 7» 1952, p. 2 3 .
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However, at Kaesong:, the Communists discovered that the UN had
completely reversed itself and refused to accept the 3 8 th parallel as
the cease-fire line.

The UN now refused to consider any other cease

fire line than the line of contact between the opposing* armies at the
moment of signing.

While the Communists were happy to have the cease

fire line as the second item of the agenda, they were simply agreeing
to something that UN leaders, in their premature public utterances, had
already stipulated.

Now, at Kaesong, the UN negotiating team had to

endure Communist confusion, which was understandable, and their invec
tive, which was not.

As Robert Leckie points out, ". . . in fairness

to the Communists, the fixing of a demarcation line had been designated
as the first matter to be settled.

The United Nations attempt to make

it the line of contact at the time the armistice was signed looked like

For their part, the UN leaders realized that to accept the 3 8 th
parallel meant sacrificing both the ground gained in a year of war and
their excellent defensive positions.

Acceptance of the 3 8 th parallel,

in effect, meant a return to the status quo ante.

That their earlier

public position had been a faux pas was now seen by the UN leaders and
just as quickly abandoned.
^Leckie, Conflict, p. 3 1 6 . Emphasis his. Although the UN
insisted that the truce line be the line of contact between the oppos
ing armies, the first demand put forth at Panmunjom must have been
even more disconcerting to the Communists. Joy records that he first
proposed a northward adjustment of the line of contact to compensate
for the withdrawal of UN air and naval operations which ranged hundreds
of miles north of the battling armies. Although this was only a bar
gaining position and Joy quickly returned to the line of contact demand,
the Communists must have been discomposed by these insistences when, in
fact, they had been led to expect a quick agreement by the UN on their
goal of a cease-fire line on the 38 th parallel. This is discussed by
Joy in How Communists Negotiate, p. 60.
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Declaring on August 1 that the UN must have a defensible line
7
and that the 3 8 th parallel did not meet that requirement, ^ Dean Ache
son later admitted that the Communists must have been shocked:
The Russians and Chinese could well have been surprised,
chagrined, and given a cause to feel tricked when at Kaesong we
revealed a firm determination as a matter of major principle
not to accept the 38 th parallel as the armistice line. . . .
So it seems to me highly probable that the Russians and
Chinese . . . received a considerable shock when at the start
of a negotiation to restore, as they thought, the status quo
ante they found us demanding a new line for our sphere of influ
ence, not only more militarily significant but involving con
siderable loss of prestige for them. They would never imagine
that what appeared to be trickery was wholly inadvertent on our
part. It was exactly the kind of maneuver in which they would
have delighted.76
The demand of the UN for a cease-fire at the line of contact
was both sensible and justified.

The UNC had fought its way beyond the

imaginary parallel and established good defensive positions in key ter
rain; to sacrifice the gain and positions simply to restore the status
quo ante, and in effect to sanction the aggression, would have been
militarily and diplomatically unwise.

The problem was one of framework:

Acheson, Lie and Ridgway had made no effort to be circumspect —
reticent —

about UN objectives.

or

In publicly stating that the UN would

be willing to halt at the 38 th parallel, they fortified the Communist
cause, undermined their own, and added grist to the Communist propaganda
mill which had a field day in holding up to scorn the UN chameleonic
positions.
In international negotiation, closed societies have a distinct
advantage.

The statements of their political and military leaders are

7-^Facts on File, XI, No.

%6±

(July 27-August 2, 195>1 )> P* 21+1.

"^Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 689-690.
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not combed by the press for possible hidden meaning or ulterior motive;
their opinions are not published in newspapers or magazines without
careful censorship.

In any tense international moment, the expressions

of the leaders of the closed society are almost certain to be restrained
and carefully guarded.

Leaders of the open society, on the other hand,

must be concerned with informing the citizenry and justifying the aims
and directions of their adopted policies and their remarks, therefore,
are apt to be more spontaneous.

Even at tense moments, the leaders of

the open society will be more inclined to air their views and are less
likely to be censored than their counterparts in the closed society.
No better proof of this is available than that the statements of Secre
tary Acheson about the willingness of the UN to accept the 38 th paral
lel as an armistice line were first made at the MacArthur Investigation
proceedings.

77

Had Acheson, Ridgway and Lie understood that their premature
assessments of what would be suitable to UN purposes would later con
tribute to the enervation of their positions, they very probably would
have chosen to be less loquacious.

This recalls the argument adduced

in the first chapter that it is an error for public figures to specify
goals.

Such specificity severely restricts the opportunity for diplo

matic maneuvering and betrays the nation's goals or policies prematurely.
The gaffe of the UN leaders is especially regrettable in the

7?The 38 'fch parallel imbroglio illustrates the failure of key UN
leaders to appreciate the fact that before and during (and frequently
even after) negotiations, public statements must be guarded. Impru
dently uttered statements can easily be made to substantiate the
charges or strengthen the cause of the rival negotiator. At Kaesong
the Communists were able to charge the UN with deceitand dishonesty,
although ineptitude was the only offense of which the UN leaders were
guilty.
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context of the 38 th parallel controversy "because that issue could so
plainly have been resolved in favor of the UN from the standpoint of
either military power or objective logic.

That the Communists could,

with some justification, accuse the UN of bad faith, is a clear indi
cation of the extent to which the remarks of the UN leaders had served
the purposes of their enemies.

Robert Leckie summarizes the problem

well:
Nam's insistence on the Parallel was so illogical and ab
surd, even for Communists whose force of logic is the logic of
force, . . . that he and his colleagues must have been impressed
by Secretary of State Acheson’s remark on June 7 that the 38 th
Parallel would be a satisfactory demarcation line. A week
earlier UN Secretary-General Lie had said that a cease-fire
could be arranged at a line approximating the Parallel, and no
one in the United Nations had challenged Jacob Malik's phrase
in his June 23rd speech calling for "mutual withdrawal of forces
from the 3 8 th Parallel." Nam must have thought, then, that he
could get away with it. . . .78
The UN team was adamant that the demarcation line would be the line of
battlefield contact, not the 38 th parallel.
were not of a mind to save Communists face

As Admiral Joy said, "We

r

sic

J

by withdrawing

from hard-won ground above the 38 th parallel thus erasing any penalty
79
for their war of aggression.’’

Because there was little of substance

that the Communists could say to support their position, they resorted
to a tactic not generally considered part of any US negotiator’s stock
in trade, invective.

Said Admiral Joy:

When their arguments failed them they took refuge in
peration, insults and rage. You could always tell their
mate of the progress they were making from the amount of
ious propaganda that blared forth on the Communist radio

vitu
esti
obnox
and in

78Leckie, Conflict, p. 30U« See also: "The Course of Negotia
tions for a Cease-Fire in Korea," United Nations Bulletin, Yol. XI, No.
k (August 19, 195>l)> P- l^J-9•
79j0y > "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8•
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their press. When they were not doing1 so well it intensified.
I presume this was their way of putting pressure on their oppo
nents. 80
Because the other items on the agenda were related to the set
tlement of the cease-fire line, the problems that arose in settling
that issue precluded agreement on or even discussion of the subsequent
items.

There was, however, no genuine alternative.

The cease-fire

line had to be discussed and agreed upon prior to attempts to solve the
other problems.

While the Communists could have used the cease-fire

line issue to stall the conference in any circumstances, the inept pre
conference diplomacy of the UN leaders made matters considerably easier
for the Communists.

The Kaesong Talks Are Suspended
Progress in the talks at Kaesong, and in those to follow at
Panmunjom, was severely impeded by incidents which detracted from the
main concern of agreeing on the five-point agenda.

On July 12, just

two days after the talks had begun, General Ridgway broke off the talks
for three days because allied newsmen were not permitted to enter Kae
song.

Given assurances that Kaesong would become an open city, Ridgway

permitted the talks to resume on July l£.

On August

a heavily-armed

Chinese company passed within about one hundred yards of the UK truce
team headquarters.

This violation of Kaesong's neutrality resulted in

another suspension of the talks, this time for five days.

Other inciO -1

dents contributed to the tension and hostility of the talks.

The

^Qjbid., p. U8.
^1-For a dramatic contrast of views concerning such issues as
who staged the incidents and what purposes they were designed to serve,
cf. Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 30“38 with Stone, The Hidden
History of the Korean War, pp. 281+-298,
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impasse over the 3 8 th parallel only made a "bad situation worse.

Some

idea of the atmosphere at Kaesong is created by this description from
US News:
. . . Historians would he hard put to find a parallel for the
sessions Joy attends. Ten men, five for each side, sit facing
each other across a long table in a dimly lit room. There is
almost increasing argument, usually in the reserved form of
prepared statements, or there is glowering, hostility-ridden
silence. 82
Whether Kaesong ever could have become the site of agreement on
the issues of a cease-fire is now purely academic.

On the night of

August 22-23, Colonel Kinney, the Kaesong liaison officer, was summoned
from his tent to investigate charges that a UNC aircraft had bombed
Kaesong in an effort to kill the Communist negotiating team.

Kinney,

an experienced Air Force officer, was convinced that the attack was a
sham.

When the Communists demanded an immediate acknowledgment of the

attack, Kinney refused.

The Communists then announced an indefinite
o^
suspension of the armistice conference. ^
The peace talks were to resume, but not at Kaesong.

In late

October when the negotiating teams returned to the conference table,
the site, wisely if belatedly, had been changed to Panmunjom.

Chap ter Summary
The conference at Kaesong conformed to the traditional American
belief that a dichotomy should exist between war and diplomacy.

Most

^"Admiral Joy Works for Cease-Fire Under Difficulties,” US
Hews and World PLeport, August 2 I4, 1951, P« 2+0•
83Admiral Joy thought that the Communists broke off the talks
thinking that they had replenished their supplies and reinforced their
units to a point at which they believed a resumption of attacks against
the UNC would drive the battle line south to, or even past, the 38 th
parallel. How Communists Negotiate, pp. 36-37*
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Americans have been able to say with Churchill that "it is better to
jaw, jaw, than war, w a r . T h e

de facto cease-fire which accompanied

the start of negotiations at Kaesong testifies to the US inclination
to separate war and diplomacy rather than to understand them as inte
gral elements of foreign policy.
The works of the Prussian writer Karl von Clausewitz, for in
stance, are out of the mainstream of US (and in the Korean context, UK)
thinking.

Clausewitz recognized the relationship among foreign, domes

tic and military policies, whereas US diplomatic history suggests
American efforts to separate those policies.

That Lenin appears to

Ac:
have been highly influenced by the writings of Clausewitz, ^ is, of

course, no proof that the Communist negotiating team at Kaesong was so
influenced.

There is, however, something to say for the argument that

Communists, on the basis simply of their ideology, appreciate the sym
biotic relationship of politics and power; conversely, the UK negotia
tors at Kaesong approached the conference with an attitude toward, and
understanding of, diplomacy which excluded the notion that power and
politics are two sides of the same coin.
Had the UK leaders been keenly aware of the relationship between
diplomatic and military power, it is probable that the UK would have
delayed its response to Malik's "peace" offer,

that the talks would

^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 532.
^Edward M. Collins in Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics and
Power, trans. and ed. by Edward M. Collins, Gateway Edition (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1965), p. 31*
86 as Admiral Joy wrote:
"Washington immediately directed
General . . . Ridgway to broadcast . . . that the United Nations Com
mand was willing to discuss an armistice. This was not only done in
great haste; it was done without denouncing the 3 8 th Parallel as a line
of demarcation. The Communists, therefore, concluded that the United
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never have "been held at Kaesong, that the conference would have assumed
a clearly more political character, that the UN team would have been
professional diplomats from several nations (not professional soldiers
from only two), and that the inexorable, although limited, military
pressure upon the Communists would have been maintained not despite,
but because of, the initiation of peace talks.
A critical indictment of the UN leadership was the way in which
their ill-timed and ill-spoken remarks could later become so important
to the Communist side that one writer could argue that the UN "raised
their price" for peace (by insisting on the line of battlefield contact
for a demarcation line as opposed to the 38 th parallel) to avert
peace. 87'
In the absence of victory as a policy alternative, the UN was
confronted with the need to select one of two options:

the first was

that of continuing a limited war, without negotiations, for an unlimited
period of time.

This obviously was an unattractive choice.

The second

was that of waging limited offensive operations within a diplomatic,
negotiatory framework, carefully integrating military and diplomatic
objectives.

That the UN would choose the second option was evident

from the outset once the idea of uniting Korea by force of arms was
finally abandoned.

That the Communists believed the UN would employ

the second option only in a weak and ineffective manner may very well
Nations Command needed an armistice, and that the 38 th Parallel would
be a truce line acceptable to the United States. These misunderstand
ings cost us many months of fruitless negotiations." How Communists
Negotiate, p. l6 f?. See also "U.S., Russia in Peace Deal," US News and
World Report, June 22, 1991 > P» 13 1
similar analysis.
87stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, p. 2 8 7 .
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have been one of their considerations in deciding to negotiate.
A good portion of the argument, of course, turns on the ques
tion of how badly hurt the Communist armies were.

Assuming that they

needed a respite, and the evidence is strong in this regard, the Com
munists had to choose the path of negotiation, hoping in the face of
superior TOT military power to strike as agreeable a bargain as pos
sible.

To substantiate their hopes they had the public statements of

TOT leaders.

Similarly, even if the Communists never intended to nego

tiate seriously, they had the evidence of ITS diplomatic history that,
very likely, the UN military pressure would reside when talks began.
In either case, the Communists stood to gain:

in the former, they

could achieve a settlement instead of suffer a defeat; and in the lat
ter they could use the military recess to revivify their armies.
A combination of factors seems to have impelled the Communists
to break off the talks in late August by manufacturing a bombing inci
dent.

They realized that the bargain they wanted, and had been led to

expect, was no longer available to them.

The stalled TOT military

operations had afforded the Communists time to re-supply and their only
prospects for a return to the 38 th parallel were by earning it militar
ily.
Kaesong was a strange and unpleasant experience to Americans.
Going to Kaesong to discuss peace, they instead found another kind of
war:

a war of shortened chairs and heightened flagpoles, a war of

newsmen and staged incidents, a war of apparent trivia and childish
pranks.

But if Korea, as one US soldier put it, was " . . .

can't win, we can't lose, we can't quit,"

88

88 cited in Leckie, Conflict, p. 9*

the war we

it was so largely because
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the UN let it he that way.

Above all else, the Kaesong conference

demonstrated the UN failure to appreciate that the common denominator
of various approaches to diplomacy is power; in understanding the peace
conference as the conclusion of the war, instead of its culmination,
the UN only strengthened the hand of its opponent.

CHAPTER

THE

TALKS

AT

III

PANMUNJOM

Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron
wood.

— Stalin

The Military Situation
Although the Communists had broken off the talks at Kaesong on
August 23, 1951 > on the pretext of a TIN bombing raid designed to kill
the members of their truce team, on August 28 they demanded a reinves
tigation of their complaint.

Fearing that the Communists planned to

exhibit skillfully faked evidence, General Ridgway refused to re-open
the investigation.

While awaiting the Communists’ next move, Ridgway

had to endure the vilification of the Peking radio which called him a
’’liar" and a "criminal."

2

It is difficult to assess the Communist

intention in demanding a re-examination of the "evidence."

Perhaps

they expected to be able to win a propaganda victory by extracting an
apology from the TJNC and, with increased prestige and diplomatic momen
tum, continue the talks at Kaesong.

Perhaps the Communists believed

that it was unwise to attempt another military confrontation with the
TJNC and chose the re-examination-of-evidence ploy in hopes of continu
ing the talks.

Whatever their real motivation, with the talks

■^Cited in Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 6 8 .
2Facts on File, XI, No.

$6$
96

(August 2U-30, 19!?l)* P. 273.
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suspended, the Communists were once again confronted with the strong
military pressure from the TJN armies.
Between August 31 and November 12, the UNC waged some of the
most bitter battles of the war.

UN commanders began a series of lim

ited offenses designed to win key terrain, disrupt the CCF build-up,
and destroy the enemy forces.

This was the period of Bloody Ridge,

the Punchbowl, Heartbreak Ridge, and the siege of Kumsong.

The UNC

was taking casualties, but was inflicting serious damage upon the Com
munist military position and prestige.
The UNC was on the offensive in three major sectors of the
front in mid-September.

On September 10, General Yan Fleet estimated

that in the two previous weeks alone the Communists had suffered 2^,000
casualties.

On September 12, Yan Fleet said of the Communist army that

"They're in bad shape, and we are hurting them more and more.

They

will want peace before winter before w e ’re through with them."

As if

to confirm Yan Fleet's observations, the Chinese radio complained the
same day that the UN was "openly inviting war" with its "killer"
atta.cks.^

During this period of unrelenting UN military pressure, it

was General Ridgway who made the most telling comment.

Ridgway let it

be known that the farther the battlefront moved into North Korea, the
farther north the eventual cease-fire line would be.^
While UN gains in September were important, they paled by com
parison with the military successes achieved in early October.

What

Van Fleet called his "Autumn Offensive" resulted in UN casualty lists

^ibid., XI, No. 5>&7 (September 7“13> I95>1 )> P* 291.
^•"The Education of a General," Time, July 7> 195>2, p. 23; and
Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks, p. i|8 .
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of up to 2 ,0 0 0 a week, but about ten to fifteen times that many for the
Communists.

The ground gained was geographically small but strategi

cally important.

cs

Walter Hermes summarized the October operations this

way:
In October 195>1
Eighth Army had inflicted upon the enemy
the highest monthly total of casualties for the negotiations
period and had won valuable defensive terrain as well. More
over, there was little doubt that the UNC success on the bat
tlefield was a factor in the enemy’s decision to resume nego
tiations. ^
The clear relationship between military and diplomatic successes
is illustrated by the chain of events in the fall months of 1951 •

Ridg

way was determined not to repeat his mistake of holding truce talks
behind enemy lines and on September 23 refused to resume cease-fire
talks at Kaesong.

On September 27, however, he expressed willingness

to resume discussions at Songhyen, 8 miles east of Kaesong, in truly
neutral territory.

The Communists refused the offer and insisted that

the talks be held at Kaesong.

7

It was after this refusal by the Commun

ists that Ridgway said simply that the Eighth Army was ready if the
g
Communists wanted "to get on with war on an all-out scale."
Ridgway was willing to agree to practically any location for
the site of the talks so long as it was in neutral territory.

With the

UNC pressing its attacks, the UN and Communist commands agreed on Octo
ber 8 and 9 "to hold talks at Panmunjom, 6 miles southeast of Kaesong.

^Robert T. Oliver, Verdict in Korea (State College, Pa.:
Eagle Press, 1952), p. 21.

Bald

^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 507»
7Facts on File, XI, No. 569 (September 21-27, 1951), p. 305®ibid., No. 570 (September 28-0ctober 4, 1951), P« 31^4-
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Although the Communists had insisted only days before that talks be
resumed at Kaesong, they were now prepared to accept another site.
William Yatcher has argued that the change of heart was a result of
inexorable UN-military pressure.
Inasmuch as the Communists had thus conceded to UNC demands
to change the site of the talks, it can be concluded that the
military pressure being exerted against them at this time by
the UNC forces had a telling effect. There is strong evidence
to support the view that, had the meetings not been resumed at
this time, UNC forces again could have forged their way to the
vicinity of the Yalu and Tumen rivers within not too long a
period. . . . This experience did demonstrate the logic that
military pressure applied at vulnerable points at suitable
times has caused the enemy to alter his otherwise obstinate
stand.9
On October 25>, after a 63 -day lapse, Joy and Nam II resumed
their negotiations, this time at Panmunjom.

Three days later the Com

munists conceded on the cease-fire line impasse and agreed that the
current battle positions, not the 3 8 th parallel, could be the armis
tice line.

There still remained one major problem.

The UN team wise

ly insisted that the cease-fire line be fixed at the moment that the
final agreement on all the agenda matters was signed.

The Communists,

on the other hand, pointed out that the agenda required the establish
ment of the line before other matters were discussed.

With an estab

lished armistice line, the Communists effectively would have been free
from UN military pressure and could have been as intractable as they
pleased.

While the Communists had given in on the idea of the 3 8 th

parallel as the armistice line, they still held out in this one impor
tant, albeit subtle, respect.

Admiral Joy offers a succinct explana

tion:

^Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 73.
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The Communists wanted to fix the then existing1 "battle line as
the final demarcation line between both sides. Their strategy
was obvious. If the line were fixed once and for all, there
would be no reason for the Eighth Army to push them further
north because we would have to give them back the territory we
had gained when and if an armistice was signed. In short, the
Communists wanted a de facto cease-fire then and there as a
relief from the Eighth Army's pressure. But we insisted that
the demarcation line be the battle line as of the time of the
signing of the armistice. We realized, if the line were fixed
permanently before completion of the negotiations, the Commun
ists could stall to their hearts’ content over the remaining
items of the agenda. General Ridgway and the delegation felt
very strongly that this was a situation calling for more steel
and less silk. We felt certain the Communists would eventually
give in on this point, thus assuring us of the retention of the
negotiating initiative and of continuing pressure by the Eighth
Army.10
What happened, however, was precisely the opposite of what Joy and Ridg
way wanted.

Known later as the "Little Armistice," TIE policy following

the resumption of negotiations can be considered the greatest blunder
by the UK in the course of negotiations.

The Little Armistice
There is an important distinction to be made between what the
UK Army had achieved and what it was likely to achieve by continued
applied pressure and penetrations deeper into Korth Korea.

Strategi

cally, the Communist forward edge of the battle area had been pierced
although the UKC could claim as tangible evidence of success only a few
Korth Korean hills.

What mattered was that the initiative at the time

lay with the UKC; the tides of battle were working with the UK and
against the Communists.

When in late October the conference resumed

and the Communists agreed to abandon their insistence on the

28th

paral

lel as the cease-fire line, there occurred another de-emphasis on
-^Ojoy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 148.
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military operations with a concomitant belief that negotiations and the
diplomatic process, independent of applied power, would soon bring the
war to an end.

As Time reported, "optimism burgeoned; to the U.K.,

somewhat chastened by the long delay, peace seemed just around the cor
ner. n11
However, the UKC repeated the mistakes it had made when the
truce teams had first gone to Kaesong:

the emphasis was placed on bar

gaining and there was a dramatic slow-down in military operations.
Curiously, the first order for limiting the operations came from Ridgway himself.

On November 12 Ridgway ordered Yan Fleet to limit his

operations to the capture of outpost positions and to assume an "active
defense."

Van Fleet was, however, instructed to be prepared to exploit

opportunities to inflict heavy casualties.

As General Collins, then

Army Chief of Staff, records:
The JCS supported this decision. We felt that the existing
main line of contact would be satisfactory as the line of demar
cation for a demilitarised zone and could not be greatly im
proved without undue losses.
If Ridgway's orders retarded the progress of the UK army, the
subsequent orders— from whatever source— ended it.

While it is diffi

cult to document a cause-and-effect relationship between public pres
sure and actual military policy, there surely is a case to be made that
public confusion or misconstruction of events played a role in the
decision that the UK must now show good faith in its negotiations with
the Communists.

After all,

h a d they (the Communists) not yielded on

the matter of the 38"th parallel?

As one source had it:

ll"The Education of a General," Time, p. 2 3 .
1p

Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 3 H »
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. . . Every time the negotiators seem to he coming near to the
moment when orders to stop fighting will be given, something
happens. And usually- so far as the public knows- this takes
the form of announcement by the U.N. negotiators that there is
some new hitch they have just discovered and must iron out
before a truce can be signed. This process began months ago
when Secretary Acheson, on June 28, said we would agree to a
truce at the 3 8 th parallel and then, when the negotiations
started, took that back. . . . Why, with the essentials agreed
on and the Communists giving up their demand for the 3 8 th
parallel, is there no t r u c e ? 1 3
When the actual line of battlefield contact between the oppos
ing armies had finally been worked out (November 2 7 ), the plan later
called the "Little Armistice" went into effect.

The existing battle

line would be considered by both sides as a provisional demarcation
line for 30 days.

Neither side was obligated to stop fighting while

the other truce questions were debated; however, if a full armistice
agreement were signed within the 30 -day period, the provisional cease
fire line of November 27 would become permanent and the ground gained
by either side during the little armistice was to be given up.

If

there were no armistice by December 27» the truce line issue was to be
re-negotiated.

As Admiral Joy later wrote:

Presumably the decision had been made on the basis that it
would serve as an incentive for the Communists to show good
faith by speeding up agreement on honorable and equitable
terms. Instead of showing good faith, they dragged their
feet at every opportunity and used the 30 days of grace to
d i g and stabilize their battle l i n e . ^ U
The Little Armistice was intended both to induce the Communists
to show good faith and as ample testimony of UN willingness to nego
tiate.

Henry Kissinger has written of the fallacy behind these objec

tives :

-*-3"Do We Want a Truce?" Christian Century, November 28, 195>1 >
p.

1361+.

■^Joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8.
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It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle
international disputes if there is "good faith" and "willing
ness to come to an agreement." For in a revolutionary inter
national order, each power will seem to its opponent to lack
precisely these qualities. Diplomats can still meet but they
cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same lan
guage. In the absence of an agreement on what constitutes a
reasonable demand, diplomatic conferences are occupied with
sterile repetitions of basic positions and accusations of bad-, ^
faith, or allegations of "unreasonableness" and "subversion."
Land fighting had come to a stop on almost the entire front on
November 28, the day after the little armistice went into effect.
Whether a cease-fire actually was in effect became a matter of some
concern and of much debate.

As reported by The New York Times on

November 29:
An informal cease-fire seemed to be in effect yesterday
along most of the Korean war front. Gen. James A. Van Fleet
. . . indicated that he hadnot issued a cease-fire order,
and a spokesman for General Matthew B. Ridgway's headquarters
. . . supported the denial.
But it was apparent that word
had gone out to commanding officers at the front to refrain
from taking aggressive action.-1-^
One dispatch indicated that orders to stop fighting unless attacked had
been passed down to UN troops from "the highest source, possibly the
White House."

Other correspondents reported that UN troops were under

"don't shoot unless shot at" instructions.

While air operations and

some artillery barrages continued, a lull had settled over the Korean
front.
Under the terms of the little armistice, offensive military
operations were permissible but illogical.

Even if the UNC won a great

■^Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston:
Company, 1957)> P- 2.

Houghton Mifflin

-*-^The New York Times, November 29, 1951, P« !•
•^Facts on File, XI, No. 57^ (November 23-29, 1951)> PP« 377~378.
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deal of territory, thereby forcing the Communists to sign the armistice,
the TOT would then have to surrender the territory it had won at a cost
of thousands of casualties.

To a public understandably anxious to end

the war as inexpensively in casualties as possible, waging vigorous
offensive action at this juncture would have seemed counter-productive.
The Administration was in an awkward position.

Although there was an

obvious unofficial cease-fire in Korea, the President and the UNC
generals had to deny it:
It was obvious that the White House had moved quickly to
deny the dispatch /about a cease-fire/ lest the American pub
lic, and especially that part of it with sons and relatives
in the war zone, build up its hopes that all the fighting and
suffering in Korea was //~ sic _J about to come to an e n d . -*-8
Although one briefing officer said that "We anticipate we will refrain
from general offensive action during the thirty day period," 19 Presi
dent Truman strongly argued that battlefield pressure had to be maintained on the Communists to force acceptance of "a just armistice." 20
In an effort to keep confusion or political embarrassment to a minimum,
the Pentagon kept the Eighth Army's orders secret throughout November.
They were thought, however, to contain instructions to front-line com
manders to hold their strong defensive positions but not waste men
taking ground that would have to be returned to the Communists if the
items on the agenda were worked out and the armistice signed by Decem21
ber 2 7 .
l^The New York Times, November 29, 1951» P* U*

l^ibid., p. 2.
^ i b i d ., p. 1; and ibid., November 30, 1951, P* 1«
^ Facts on File, XI, No. 578 (November 23-29, 1951), P» 378.
See also, The New York Times, December 3> 1951, P« !+■ A good explana
tion of the controversy is in Collins, V/ar in Peacetime, pp. 311-312.

Time neatly summarized the effects of the little armistice:
Since the lull on the “battlefield, the Red negotiators
have been wholly intractable. The U.K. has no policy except
to try to wear down the Reds at the conference table. In the
game of waiting the U.H. is up against the champs. Once, the
U.K. had the advantage in Korea; now it has got into a con
test in which the advantage is with the e n e m y . 22
Throughout the 30-day period the front was relatively quiet, optimism
was again the fashion and the troops spoke of being home for Christmas.
Then, said Robert Leckie, "came the greatest disillusionment of the
Korean War."

By December 27 not even the slightest agreement on the

issues had been achieved; all that had been accomplished by the 30 -day
respite was that the Communists had fortified their positions.

As

Leckie expressed it, "Communist diplomacy, assisted by American naivete
had done Communist arms a great service."

21

**

What William Yatcher thought was perhaps the greatest blunder

by the UlT^ charted the course for the remainder of the Panmunjom talks
The UK had learned "rather late," said Admiral Joy, "that progress
negotiation with them ^/the CommunistsT" is in direct proportion to the
degree of military pressure applied."

Admiral Joy thought that the

little armistice was the turning point of the talks:
In retrospect, I believe this was the turning point of the
armistice conference, and a principal reason progress slowed to
a snail's pace from then on. In demonstrating our own good
faith, we lost the initiative, never to regain it. We were no
longer negotiating from a position of strength but from a posi
tion of military stalemate. . . . The end of the 30-dny time
limit was just another date on the calendar. Ho one wanted to
launch another ground offensive because the psychological handi
cap would be too large to overcome. The impetus was gone.25
22'iThe Reason," Time, April 28, 195>2, p. 28.

23Leckie, Conflict, p. 3^7•
2^-Vatcher, "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," p. 36.
2£joy, "How We Lost Out in the Korean Peace Talks," p. 1+8.
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While the Communists worked feverishly to improve their defensive positions,

26

the UNC was even willing to extend the deadline.

Washington

authorized Ridgway to continue the deadline for 15 days if the Commun
ists requested it.

As Time observed, not without sarcasm, the Commun

ists "did not ask; but it looked as if they would have it without
asking.

The Stalemated Talks
With the issue of the cease-fire "settled," the conferees at
Panmunjom began discussions of the third, fourth and fifth points of
the agenda; that is discussions centered upon a supervisory commission,
arrangements concerning prisoners of war (POW's) and recommendations to
governments of nations on both sides.

The cease-fire line was to

change very little in the remaining months of the war.

In early 1952

the Communists did not have the strength to move it and the UNC did
not have the authority; by 1953 the strengths of the opposing armies
were roughly equal.

Except for see-saw battles over certain hills and

ridges, the main line of resistance between the armies remained pretty
much the same as they were in late 1951*

This is not to say that no

bitter or bloody battles remained, but demonstrable military progress

^Leckie points out that by the spring of 1953» "the Chinese
main line of resistance was "among the most formidable fortifications
in the history of the world." Conflict, p. 317*
27 itAfter the Deadline," Time, January 7> 1952, p. 15* Shortly
before the expiration of the 30-day agreement, the Communists released
the names of some 12,000 UN prisoners, including 3,000 Americans.
Because another 8,000 US soldiers had been reported missing in action,
there was great public concern. Time observed:
" . . . Red timing was
adroit. . . . In the excitement, the failure of the U.N. strategists to
resume the war went almost unnoticed." "The Education of a General,"
p. 2i|.
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after the little armistice was slight.

The war had become one of words

and the TIN no longer had any policy except "to try beating down the Red
negotiators with verbal maneuvers and high-flown rhetoric— which had no
28
more effect than so much birdshot against a tank.”
As early as January, 1952, it was clear that the negotiations
were deadlocked.

The Communists were in the kind of battle for which,

at least by comparison with open societies, they are well-prepared.
The war in Korea appeared to be endless and truce talks to be incapable
of resolving the difficulties
were

and engendering peace.

The Communists

able to hope for victory by default; secure behind astrong, rein

forced main line of resistance they could now hope to erode TIN will
power by degrees through protracted "peace talks" and indecisive mili29
tary attrition. ^
Because a good deal of the U N ’s policy hinged upon subtle, if
not really abstruse, reasoning and political realities, the Communists
were able to employ diplomatic maneuvers which appealed to the western
public’s desire for quick and uncomplicated solutions.

An illustration

of this is the January 3 (1952) suggestion of Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Vishinsky.

A comprehensive program proposed by him that day to

the Security Council included the recommendation that truce talks be
transferred into the Security Council in an effort to break the dead
lock at Panmunjom.

He added to his presentation a number of phrases

which expressed his concern with ending the killing in Korea and
28niphe Education of a

General," Time,p. 21+.

^See, for instance, "Korea: Formula for Endless War," US News
and World Report, November 23, 1951 > PP* lU-15; and "How to Deal With
Communists," in ibid., January 11, 1952, pp. 19-21.
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lessening cold war tension.

Pointing out that in the Security Council

Russia would have a veto over any truce talk results, the United States
argued that Yishinsky's suggestion about the truce talks was a trick to
disrupt the talks at Panmunjom.

While a number of small nations in the

UN at first favored the Yishinsky peace proposal, the United States,
aided by Britain and Prance, warned that both the system of collective
security and a safe Korean truce would be endangered by this diplomatic
trap.

During this debate in the United Nations, truce talks at Panmun-

jom came to a standstill while the Communists awaited the outcome of
the Yishinsky proposal.

In separate votes on various aspects of his

plan, it was voted down on January 8-9, 1952.

30

Importantly, however,

Yishinsky had managed to win a propaganda victory, at least in some
quarters.

As one magazine reported:

/The rejection/ gives Communist propaganda a chance plaus
ibly to claim that we refuse even to explore Russian peace ad
vances which on their face appear reasonable. . . . Unless
there was something about the Yishinsky offer which has been
concealed from the public, the American response seems to us
to have been woefully mistaken.31
Any end to the war would have to come, therefore, at Panmunjom.
General Ridgway had let it be known that the object of his forces was
not victory, limited or complete, but peace.

UN negotiators had repeat

edly stressed that their goal was not to impose terms upon a vanquished
enemy but to negotiate a fair deal.

32

While patrolling and some

30Facts on File, XII, No. 581+ (January J+-10, 1952), p. 2.
3^!,Aaother Free Gift to Red Propaganda,1' Christian Century,
January 16, 1952, p. 60. The intriguing point about this passage is,
of course, that the editors themselves apparently had been taken in by
the Vishinsky proposal.
11Climax in Korea," US News and World Report, May 9> 1952, p.

15.
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skirmishes were authorized by Ridgway, several limited-objective attacks
proposed by Yan Fleet were turned down by Ridgway, either because they
would M. . . b e too costly in casualties or would adversely affect the
n e g o t i a t i o n s . U n d e r these conditions the type of negotiatory tac
tics best used by the Communists come to the fore.

Because the Commun

ists were relatively insulated from UR military power, they were able
to employ their standard tactic, explained by Admiral Joy:
On day after barren day the Communists will regurgitate the
identical statements, the same arguments, used endlessly before.
They seem to follow the philosophy of the small lad who had a
dollar bill changed into pennies at one bank, then back into a
bill at another, then back into pennies, ad infinitum. When
asked why he pursued this seemingly senseless practice, the lad
replied, "Sometime somebody is going to make a mistake, and it
isn't going to be m e . "34
By the spring of 195>2, it was clear that the Communists had all
along intended truce talks to serve a totally different purpose from
that intended by the TOT.

The Communists, by this time, had fortified

their positions so well that the TOT— unless it wanted to suffer dispro
portionate casualties— was able only to regret its mistakes, not cor
rect them.

As US Hews pointed out:

Truce talks, it finally is clear to U.S. negotiators, were a
Communist ruse and stalling tactic from the start.
Talk induced U.S. to end military pressure on Communist
armies when they were hard pressed. Talk led U.S. officials
^ C o l l i n s , War in Peacetime, p. 322.
Ridgway's conduct is
among the most puzzling aspects of the diplo-military side of the
Korean War. At times he appears to be the champion of the Realpolitik
viewpoint, the disciple of Clausewitz; at others, however, he seems
utterly oblivious of the relationship between politics and power. The
perplexing question of Ridgway's bifurcated approach, urging military
power at one time and forbidding its application at another, was not
resolved by research for this thesis. Surely part of the answer must
lie in the orders he received prior to the start of talks at Kaesong
and Panmunjom, although Collins offers little help in this regard.

-^Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 137-
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to announce that they no longer intended to try for a military
victory. . . . Truce talks, it turns out, have paid off in a
big way for the Communist forces.35
As is discussed below, the Communists’ use of wearying tactics was com
plemented by their employment of other, far more insidious, methods.
Despite Joy's best efforts, the nadir of negotiations for the UNC
occurred in his last month as UNC senior delegate.

"36

Issues and Techniques
If the UNC now fully understood that the Communists were using
the truce talks to wage war, not end it, it was equally clear by the
spring of 1952 that the methods of negotiation they used were based on
ethics and customs markedly different from those of the UN team.

One

of the techniques employed by the Communists, called "Red Herrings" by
Admiral Joy, became very important in early 1952:
A basic negotiating technique of Communists is to intro
duce spurious issues and use them as bargaining points. To
illustrate, imagine that two men are discussing the sale of an
automobile. Suppose that the seller demands $1,000 for his
car; the buyer offers $700. If the seller followed the Commun
ist method something like the following would occur. The Com
munist seller would propose that the buyer agree in writing to
purchase all his future automobiles from the same Communist
salesman. . . . You or I would terminate the discussion peremp
torily and find another source of the automobile we need. This
is not possible in international negotiations, however, since
"36
-'-'"Why
Communists Don't Want Truce," US News and World Renort,
May 16, 1952, p. 21*.
3^It is interesting to note that even at times when progress
was least evident, there were predictions of imminent success. For
instance, one of the bleakest months for the UNC was May, 1952; how
ever, the following had been reported in The New York Times on April
13, 1952: "Officials guiding truce negotiations in Korea said today
that an armistice probably would be agreed on fairly soon, possibly by
May 1." (p. 10). One is rarely justified in generalizing from speci
fic cases; however, one of the lessons of the Korean truce talks seems
to be that both negotiators and the general public are better served
"by moderate skepticism than by buoyant optimism.

Ill
matters of life and death are at stake. Accordingly, our anal
ogy must continue. After pressing his proposal to commit the
automobile buyer forever to buy from only one source, himself,
the Communist seller at last states that he will withdraw his
proposal only if the buyer will agree to pay $1,000 for the car
in question. When the buyer protests, the Communist seller
contends that he has made a great concession in withdrawing his
proposal; therefore the buyer should be willing to make a con
cession on the price of the car.37
While Admiral Joy's analogy sounds far-fetched, the tactic he
explained was used to advantage by the Communist team in early 195>2.
By the spring of 1952, their demands had been reduced to three.

They

wanted to build as many airfields as they desired in North Korea after
the truce; they wanted Russia accepted as a neutral in the truce super
vision; and they wanted all 132,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners
returned, regardless of whether they wanted to go back.
UNC prisoners of war would be turned over.

In return, the

As Joy wrote, the second

demand (acceptance of the USSR as a supervisory neutral) was inter
jected merely for trading purposes.
the right to build airfields.

In due course, it was traded for

The remaining months of frustrating

negotiations involved essentially one issue:
NKPA POW's who did not wish to return home.

the plight of CCF and
From their demand that all

prisoners be returned the Communists said they would never retreat; the
UN determination to resist involuntary repatriation was equally strong.-^
37j0y, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 89-90.
Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 125. It
should be pointed out, however, that Admiral Joy has written that the
UNC delegation at Panmunjom opposed the principle of voluntary repatria
tion, fearful that the Communists would subvert it to their own pur
poses on subsequent occasions. Joy favored an all-for-all exchange of
POW's which, he thought, could be effected much more quickly; he was
overruled by his superiors who saw in the principle of voluntary re
patriation both humanitarian considerations and propaganda potential.
How Communists Negotiate, pp. 150-153*
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The UN was completely •unprepared for the POW problem.

As Dean

Acheson later pointed out,
In the first place, it was a wholly unexpected issue to the
United Nations Command. It never occurred to the United
Nations negotiators that this would be an issue. . . .
When we saw the numbers who held these views /about not
wanting to be repatriated/ and the violence with which they
held them, it became clear that it would not only be highly
immoral and illegal to force these prisoners to return, but
that it would also require a military operation of no incon
siderable proportions to do it.39
A poll of the prisoners had been taken to determine how many wanted to
return to their Communist homelands.

Time reported the results:

These said they would "forcibly resist" repatriation:
l+lj.,000 out of 96,000 North Korean soldiers
15,600 out of 20,700 Chinese soldiers
The following were also unwilling to go back to Red Korea:
12,200 out of 16,000 South Koreans pressed into North
Korean service
29,800 out of 37>000 Korean civilian internees .. .
Red negotiators tried to persuade the UN to "revise" the
figures upward. When these efforts were unavailing, they
broke off the secret sessions and denounced the UN publicly,
alleging coercion and a "disgusting Anerican t r i c k . " U 0
President Truman knew that his intransigence on the matter of
voluntary repatriation would deadlock the conference indefinitely but
considered his decision morally necessary.

As he said:

To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It
would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian
principles which underlie our action in Korea. To return
these prisoners of war in our hands by force would result in
misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United
States and of the United Nations.

39pean Acheson, "The Truce Talks in Korea: A Pull Report to
the United Nations," Harper*s Magazine, January, 1993> PP» 23> 29^" T h e Prisoners Speak," Time, May 9> 1992, pp. 30-31? see also
"Climax: in Korea," US News and World Report, May 9> 1992, p. 17*
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We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings
for slaughter or s l a v e r y . ^8It is instructive to note that President Truman was willing, in the
Presidential election year of 1952 , to concede to the Communists on the
point of letting them build airfields in North Korea.

When on April 28

Admiral Joy presented the U N ’s Mfinal offer1’ it included approval for
the Communists to build airfields, a sacrifice of the UN premise that
no power should use the truce to make itself stronger.^

While Truman

may have been willing to give permission for the Communists to build
airfields, he was, to his credit, unyielding on the matter of voluntary
repatriation.

Robert Sherrod has called Truman’s refusal to permit

involuntary repatriation ’’one of the most important in history, perhaps
more important than the basic decision to halt communist aggression in
Korea.
Sherrod points out that the United States "could have had a
truce in a minute if we had chosen to turn back the 1 3 2 ,0 0 0 prisoners."^
Truman, however, did not want peace that badly.For the

first time

in

the truce talks, the UN team was debating something that clearly was
more a political than a military issue.

To be sure, this was the most

important issue of the negotiations, political or military.

The refus

al of great numbers of Communist soldiers to return home was a tremen
dous blow to Communist propaganda.

Despite their allegations of

^-’’Statement by the President," Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. 26, No. 673 (May 19, 1952), p. 787^Leckie, Conflict, p. 326.
^Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 127^ i b i d . , p. 1 2 7 .

Ilk
"American trickery," there was little the Communists could do to smooth
over such a stinging and residual political issue. ^
Appointed Superintendent of the US Naval Academy, Admiral Joy
left Panmunjom on May 22, 1952.

Before he left, he delivered his final

remarks to the Communists in which he said in part:
You have increasingly presented evidence before the world that
you did not enter these negotiations with sincerity and high
purpose, but rather that you entered them to gain time to re
pair your shattered forces and to try to accomplish at the con
ference table what your armies could not accomplish in the
field. . . . You impute to the United Nations Command the same
suspicion, greed and deviousness which are your stock in trade.
You search every word for a hidden meaning and every agreement
for a hidden trap.^-°
Joy's replacement, US Army Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr.,
was a lay Baptist evangelist who considered his bargaining rivals to be
criminals.

"The most important thing in dealing with a Communist,"

Harrison observed, "is to remember- and never forget- that you are deal)

7

ing with a common criminal."^'

William Vatcher pointed out in his book

^One Communist propaganda technique, the half-truth, is ex
plained in Joy’s book. Although Joy chooses an amusing illustration
with which to make his point, the technique he exposes is a particu
larly cunning and insidious one: "A man was accused of mayhem, it
being alleged that during a street fight he had bitten off the ear of
his opponent. There was only one witness to the fracas. The witness
was put on the stand by the lawyer for the accused. The lawyer asked:
'Bid you see my client bite off the ear of this man during the fight?'
The witness replied, 'I did not.' The lawyer for the accused, being
encouraged, then pursued the point further.
'I want this to be very
clear. You witnessed the entire fight, but you did not see my client
bite off his opponent's ear?' The witness replied, 'No, but I saw him
spit it out.' Now the Communist would never have allowed that last
statement to appear. He would have halted the record at the witness'
first reply, leaving an utterly false conclusion to the hearer." How
Communists Negotiate, pp. 102-103.
^C i t e d in Vatcher, Panmun.jom, p. 1^0.
^ C ited in ibid., p. 201)..
June 2, 1952, p.

See also "Joy's Successor," Newsweek,

n5
that after one meeting in which Harrison has argued his case well,
Vatcher complimented him on his eloquence.
those weren't my words.

Harrison replied, "Vatcher,

It was the Lord that put those words in my

m o u t h . D e s p i t e Harrison's military experience and his theological
erudition, his dismissal of the Communists as criminals and his appar
ent readiness to understand himself, in some circumstances, at least,
as an interlocutor with the Lord, are questionable personal attributes
of an international negotiator.

Without reflection on Harrison's

la

abilities, ^ one is justified in at least questioning whether one so
committed to absolutes is able to understand— and effectively deal
with— the nuances of international bargaining.

To Harrison was en

trusted the most delicate political bargaining of the two-year talks;
while he appeal’s to have done a creditable job under demanding circum
stances, his performance, as a professional soldier and as a man of
rigid opinion, would seem to be the exception and not the rule.

The Koje-do Riots
To the Communists the Korean War was more than a military con
flict to be waged by their armies; it was an opportunity to enhance
their prestige in the world.

In an effort to wring as much of propa

ganda value as they could from the war, the Communists resorted to
duplicity and deceit.

Trickery of the kind Admiral Joy first encoun

tered at Kaesong was complemented by a more vicious and brutal type of

^8Cited in Vatcher, Panmunjom, p. ll*9»
^ S e e ibid., p. li|9» &nd Collins, War in Peacetime, p.
for
an appraisal of Harrison's experience and ability. For a discussion of
religious people as diplomats, see Thompson, The Moral Issue in State
craft , p. 1 2 7 .
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propaganda.

To the Communists their capture of UNC soldiers provided

them the chance to gain "confessions" or "apologies" or similar state
ments from their captives that would he useful as propaganda weapons.
Although it is beside the point here to go into great detail about
Communist methods of brainwashing and their allegations that the UN
was waging a bacteriological warfare against North Korea,

5o

it is

important to point out that no aspect of the war was overlooked by the
Communists as a possible source of propaganda.

While much of the pro

paganda they used would have been quickly dismissed as such by most
Americans and west Europeans, the Asians— at whom most of the propa
ganda was directed— generally did not have the benefit of high levels
of education; they were less able to distinguish between objective fact
and manufactured fiction.

As Ridgway pointed out, the Communists "had

propaganda points to make and we did not perhaps appreciate that what
looked like obvious fakery and deception to us could be made to look
wholly different to the Asian peoples."

5l

It is only with some understanding of Communist propaganda
purposes that one can begin to appreciate their thinking about the pos
sible use of their own captured soldiers as a propaganda weapon.

Some

thing beyond the imagination of UN military planners occurred in Korea
as a matter of Communist routine:

over a period of months, the Commun

ists "gave" the United Nations Command prisoners, including even North
Korean colonels and commissars.

Understandably happy to capture these

high-ranking officers, the UN had imprisoned them on the island of

^ F o r a good analysis of Communist propaganda see Rees, Korea:
The Limited War, ch. 19 ("Peking: Bacteria for Peace").
The Korean War, p. 202.
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Koje-do, h-undreds of miles from the front.

As John Dille wrote:

. . . too late, we found out we had "been had. In our own rear
area, and under our very noses, the same colonels we had once
thought ourselves so lucky to capture set about organizing an
army. It was equipped with crude weapons made in our own com
pounds, and it was so defiant and well-led that it engineered
a series of mass prison revolts which stood us right on our
ears.52
In early 1952 there had been several riots on Koje Island which
were a source of some embarrassment to the UUC.

However, instead of

fairly but firmly tightening the military discipline that should have
prevailed, the Koje camp commander, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd,
was told by the Pentagon that his captives should be ’’pampered, soothed,
appeased— to make the truce talks run more s m o o t h l y . T h e organizers
planted by the Communists were not to be placated by a policy of leni
ency.
Asked to meet with a group of prisoners to discuss camp condi
tions, Dodd and another officer, unaccompanied and unarmed, went to see
them on the afternoon of May 7, 1952.

As Dodd indicated that the talks

would end, he and his aide were surrounded.

Unable to resist, Dodd was

captured and carried off into the compound, a prisoner in his own POW
camp.

His aide averted capture by hanging onto a gatepost for dear

life; even then the POW's would not release him until one of them was
bayonetted in the face by a US guard .^

52John Dille, Substitute for Victory (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1952), p. 12.
"^’’Koje Generals: Clark is Cleaning Up Mess. . .,” US Hews and
World Report, May 2 3 , 1952, p. 52.
5^Hal Vetter, Mutiny on Koje Island (Rutland, Vt.:
Tuttle Company, 1 965 ), p. 2 3 .

Charles E.
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Sent to restore order in the compound, BG Charles P. Colson
found himself on the horns of a dilemma.

The Communists wanted him to

sign statements to the effect that there would "be no more brutal treat
ment of the POW's at Koje.

Colson was told that if he refused to sign

the statements, the POW's would kill BG Dodd.

While Colson knew that

the Communist demands and allegations were ridiculous, he was anxious
to save Dodd's life.
Dodd was released.

Accordingly, he met their demands and on May 10,
As T. R. Fehrenbach has put it, it was as if the

Communist prisoners were saying, "please stop torturing us and we'll
give you your general back."

Colson's signing of statements to the

effect that the Communist POW's had been tortured was a tremendous
propaganda victory for the Communists.^
On May 12, General Mark Clark took over command of the TOT Army
from General Ridgway,

As Clark later wrote, Admiral Joy (still the TOTC

senior delegate at Panmunjom) was "absolutely flabbergasted" by the
Dodd incident.

Convinced that the incident had undermined him in his

negotiations, Joy said, "I'm certainly going to take a beating over
this at the conference table."

Of that there was no doubt.

Because

General Nam II had ordered the Koje riots, he was in an excellent posi
es
tion to exploit them at Panmunjom.
The numbers of Communist soldiers who had announced that they
^Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 612. For General Clark's
version of the Koje affair and the statements signed by Colson, see
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 33~b9•
^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 39.
tin

^'Leckie contends that Nam II had ordered the Koje kidnapping
(Conflict, p. 33U), and Yatcher agrees, saying that it was Nam II who
directed the riots (Panmunjom, p.
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would refuse repatriation were a major embarrassment to the Communists.
There was no better way to reverse the embarrassment and heap discredit
upon the UNC than by extorting statements to the effect that the pri
soners' refusal to return to their Communist homelands was the result
of UN torture.

Whether the prisoners "given" to the UNC were planted

expressly for the purpose of achieving these ends is unknown; there is
no question, however, that the organizers planted at Koje Island were
a credit to whoever first planned their objectives.
Although General Clark repudiated the statements signed by Col
son as extorted under duress, Nam II could still say that "your comman
dant admitted to the world your inhumane treatment and murderous vio
lence against our captured personnel."

His most important point, how

ever, was that the riots had "killed and buried the myth that our captured personnel refused to be r e p a t r i a t e d98
. S t i l l more ammunition
was available to Nam II when the UNC had to bring in BG Haydon L. Boatner to return discipline to Koje Island.
accomplish his mission:

Boatner had to use force to

although order had been re-established by mid-

June, about IjO POW's were killed and at Panmunjom the Communists were
able to claim that the UNC was once again using repressive violence
against the POW's.
The Koje-do incident illustrates the extent to which the Com
munists were prepared to go to maximize advantageous propaganda or to
neutralize disadvantageous propaganda. 99
^

Had it not been for the will

ingness of the UNC to tolerate the early POW disruptions and defiance

5®The New York Times, May 21, 1952, p. 2.
^See, for instance, Henry E. Lieberman, "Koje Prison Case
Grist for Propaganda Mill," in ibid., May 25, 1952, IV, p. 5*
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in the "interests" of progress in the truce talks, the Koje situation
might never have deteriorated so badly.

US News summarized the Koje

problem well:
. . . In return for the American general’s release, the pri
soners exacted a propaganda-rich statement implying that U.S.
troops had mistreated their prisoners grossly. The Communist
world chortled, broadcast the document throughout the Orient.
Red spokesmen pounced upon its terms to prolong the Korean
truce talks. The U.S. was seriously embarrassed. . . .
And, behind the Koje episode, critical observers find a
reason for many U.S. troubles in Korea. Communist officers
are trained not only in war, but also in politics and propa
ganda. American military men know how to fight, but little of
politics. So, in a war that has become more politics than
fighting, the Communists have outmatched American leaders.^0

Break-Through in Negotiations
Although the Koje-do affair, with its attendant adverse reac
tions among UN allies,^ hardened the opposition of Communist negotia
tors to the UNC's principle of no forcible repatriation, there was still
hope that the truce negotiations could be successfully concluded before
1953*

General Van Fleet, however, proved right in saying in July that

there was "less chance for an armistice /now/ than ever before."

6P

If

the present approach to resolving the conflict was not working, extreme
solutions, such as unilateral withdrawal of UN forces or all-out war,
were not seriously advocated,

61

and the wisdom of even limited-objective

^"Koje Generals. . .," US News, p. 5>2. See also Haydon L.
Boatner, "The Lessons of Koje-do," Army Magazine, March, 1972, pp. 3h37.
61

Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 3^7* li is a measure of the
success of Communist propaganda that, as Fehrenbach writes, " . . . some
of the United States' staunchest allies rather politely queried, 'just
what the hell is_ going on over at Koje-do?1" This Kind of War, p. 612.
^ T h e New York Times, July 31 > 1952, p. 2.
^3jbid., editorial, p. 22.
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attacks was questionable because of the well-fortified Communist main
line of resistance.
As General Clark later said, his mission in Korea was fundamen
tally defensive:
. . . My military mission as left for me by General . . . Ridgway, which had been prescribed to him by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and which I inherited, was a defensive mission. I did
not have the authority to launch a general offensive designed
to defeat the enemy.
Although there were costly battles such as those for Baldy Hill and
White Horse Hill, the general stalemate along the battlefront matched
the deadlock at the Panmunjom conference table.

If the two opposing

armies were roughly equal in strength, the two opposing truce teams had
reached an impasse on the POW repatriation issue.

In the general US

elections in November, the Republican ticket of Eisenhower and Nixon
had won.

Keeping his promise to go to Korea, President-elect Eisenhower

arrived there on December 2.

General Clark hoped that the new Adminis

tration would unleash his army and let him resume the offensive.

Al

though Clark was often with the new President, he did not have the
opportunity to present his plans for victory to Eisenhower.

Clark

became convinced that Eisenhower would seek an armistice on honorable
65
terms rather than outright military victory. ^
At the time of Eisenhower's visit to Korea, the prospects for
negotiated settlement were bleak at best.

On October 8, 1952, General

Harrison had walked out of the Panmunjom conference saying that he had

6^"You Can't Win a War if Diplomats Interfere," US News and
World Report, August 20, 195U, P« 75*
^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 233>
in Peacetime, p. 3 .

Collins, War
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no intention of returning until Nam II had something of substance to
say.

That substance was to come not from Nam II, but from India which

on November 17 offered an armistice settlement.

India proposed that no

prisoners should be repatriated against their wills but that those un
willing to be repatriated should be supervised by a five nation commis
sion made up of Poland and Czechoslavakia, both Communist, and Sweden
and Switzerland, both neutral, with a fifth nation serving as umpire.
Despite the fact that this was what the Communists would finally agree
to seven months later, Andrei Vishinsky automatically denounced the
proposal as "unacceptable, unsuitable, unbelievable, unsatisfactory."^
Robert Sherrod had made the point that the Communists might
have compromised, even on the POW issue had it not been for the defec
tion of so many Chinese.

It did not matter, Sherrod argues, that so

many North Koreans refused repatriation; but when llj.,000 of the 20,000
Chinese prisoners refused, "the loss of face was too much." '

Despite

the intransigence of the Communists on the repatriation issue, General
Clark in a letter of February 22, 1953? requested at least an exchange
of sick and wounded prisoners.

More than a month later (March 28) the

Communists agreed to the exchange, which was effected between April 19
/TO

and May 3> 1953*
In mid-April the battle for Pork Chop Hill competed for the
attention of the world's press with the exchange of the sick and wounded

^Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 127.
^ ibid., p. 1 2 7 ^ F o r details see "Real Story of the Returned Prisoners," US
News and World Report, May 29, 19535 PP* 5U-&3•
this exchange,
called "Operation Little Switch," there were 6 ,6 7 0 Communists and 681).
UNC personnel repatriated.
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prisoners which was about to occur. 69
y

In May, as the negotiators

worked out details of the truce, the fighting along the stalemated
battle line was savage.

The Communists had come full circle:

they

were now attempting to gain on the battlefield what had been denied
them at the conference table— a claim to victory.

With a genuine

diplomatic breakthrough on the horizon in the spring of 1953 > "the Com
munists decided to use the battlefield to win political points.

Com

munist military efforts to gain the last propaganda victories of the
war were described this way by Walter Hermes:
. . . the Communists decided to use the battlefield to apply
pressure upon the negotiations and to prepare some basis for
their claim of military victory. They had little hesitation
in expending lives to take a few more hills when the sacri
fice seemed to promote future political gain.70
If the spring, 1953? fighting was savage and costly to both
sides, it was strategically indecisive.

The plenary talks, which had

not been in session since General Harrison walked out of them in Octo
ber, were resumed on April 26, 1953*

® :le talks were now able to show

progress, although it was slow and unsure.

There were indications in

the spring, the fighting notwithstanding, that the Communists really
did want to conclude a truce.

After nearly three years of indecisive

combat and frustrating negotiations, the Communists' positive response
to General Clark's letter requesting exchange of sick and wounded
prisoners seemed to break the diplomatic logjam.

The Communists had

at last retreated from their former intractable position on the POW's
and, for the first time in the Korean truce talks, discussions

^ F o r an account of this battle, see S. L. A. Marshall, Pork
Chop Hill (Hew York: William Morrow and Company, 1956).
H e r m e s , Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. $0Q.
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concerned substantive issues and seemed capable of bringing about an
armistice.

Signing of the Armistice
As with many other questions dealing with the politics of the
Korean War, the question of what induced the Communists to sign the
armistice has only speculation as an answer.

While it is difficult to

point to a single incident or cause that so motivated them, one can
make the case that a number of occurrences, understood as a pattern,
convinced the Communist leaders that the expedient thing to do was to
make the truce.
On December 17» not long after his return from Korea, Presidentelect Eisenhower met with General MacArthur in New York City. 71

Al

though little of their conversation was made public at the time, the
President's eagerness to have the counsel of his nation's best-known
proponent of victory, as opposed to negotiated peace, established a
pattern followed by Eisenhower after his inauguration.

In his Febru

ary 2, 19^3, State of the Union message, Eisenhower said that the US
Seventh Fleet would no longer be employed to shield Communist China
from attacks by the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa.

As Robert Sherrod

has said, Eisenhower's deneutralization of Formosa was a signal that
"Chiang Kai-shek was being 'unleashed' to invade the China coast if he
chose."

72

Prudently, however, Eisenhower withheld from Chiang the use

of the Seventh Fleet which meant that Chiang1s troops had no way to
cross the Straits to attack the mainland.

Although the deneutralization

7^See MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. I|09-Ul5 for details.
72sherrod, "Inside Story of the Korean Truce," p. 127.

of Formosa was not of itself impressive, understood as part of a mood
of increasing belligerency, it gained significance.

As General Clark

has written, "I think /the Communists/7" feared that a new administration
with the backing of an exasperated American people, would go all out
for a military decision, whatever the cost, if a stalemate continued
73
much longer."
At a moment of uncertainty in Communist circles about the inten
tions of the Eisenhower Administration, their chief leader, Joseph
Stalin, died on March 5, 1953-

While it is difficult to ascertain the

effect of his death on the end of Communist intransigence at Panmunjom,
one can say at least that his death in no way interfered with the end
of the war and very probably hastened it.
As early as December, Senator Styles Bridges had advocated
"use of some of the new weapons, including atomic weapons if their
rj J

employment would save American lives."

For his part, Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles was already on record as saying that atomic
weapons in the hands of statesmen could serve as effective political
weapons.

If the Communists at this stage could only guess that the

Eisenhower Administration had adopted an atomic policy, they could be
sure after Dulles' visit to Indian Prime Minister Nehru in May.

Sher

man Adams later discussed these events in his book in which he points
out that the Eisenhower Administration had chosen an atomic solution
7^Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 2.
^"Atomize Foe If We Must," (interview with Senator Styles
Bridges) Newsweek, December 22, 1952, p. 19.
7^\John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, May 19,
1952, p. 152.
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to the Korean War:
The solution was a precisely stated intention to drop an
atomic bomb after full notification to the North Koreans of our
purposes. MacArthur was sure that there was not the remotest
chance we would actually have to carry out the threat; the Com
munists would simply throw up their hands and the war would be
over. Although not as blunt and specific as MacArthur had sug
gested, it was indeed the threat of atomic attack that even
tually did bring the Korean War to an end. . . .
That spring we moved atomic missiles to Okinawa. In May,
during talks with Nehru in India, Dulles said that the United
States could not be held responsible for failing to use atomic
weapons if a truce could not be arranged. This message was
planted deliberately in India so that it would get to the Chin
ese Communists, as it did. . . . I //ater/ asked ^/Eisenhower/
what it was that brought the Communists into line. "Danger of
an atomic war," he said without hesitation.76
As Secretary Dulles was to say in the famous "Drihksmanship"
article, "on the question of enlarging the Korean War, . . .
to the brink and we looked it in the face.

we walked

We took strong action.™77'

President Eisenhower supported Dulles by saying simply that his strat
egy was, if need be, to expand the war.

Eisenhower intended

to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the ab
sence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively
without inhibition in the use of our weapons, and would no
longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean
Peninsula.7o
’There is plenty of evidence," wrote David Rees, "that Eisenhower and
Dulles were in earnest about fighting a no-holds-barred war to unite

7^Sherman Adams, Firsthand Renorb (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1961), pp. J48-I19. See also Sherrod, "Inside Story of the
Korean Truce," p. 128.
77james Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16,
19^6, P* 78. Dulles indicated that no effort or weapon was to be held
back if the war continued (p. 71 )•
7^Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, 1993-1996. Vol.
I. Mandate for Change (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1963), P. 181.
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Korea, using atomic weapons and in which the trans-Yalu "bases would
79

have "been a t t a c k e d . ^

It is enough to record that, with his threat

registered, Dulles was listened to in June when he indicated that the
Communist military offensive was delaying peace.

80

The Eisenhower

Administration meant to have peace, even if it had to go to atomic war
to get it.
The two-month delay "between the time Dulles informed Nehru
that the US was willing to use atomic weapons in Korea and the signing
of the truce in June is attributable to a number of factors, foremost
among them the difficulties caused by Syngman Rhee*

When in early

June, 1953, it at last became clear that a concord of sorts was about
to be reached, the ROK president became as hard to deal with as the
Communists.

He continued his demands that Korea be unified by force

and, to emphasize the depth of his feelings, on June 18, he had his
troops cut the wires of prisoner compounds releasing about 2 5 ,0 0 0 pri
soners into South Korea (there was no danger here because most of the
prisoners had already indicated their desire to remain in the South.)
Although President Eisenhower called Rhee’s action "a bomb
shell" and on July 1 found it necessary in a news conference to remind
Q “I

a questioner that "the enemy is still in North Korea,"

General Col

lins has pointed out that Rhee’s actions were really a service to both
the UNC and to the Communists:
Rhee’s solution of the nonrepatriates problem was far
simpler than anything evolved at Panmunjom. His action per
formed a service to both the United Nations Command and the

^David Rees, Korea:

The Limited War, p. 5-18.

®^The New York Times, June 16, 1953, P« i*
^Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 185, 1 8 7 .
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Communists. It effectively reduced the number of repatriates
to he handled later by the TJ.N. Command, and it provided a
face-saving1 alibi to the Communists to cover their propaganda
defeat when so many of their captured soldiers refused to he
repatriated. They could now claim, as they did, that these
men had been "kidnapped" by the ROK f o r c e s . ^2
Rhee's "final solution" to the P0¥ problem and the Communists
consent to the plan for screening of the remaining POW’s (the same one
toward which Vishinsky had been so bitter in November) cleared the way
for the signing.

Minor problems still remained.

The Communists wanted

to paint Picasso’s peace doves at the entrance of the building in which
the armistice would be signed; the UN refused to permit the painting,
claiming it was a Communist propaganda device.^

Similarly, General

Clark demanded construction of another door on the building rather than
let his truce team pass through the only door on the north side, through
the Communist section of the building, and thus appear as suppliants for
peace.

To resolve the problem of vietor-vanquished seating, the tables
D)
were arranged on an east-west line.
On July 11, the ROK president agreed to the peace terms, al
though the ROK truce team representative boycotted the signing of the
armistice.

On July 27, 1953? after two years and seventeen days, 579

regular meetings and 18 million words, the Korean Armistice Agreement
was signed. 85
^

General Clark commented simply, "I cannot find it in me

^^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 357*
^Caridi, "The G.O.P. and the Korean War," p. 1+1+2; and Pacts on
Pile, XIII, No. 665 (July 2^-30, 1953), p. 21+5.
^Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 362 -3 6 3 .
^Vatcher, Panmun.iom, p. 1. For three views of the signing,
see: Dulles, "A Solemn Hour," Yital Speeches, Vol. 19, No. 21 (August
15, 1953), P« 61+3? Irving T. McDonald, "The Korean Truce: Will the End
Justify the Means?" in ibid., Vol. 19, No. 22 (August 15, 1953), PP*
677 -6 7 8 ; and Vera M. Dean, "Neither Munich nor Armageddon," Foreign
Policy Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 20 (July 1, 1953), p. h*
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to exult in the hour."

Chapter Summary
As General Van Fleet pointed out, before the conferences at
Kaesong and Panmunjom, the Communist armies were in serious trouble,^
and had to negotiate in order to assuage the UP military pressure.
However, the UP, on balance, was more anxious to demonstrate its good
intentions, its cordiality and its willingness to negotiate openly and
honestly than it was to exploit at the bargaining table its clear
superiority in the field.
The persistent desire of the UPC to understand negotiations as
the completion, rather than as the culmination of its efforts led at
Panmunjom to the single greatest diplo-military blunder of the war.

At

a moment of major strength, the UPC not only sacrificed its initiative
but guaranteed a self-imposed halt to its operations for 30 days.

At

the end of that time limit, the UPC offered to extend it for another
15 days.

During this period, the Communists built a major field forti

fication that, some sources contend, effectively changed the military
course of the war and ended the initiative of the UP Army for the rest
of the war.

At Panmunjom, the UPC learned that good diplomatic inten

tions are no insurance of equally desirable consequences.

^Cited in Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 693* -An excellent
analysis of the events and actions which led up to the signing of the
armistice is contained in Caridi1s The Korean War and American Politics,
ch. 9, "The Eisenhower Peace," pp. 246-281.
"Enemy in Korea Stronger Than Ever," (interview with Van
Fleet), US Pews and World Perort, March 28, 1952, p. 24. Van Fleet
contended, "I have always felt that the enemy’s desire for a cease-fire
was in direct ratio to the military pressure on him." (p. 2 4 ).

130
The best UP efforts to maintain a diplomatic equilibrium pro
duced precisely the opposite effect in the Koje incident.

Unwilling to

risk the possible bad publicity of a disciplinary crack-down on the
obstreperous ROW compound, the UPC permitted a bad situation to get
worse; had the Koje commander been ordered to tighten discipline, the
UPC might have had to endure a few days of unpleasant Communist rhetor
ic.

As it turned out, Koje Island became a two-month imbroglio that

upset the whole course of negotiations.
Only after the Eisenhower Administration threatened the Commun
ists with an expanded and atomic war, did they end their dilatory tac
tics and begin to discuss matters of substance.

In the opinion of

Admiral Joy:
. . . what influenced them most, I feel certain, were ominous
sounds of impending expanded warfare, the prospect of United
Pations Command forces being released from their confinement
to Korea and allowed to range over Red China. . . . Thus at
the last, the one negotiating factor that Communists respect
above all else was beginning to appear: naked, massive power
and the willingness to use that power when n e c e s s a r y .
The temptation is to say that much the same results could have been
attained earlier by the Truman Administration.

This question, of

course, cannot be resolved; what is more likely is that by the time
Eisenhower threatened to use atomic bombs, Communist prestige was not
so much in jeopardy as it was, say, one or two years earlier.

Because

the Eisenhower Administration had the prudence not to broadcast its
ultimatum to the world, the Communists could conclude an armistice
without a concomitant loss of face.

The matter of timing is particu

larly important to any diplomatic effort and belies general principles
claiming to be universal.
88joy, How Communists Pegotiate, pp. l6l-l62.
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The proper method and timing of the Eisenhower Administration
only underscores the failure of earlier efforts at Kaesong and Panmun
jom.

At those conferences the UPC was anxious to prove its good will

and thus subverted its own power.

Particularly at Panmunjom, the UPC

mistook the shadow of a promised peace for the substance of applied
power; it failed to recognize there, as at Kaesong, that diplomatic
and military activities are correlates.
to it are discussed in the Conclusion.

This point and matters related

CHAPTER

TV

CONCLUSION

It is as fatal in politics to ignore power as it is to ignore
morality . 1
— E. H. Carr

This study of the diplo-military events of the Korean War
reveals a mixed success for UN leaders.

Two themes help explain the UN

involvement in and prosecution of the Korean War:
self interest.

high purpose and

One of the principal reasons that this thesis has been
/

given the sub-title "a study in negotiatory naivete” is that the UN
leaders invariably confused these two themes or attempted to explain
their participation in the war primarily in terms of the former theme,
while attributing the latter to the baser instincts of the Communist
bloc.

When the UN resorted to explaining its conduct on the basis of

high purpose, it impaired the progress of negotiation, for nations
negotiate on the basis of self-interest, not high purpose.

As

explained by Fred Ikle'*:
Two elements must normally be present for negotiation to
take place: there must be both common interests and issues
of conflict. Without common interest there is nothing to
negotiate for, without conflict /there is/ nothing to nego
tiate about. ^

■^Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939» Harper
Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, I96 I4.), p. 97*
2

/

Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, p. 2.
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There is, however, something to be said for the UN "high pur
pose rationale."

As Robert Leckie has put it:

The United Nations made no attempt to deceive the world,
did not torture or murder or brainwash or remain indifferent
to human suffering. There might have been lapses in this
direction, as there are in every army, but they were in con
tradiction to a policy of compassion.3
"While the two elements of successful international relations (selfinterest and high purpose) were present in the policy of the United
Nations, it was in seeking to maintain an arbitrary division between
politics and power that the UN leaders confounded their purpose^- and
compromised their strength.

The rhetoric of UN leaders obscured their

understanding of the role of the UN in Korea as having been fundamen
tally shaped by a regard for self-interest and the desire to save face.
Thomas Schelling offers this explanation:
"Face" is merely the interdependence of a country’s com
mitments; it is a country’s reputation for action, the expec
tations other countries have about its behavior. We lost
thirty thousand dead in Korea to save face for the United
States and the United Nations, not to save South Korea for
the South Koreans, and it was undoubtedly worth it.3

^Leckie, Conflict, p. 399* As Walter Hermes has observed, the
Communists could distort history, manufacture false charges and create
incidents in POW camps because for them the dialectic permits the end
to justify the means. These tactics, he says, "were as much a part of
the Communist arsenal as the yelling, cursing, insults and discourtesy
in the conference tent. They were all part of the game to discompose
the opponent through every kind of pressure." Truce Tent and Fighting
Front, pp. 505-506»
^"As Henry Kissinger
our objectives dependent on
with the fortunes of battle
the security of our forces,
Weapons and Foreign Policy,

said: "Throughout the Korean
the military situation: they
between repelling aggression,
and a guaranteed armistice."
p. %0.

^Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 121+.

War we made
fluctuated
unification,
Nuclear
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In coming to the negotiating tables at Kaesong and Panmunjom,
the UN practically ceased its offensive military operations, thus
removing the sole impetus for the Communists to come to reasonable
terms.

The diminished operations were the natural result of the buoy

ant UN hope that the start of the talks signalled the end of the war.
Thus, for the UN, talks meant the imminent end of hostilities; for the
Communists, truce talks meant the opportunity to continue hostilities
by other, that is non-military, means.

Instead of regarding the talks

as a diplo-military conference, the UN sought to segregate political
affairs from the problems of the battlefield.

Yet, contrary to their

wishes and despite the protests of Admiral Joy, UN negotiators were
called upon to handle the most inflammatory (and clearly political)
issue of the truce talks:

the POW voluntary repatriation affair.^

In handling the political matters that arose at Kaesong and
Panmunjom, the UN negotiators, despite their creditable performance,
were at a disadvantage because the Communist "soldiers" were in fact
trained, professional diplomats.

While dealing in stereotypes and

generalities is rarely very helpful, it is at least worth considering
the possible influence upon the negotiations that professional UN
diplomats might have exerted.

An example is provided by Lord Strang:

Apart altogether from effective military power or the
prestige that rests on military potential, there are fac
tors which can weigh substantially in the diplomatic scales.
One of them is sheer diplomatic skill. Power of exposition,
choice of timing, the appeal to reason or to good faith or

6Admiral Joy pointed out that "It must be admitted . . . that
besides humanitarian considerations, the major objective of the
Washington decision to insist on voluntary repatriation was to inflict
upon the Communists a propaganda defeat. . . . Voluntary repatriation
cost us over a year of war." How Communists Negotiate, p. 152.
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to international comity and morality, or to personal relation
ship, or to self-interest; the canvassing of support, the
judicious threat, the dangled inducement, the hint of support
or opposition on other issues, the sagacious estimate of the
. . . strength and standing of the other government: as
between well-matched adversaries, these skills can play a
substantial role.^
Because the TIN tried so hard to separate political and military matters,
the employment of professional diplomats at the truce talks was out of
the question.
Shortly before the armistice pact was agreed upon, General Mark
Clark said of dealing with Communists, whether at Moscow or Panmunjom,
that they showed the "same dishonesty and the same duplicity.
have no decency, no honesty.

They

They are cheaters, murderers and liars

and they would stoop to anything to attain their aim of world cono

quest."

Although he probably did not have Clark in mind, William

Yatcher offered a comment that may be understood as an answer to
General Clark:
It must be understood that such methods as the Communists
employ in negotiations are to them entirely legitimate. To
them the nature of their ultimate end justifies the use of any
tactic. The tragedy of Korea was that the United Nations Com
mand did not accept this fact from the beginning.''
In negotiation, the bargainer must have sure knowledge of his
own means and ends and have the best intelligence about those of his
opponent that can be ascertained by serious and sustained study.

The

TIN leaders failed to appreciate that at least in dedication to the

^Lord William Strang, Britain in World Affairs: The Fluctua
tion in Power and Influence from Kenry VIII to Elizabeth II (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 153*
®The New York Times, March 28, 1953» P* 3«
^Yatcher, Panmunjom, p. 216.
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realization of their goals, the Communists were paragons of moral vir
tue.

In expecting or hoping that the Communists would subscribe to

western rules or traditions, cherish western values and conduct their
diplomacy according to some western-fashioned handbook of negotiations,
the UN leaders were chimerical.

Ethics, morality, justice and other

paradigms of spiritual excellence are important to the life of any
society.

Yet in the relations that occur among states, who will be

chosen as umpire to determine which local paradigms shall be univer
salized?

Until there be consensus upon the right means and ends, the

currency of diplomacy will be power.
According to Hans Morgenthau, power "may comprise anything that
establishes and maintains control of man over m a n . W h i l e

the UN

leaders were loath to recognize the residual importance of power to
diplomatic concerns, the Communists used every opportunity and device
to enhance their standing by winning propaganda victories and combining
their military and diplomatic resources.
Korea was a failure of its power.

The failure of the UN in

The UN did not prosecute the war

with unrelenting determination, even within its self-imposed restric
tions, thus requiring the Communists to come to and stay at the bar
gaining table; the UN did not assess its options and exploit them in
light of its power premium; the UN failed to produce and adhere to a
comprehensive program of goals and diplo-military objectives.
The failure of the UN to use and exploit its margin of military
superiority— to translate it into advantage at the conference table— is
amply testified to by events in the first year of the conflict alone.

10jYjorgenth.au, Politics Among Nations, p. 9«
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On December 13, 1990, the United Nations passed a measure asking the
Communist Chinese for a cease-fire in Korea.

Peking’s answer was to

demand a UN withdrawal from Korea, US withdrawal from Formosa and ces
sation of rearmament plans by the entire anti-Communist world. ^

On

December 22, Chou En-lai indicated that his government would not even
discuss a cease-fire until his demands were met.

Demands for UN with

drawal from Korea and US withdrawal from Formosa were reiterated and
the ultimatum was made that Fed China have a seat in the UN.

Chou

En-lai also declared that when US forces crossed the 38 th Parallel in
October, it had been "obliterated forever" as a "demarcation line of
political geography," and that he would not be taken in by "U.S. strategy to first obtain a cease-fire and later negotiate."

12

As was pointed out in the preceding chapters, all these goals
were abandoned by the Communists when they were subjected to sufficient
pressure. 11

"Pressure" may be understood either as overt, such as

military attack, or covert, such as psychological influence.

Fred Ikle"

offers a succinct explanation:
The Korean armistice negotiations might have been ended
faster or on terms more agreeable to the West had Peking been
left in greater doubt whether or not the mainland (then exceed
ingly vulnerable) might have been attacked from the air or the
sea. At least the threat should have been kept alive that the
United Nations forces would try to regain part of North Korea.
On February 3> 195>11 months before the armistice talks had even
started, the State Department declared . . . "that the restora
tion of peace in Korea would not be helped by ’speculation’

Facts on File, X, No. 5>28 (December 8—l2p, 1990), p. 397; and
The New York Times, December lip, 1990, p. 1.
Facts on File, X, No. 930 (December 22-28, 1990 ), P- Ipllp; and
The New York Times, December 23, 1990, p. 1.
^3see Fred C. Ikle^ Every War Must End (New York:
University Press, 197l)> P* 88 for a discussion.
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about whether U.N. forces would or would not cross the 3 8 th
Parallel if they reached it in a new offensive." The restora
tion of peace might indeed have been helped if just such
speculation had been encouraged very loudly in Washington! ^
Desire to expedite negotiation was a critical factor in at
least the initial approach to the truce talks adopted by the UN leaders.
As General Collins has pointed out, the UNC delegation was under pres
sure from the US government to conclude the talks on agreeable terms as
quickly as possible.

Responsible both to American and allied public

opinion, the US government knew that people were becoming anxious to
end the war.

The Communists, however, were "habitually less concerned

with time and human losses _/and7 were better equipped, both tempera
mentally and with instructions from their governments, to hold out for
concessions." 15>

Iklefhas made the point that "often one side suffers

far more from the postponement of an agreement than the other side.
Such an asymmetry is one of the most cogent factors in pushing the side
that is in a hurry toward its minimum position.

With the UN so

desirous of a quick peace, it is all the more puzzling that they were
so ready to abandon military pressure when the talks began. 17
Cataloguing the diplo-military mistakes of the United States
during the Korean War is not a particularly difficult task.

What is

"^Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, pp. 2^0-2^1; and The New York
Times, February 3> 1951» P« 2.
■^Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 331* Vatcher discusses the
influence of the US government in the UNC delegation in Panmunjom, p.

208.

•^Ikle^ How Nations Negotiate, p. 72.
■^Ikle^ says in ibid. that the "negotiations would probably have
led to an agreement much sooner, or on terms more favorable to the
United Nations side, if the latter had been able to demonstrate to the
Communist side that it might launch a major offensive." (p. 29)
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difficult, however, is the job of weaving those mistakes into the
fabric of a conspiracy either by or against the US.
conspiracy" have made the effort.

Two "schools of

The first, arising during the Korean

War and reaching its climax shortly after it, saw the mistakes made
during the war and the war's inconclusive end as evidence of a pattern
of Communist influence upon or control of the workings of the US govern
ment.

The second, the most visible advocate of which is I. F. Stone,

saw the "mistakes" of the war as a pattern of American aggression;

"I^

he saw in the truce talks, for instance, evidence of American procras
tination and attributed to the US government— or certain of its leaders
— a conspiracy against world peace.
The trouble with conspiracy theories is not that those who hold
them find in the conspirators an -unparalleled bent for fiendish and
diabolical scheming.

Rather, the problem is that those who have "dis

covered" conspiracies attribute to the conspirators an efficiency and
purposiveness to the point of perfection.

It is instructive that both

schools draw on much the same data presented in the three preceding
chapters of this thesis; while each school draws totally different con
clusions, the basic information is, remarkably, much the same.
The evidence adduced by this thesis has not been that the US
government was the victim of an internal Communist conspiracy nor that
the US government plotted against the peace of the world.

The argument

presented throughout has been that the UN-US fought a necessary fight
“|O
Besides Stone's Hidden History of the Korean War, see a
Christian Century editorial, August 22, 1951*
examples: "There
have been suggestions that the delays at Kaesong were caused by a
mutual face-saving contest and even more cynical suggestions that the
U.S. administration did not want the Kaesong talks to end before its
gigantic $58 billion arms bill had passed Congress." (editorial, p.
955).
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in Korea and, on the whole, performed creditably.

There were, however,

serious and repeated mistakes, misconstructions and misjudgments, the
roots of which were in the reluctance of UN leaders to regard power and
politics as two sides of the same coin.

The thesis, in short, has

sought to marshal data to demonstrate that the UN effort in Korea is a
/

suitable subject for "a study in negotiatory naivete."
The problems of the Korean War truce talks are not

peculiar to

that trying two-year period of negotiation. Panmunjom was also the
site of negotiations between North Koreans and Americans bargaining for
the release of the U.S.S. Pueblo.

While it is beyond the scope of this

thesis to dwell at length on the Pueblo negotiations, it is interesting
to note the similarities in the styles of the Communist negotiators.
During the Pueblo talks, North Korean General Pak Chong-guk, while con
demning the United States in obscene terms, referred to the late Presi
dent Kennedy as a "putrid corpse" and to then President Johnson as a
"living corpse" sure to meet Kennedy’s fate if the US persisted in its
"mad imperialism." 19

The vilification and seemingly senseless ad

hominem argumentation was a page from the notebook of General Nam II,
fifteen years before.

Calculated to enrage and disconcert the western

negotiator, the Communist method of invective and insult will be ineffec
tive against a dispassionate diplomat, intent upon the substance of
negotiation.

While it is difficult to determine if the Communist

imprecations were successful in distracting the US negotiators during
the Pueblo talks, Admiral John V. Smith, a US Pueblo negotiator, said
of the North Koreans in 19&9 that they were "Mongolian savages . . .

-^Fehrenbach, The Fight for Korea, p. 1^2.
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disciplined rabble . . . mad dogs just a step above animals."

20

As

long as western negotiators expect their cultural ethos to prevail at
international conferences, there will be substantive problems for
negotiators of all nations.

While the maledictions uttered by the

North Koreans during the Pueblo talks surely would have been distaste
ful to (and perhaps beyond the ken of) any western or democratic nego
tiator, the diplomat must steel himself to the problems at hand and
regard insult as an annoying tactic, not a substantive issue.
If there is an example of the ideas and arguments presented in
this thesis, it is the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam in
December, 1972.

In the words of Henry Kissinger, the President and he

"came to the conclusion that the negotiations as they were then being
conducted were not serious, that . . . the North Vietnamese at that
point had come to the conclusion that protracting the negotiations was
more in their interest than concluding them."

Kissinger had observed

that "the more difficult Hanoi was, the more rigid Saigon grew, and we
could see a prospect, therefore, where we would be caught between two
contending Vietnamese parties with no element introduced that would
change their opinion."

Afraid that his negotiations with North Viet

namese negotiator Le Due Tho would serve only the ends of propaganda,
Kissinger said that "it was decided to try to bring home really to both
Vietnamese parties that the continuation of the war had its price." 21
2QFacts on Pile, XXVIII, No. 11*82 (March 20-26, 19 69 ), p. 166.
Recent books concerning post-Korea negotiations with the Chinese are:
Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates (New York: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1968) and Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese
Communists: The United States Experience. 1998-1967 (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 190 8 .
21Pacts on File, XXXIII, No. 1683 (January 28-February 3, 1973)»

P. 71.
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When the last round of talks between Le Due Tho and Kissinger
collapsed on December 13, 1972, the United States began a series of
massive air strikes on North Vietnam.

A December 22 statement issued

from the White House indicated that President Nixon was determined to
continue the bombing until Hanoi decided to resume serious negotiation.
Although North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap said that the bombing
would have no effect on North Vietnam’s will to resist, the air strikes
continued with unabated fury except for a 3 6 -hour halt during a New
Year's truce arrangement, after which they were renewed.

By January lf>,

1973 > "the President had ordered a halt to the bombing and on January 23,
he announced that a truce had been concluded.
Was this use of military power an impetus for the resumption of,
and even the conclusion to, the Vietnamese-American negotiations?

This

question alone represents an intriguing aspect of international nego
tiation between belligerents.

If the negotiations were resumed as a

result of the American bombing raids, the North Vietnamese could admit
it only with a concomitant loss of face.

Similarly, it would be an

egregious error for Americans to boast that bombing had brought the
North Vietnamese back to the table.

Por his part, Kissinger, in answer

to the question, would say only, "There was a deadlock which was
described in the middle of December, and there was rapid movement when
negotiations resumed.
person for himself."

These facts will have to be analyzed by each
Predictably, Tho insisted that the bombings "failed

completely," actually delayed a settlement and were halted because of
the international outcry against them.

22

22"paris Peace in Nine Chapters," Time, February 9, 1973, P»
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An equally interesting issue of the bombing of North Vietnam
was the ’’disappearance” of the President after the decision to bomb was
made.

He offered no public explanations and kept his personal appear

ances to a minimum during the crisis.

Why?

If he had tried to give the reasons for the breakdown of
the talks, said Kissinger, he would have violated the "confi
dentiality” that had been agreed on. If he had revealed his
conditions for ending the bombing, he would have put Commun
ist prestige at stake. "Therefore the President decided that
if this action succeeded, then the results would speak for
themselves in terms of a settlement."^3
There is a painfully thin line between the President’s duty to respond
to public opinion and his responsibility to help mold it.

Which option

he chooses in a given set of circumstances depends both upon the intri
cacies of the situation and the character of the President involved.
Although no formula can hope to apply to every situation, Morgenthau’s
dictum that the government must be the leader of public opinion and not
its slave seems apropos.^
The inevitable and eternal tension between politics and power,
right and might, self-interest and high purpose— evidenced by the
humanitarian concerns about the bombing of North Vietnam— is a constant
reminder that in the realm of international politics, pat answers are
not to be had.

If we regret that international politics is not a care

free matter, something to be epitomized into a snappy shibboleth, we
must do more than mourn.

’’N
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We must ■understand that no universal

Reappears on the Scene," Time, February 12, 1973> P- 9«

2UMorgenth.au, Politics Among Nations, p. 5>U7» ^ne d-oes no"k
need much imagination, however, to conceive of scenarios in which the
President might be contemptuous of public opinion.
The distinction
between the President's making and following public opinion is of neces
sity blurred and is a persistent problem of democracy.
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prescriptions for the problems of international relations exist.

There

are no formulas certain to cure various international ailments with a
mixture of so much diplomacy on the one hand and so much military power
on the other.
To be sure, military power is no panacea for problems requiring
the craft and competence of the professional diplomat.

At the same

time, we must understand that power, like fire, is evil only with evil
employment.

Admiral Joy's book contains a final chapter entitled "From

This Thorn, These Wounds, These Warnings."

The warnings and the les/

sons of Korea are valuable and can remedy US negotiatory naivete if we
pay them the proper attention.

For those who would fear the mixture of

power and politics and who would seek refuge in any utopian scheme
wherein power does not exist (as in this imperfect world, it must), a
warning, not from Joy, but Matthew (21;:6) — "And you shall hear of wars
and rumours of wars.

See that ye be not troubled.

must come to pass, but the end is not yet."

For these things
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APPENDIX

A

CHRONOLOGY

II4.6
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(The discrepancies among chronologies of the Korean War are
attributable to a lip-hour time difference between Korea and New York
City and disputes in judgment about decisive moments in combat opera
tions. Below is a brief listing of a number of important dates in the
diplo-military history in the Korean War.)

1950
June 25> — North Korean People’s Army crosses 38 th Parallel to invade
South Korea.
June 2^ — UN Security Council calls for cease-fire in Korea and with
drawal of North Korean troops.
June 27 — TIN asks members to go to aid of ROK. President Truman
orders US air and sea units to support South Korea.
June 30 —
July

—

President Truman orders US ground forces committed in Korea.
Pirst US ground troops go into action in Korea.

July 7 — UN creates United Nations Command, under commander appointed
by US.
Aug 1 —
Aug

UN forces in Pusan Perimeter.

—

Pusan Perimeter established and Soviet Delegate Malik calls
Korean fighting an "internal civil war” and demands withdrawal
of "all foreign troops from Korea."

Aug 27 to Sept 15 —

Perimeter battles, heaviest fighting of war.

Sept 15 —

United Nations forces land at Inchon.

Sept 16 —

Breakout from Ptisan Perimeter

Oct 7 —

NS troops begin crossing 38 th Parallel: UN General Assembly
authorizes UN forces to pursue the enemy across the 38 th Paral
lel: UN sanctions defeat of North Korea, reunification of
country.

Oct 16 —

First Chinese Communist troops— the "People's Volunteers"—
secretly enter Korea from Manchuria.

Oct 19 —

Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, captured by UN forces.

Nov 2 I4 —

General Mac Arthur announces "win-the-war" offensive.

Nov 26-27 — Communist forces, now controlled by People's Republic of
China, attack on both fronts; deep penetration around Tokchon
threatens to turn Eighth Army's right flank, in the east 1st
Marine Division flanked and cut off at Chosin Reservoir.

1^8
Dec 23 —

Walker killed; Ridgway takes command of Eighth Army.

1951
Jan 1 —

Communist forces launch all-out offensive against United
Nations; Ridgway begins orderly retreat.

Jan i| —

Seoul again captured by Communists.

1$

—

Enemy offensive halted.

Jan 21

—

General Ridgway issues orders forcounteroffensive.

Jan

March llj —

Seoul recaptured by UN forces for second time.

March 31 — Leading elements of United Nations Command reach 38 th
Parallel.
April 11-llj. — President Truman relieves General MacArthur as Supreme
Commander of UN forces and replaces him with General Ridgway;
Lieutenant General James Van Fleet appointed as commander of
US Eighth Army.
April 22 —
May 3 —
May 21

Chinese Communist forces launch spring offensive.

Enemy offensive halted.
— United Nations Command launches counteroffensive which suc
ceeds in driving enemy north of the 38 th Parallel.

June 23 —

Soviet delegate Malik proposes truce in the Korean War.

June 30 — General Ridgway notifies enemy he is ready to discuss pos
sibility of arranging a cease-fire.
July 10 — Truce talks begin at Kaesong; UN delegation led by US ViceAdmiral Charles Turner Joy, Communist group led by Lieutenant
General Nam II of North Korea.
July 27 —
Aug 5 —

Aug 10 —
Aug 23 —

Negotiators at Kaesong agree on agenda.

HN Command breaks off truce talks on grounds of armed enemy
troops in the neutral area.
Cease-fire talks resumed.
Communists suspend cease-fire talks on grounds of MbombingM
of their delegation at Kaesong.

Aug 31 — HN forces open drive against northern portion of Punch
bowl area, securing their objective on Sept 18.
Oct 25 —

Armistice conference resumed at new site, Panmunjom.

11+9
Oct 28

— Agreement reached on battle line as the line of demarcation.

Nov 12

— Ridgway orders Van Fleet tocease offensive operations and
begin active defense of UN front, thus introducing the stale
mate which lasts until June, 1952.

Nov 26 — Agreement reached on location of battle line, "Little
Armistice" begins next day.
Dec 18

— Prisoner of war lists exchanged by both

sides.

Dec 27

— "Little Armistice" ends but war remains stalemated.

1952
Jan 2 —

United Nations makes proposal on prisoner exchange embodying
the principle of "voluntary repatriation."

Jan 3 —

Communists reject UN proposal in such language as to indicate
the 18 -month deadl ock over voluntary repatriation has been
reached.

April 28 — Admiral Joy presents UN final offer insisting on voluntary
repatriation.
May 7 —

Communist POWs on Koje Island begin riots; General Mark Clark
arrives in Tokyo to succeed Ridgway as Supreme Commander of UN
forces.

May 22 —

Major General William Harrison relieves Admiral Joy as chief
of UN delegation at Panmunjom.

Oct 8 —

United Nations adjourns armistice talks indefinitely until
communists accept its proposal on prisoner exchange or make a
suitable counteroffer.

Nov

b

—

Dwight Eisenhower elected President of the United States.

Nov 17 —
Dec 2 —

India introduces compromise truce plan or United Nations.
President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour in Korea.

Dec 15 — Peiping radio announces Communist China’s formal rejection of
Indian compromise plan.

1953
Feb 2 —

President Eisenhower in first State of the Union message ends
"neutralization" of Formosa Strait.

March 5 —

Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies.

i5o
March

28 —
Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange ofsick
and wounded prisoners of war.

April

20 —
Exchange of sick and wounded prisoners —
Switch" — begun in Korea.

April

26 —

May 7

— Communists accept a UN proposal that prisoners unwilling to be
repatriated be kept in neutral custody in Korea rather than
removed to a neutral nation.

"OperationLittle

Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.

May 25 —

New proposals for ending prisoner deadlock offered at Panmun
jom, but South Korean observer boycotts meetings; beginning of
South Korean President Rhee’s campaign to block the cease-fire
is indicated.

June 8 —

Agreement reached on prisoner of war issue.

June 9 — South Korean National Assembly unanimously rejects truce
terms.
June ll| — Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years at ROK
troops in eastern sector.
June 18 — On orders of President Rhee approximately 27,000 North
Korean prisoners are freed and returned to civilian life in
South Korea.
June 20 — Communists accuse UN Command of complicity in freeing of
prisoners; suspend truce talks.
June 23 —

President Rhee reiterates opposition to truce terms.

July 11 —

Rhee announces he will no longer oppose truce terms.

July 13 — Communists launch even larger offensive than June 12+ assault
against ROK troops.
July 27 —
Aug 5 —

Cease-fire agreement signed, Korean War ends.

Exchange of prisoners —
Panmunjom.

"Operation Big Switch" —

begins at
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